

**Mapping Peacekeeping or Peace-building as Priority Action by the United Nations.
Africa as a Case Study (1999- 2008)**

by

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List of Abbreviations or Symbols

AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
APC	All Peoples Congress
AU	African Union
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BONUCA	The UN Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic
CAR	Central African Republic
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EUFOR	European Union-led military force
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MISAB	The Inter-African Commission to Monitor Implementation of the Bangui Accords
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non- Governmental Organizations
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
RUF	Revolutionary United Front

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ABSTRACT

Post Cold War era witnessed decisive upward trend in conflicts in Africa where intra-state wars and political unrest dominated the African continent. Studies have shown that about half of all post-conflict countries relapse into conflict within a decade. This percentage suggests that there are major deficiencies in the preventive actions taken by local and/ or international actors. The thesis investigates this reality in Africa and attempts to establish a framework for action through analysing the existing gaps in Burundi, Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic; where the United Nations was involved in post conflict peacekeeping and peace-building measurements for conflict prevention.

This thesis has two main hypotheses drawing a positive correlation between peacekeeping and conflict prevention in post conflict African countries and positive correlation between peace-building and conflict prevention in post conflict African countries. These two hypotheses were studied through addressing the following questions: 1) What do peace-building and peacekeeping encompass; 2) To what extent have United Nations peace-building and peacekeeping efforts succeeded in establishing durable non-conflict zones in the countries where peacekeeping missions were deployed. 3) Clarify the conceptual as well as the operational aspects of the United Nations Peacekeeping and peace-building initiatives.

This thesis used descriptive critical analysis and concluded by giving more emphasize on UN post conflict peace-building over peacekeeping recommending to have long term peace-building as the

main approach to conflict prevention in post conflict countries while integrating short term peacekeeping to leverage the peace-building efforts when needed. The thesis also provided a comprehensive analysis to the conceptual framework of UN post conflict peacekeeping and peace-building and elaborated on its finding through formulating distinct definitions for the terms- post conflict peacekeeping and peace-building.

Introduction:

Conflict Prevention remains one of the dominant and highest aims of the United Nations. The term and its applications have evolved over the years to adapt to the changes of the international system and the nature of world conflicts and politics, but most importantly, to adapt to a much needed international mechanism which provides a collective action and channels international diplomacy. The practice of UN peace-building and peacekeeping witnessed major changes that subjected the efforts to trial and error exercises. UN work was experimental, and this conviction has resumed labelling UN interventions at times by catastrophic, chaotic and unsystematic.

New models were brought to widen the scope of UN role from a reactor to preventer of conflicts, from a mediator and direct diplomacy actor to a soldier at times, and a humanitarian agent at other times. The progression of the mandate encompassed numerous actors and different names, among which African Union (AU), the former Organization of African Unity (OAU)¹, the Economic Community Of West African States (ECWAS) and, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in the African continent in addition to non- African actors such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union to name few. Over the past decade, a new approach was adopted and introduced development, human rights, rule of law, good governance, elections, building democracies, national

¹ The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963. It was disbanded on 9 July 2002 by its last chairperson, South African President Thabo Mbeki, and replaced by the African Union (AU).

reconciliation, institutionalization, Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration of ex-combatants, control of small arms and other measures as the new way to establish conflict prevention and peace-building. Conflict prevention in post conflict countries gained even more attention by the United Nations through successive UN Secretary General's and the Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group reports on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa.

Africa- Specific Delineations:

The African Continent had a great impact on shaping the limitations and possibilities of UN operational and doctrinal framework in conflict prevention². UN efforts attempted to mobilize massive international community's actions in Africa, but attempts by the international society to intervene at the right time using effective tools and mechanisms have not always succeeded in preventing the post conflict countries from going back into the cycle of violence. Numerous attempts have channelled international society's efforts to establish a robust framework for conflict prevention through focusing on peacekeeping or/ and peace-building actions. In formulating a consolidated approach to address peace and security in Africa, the UN voiced the international society's call stressing that the responsibility for peace and security in Africa, including the capacity to address the root causes of conflict and to resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner, lies primarily with African countries, while recognizing the need for support from the international community. The UN also

² Neethling, Theo, (2004), International Peacekeeping Trends: The Significance of African Contributions to African Peacekeeping Requirements, **South African Journal of Political Studies**, Carfax Publishing,

voiced the necessity of enhancing African peacekeeping capacities as a priority action from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Overall, the UN has been involved in 63 Peacekeeping operations. Currently, there are 16 UN peacekeeping operations, 7 of which are deployed in Africa, 1 in the Americas, 2 in Asia and Pacific, 3 in Europe and 3 in the Middle East. Africa had the largest share of past Peacekeeping Operations as well with a total 18 operations counting for %38 of all operations. In January 2009, the total number of personnel serving in 16 peacekeeping operations amounted 111,271.³

As for UN formal peace-building offices, at present the UN Department of Political Affairs supervises three Offices, currently active in Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic and Sierra Leone –all African countries- aiming to help nations consolidate peace through comprehensive peace-building strategies⁴.

Despite all efforts, there is still lack of clarity to which degree UN plans and actions have had direct impact on the ground and the voices calling for a bigger role in Africa have not always succeeded in motivating action by the international community. This thesis intends to contribute to the collective scholarly and practical knowledge gained over the past couple of decades on United Nations evolved role in conflict prevention in post conflict context with a concentration on Africa.

³ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations website (2009). Retrieved in March 2009 from: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>

⁴ United Nations Department of Political Affairs website (2009). Retrieved in June 2009 from : <http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/>

Hypotheses and Questions of the thesis:

This thesis has two main hypotheses drawing a positive correlation between peacekeeping and conflict prevention in post conflict Africa countries and positive correlation between peace-building and conflict prevention in post conflict in African countries.

These two hypotheses will be studied through addressing the following questions:

- 1) What do peace-building and peacekeeping encompass;
- 2) To what extent have United Nations peace-building and peacekeeping efforts succeeded in establishing durable non-conflict zones in the African countries where peacekeeping missions were deployed.

Effectiveness, though has been a key element in the assessment, monitoring and evaluation, but has been so far, diluted in terms of being insufficient in providing measurable indicators. As such, the thesis will attempt to:

- 3) Clarify the conceptual as well as the operational aspects of the United Nations Peacekeeping and peace-building initiatives through analysing their relevance, coherence and priority.

Through this analysis, and as a conclusion, the thesis endeavours to analyse the effectiveness of the UN measures and priority of action in Africa. The thesis attempts to come up with recommendation for a new or enhanced conflict prevention measures of peacekeeping and peace-building applicable to African countries.

Importance of the Thesis:

Today, there are around 35 million conflict survivors in the world, 10 million refugees and 25 million internally displaced person⁵. Africa has the largest share of world impact. Regional and international spill over effects of conflicts in addition to international society concerns from terrorism and conflict overstretch have further validated the urgency to react to crises and conflicts beyond national borders. As such, the world came about to acknowledge the benefits of conflict prevention and the costs associated with post conflict recovery, where reality provides that the political, humanitarian, economic and social costs associated with conflicts prevention are much lower than post conflict recovery costs. The UN reaction with regards to the former is contested throughout the paper, where the trend in UN reaction to conflicts in Africa has varied over the past few decades. The UN repeated failures and difficulties in Africa have contested the view of cost- benefit analysis of conflict prevention in Africa through UN post conflict peacekeeping and peace-building; ultimately leading to the conviction that the "costs and other challenges associated with peacekeeping in Africa simply outweigh the altruism of contributing to peacekeeping in Africa"⁶.

The UN "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine holds another counter argument addressing the need to mobilize international community to react to conflicts. The doctrine which was adopted in the UN General Assembly in 2005 by world leaders,

⁵ UNDP, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery website. Retrieved in March 2009 from <http://www.undp.org/cpr/>

⁶ Ibid, Neethling, Theo (2004)

acknowledged international community's responsibility to protect the most vulnerable groups from wars and conflicts⁷. The United Nations came about as a key player in manifesting the international community's efforts under this doctrine in many parts of the world, including in Africa. Among other measures, the doctrine was coupled with the call for the establishment of the UN Peace-building Commission to help countries transition from war to peace.

Studies have shown that about half of all post-conflict countries relapse into conflict within a decade⁸. This percentage suggests that there are major deficiencies in the preventive actions taken by local or international actors. The thesis will investigate this reality and will attempt to establish a framework for action through analysing the existing gaps in current cases where the United Nations is involved and the peacekeeping and peace-building measurements put in place for conflict prevention. The thesis concentrates on most current post conflict cases in the past decade (1999-2008) with direct UN systematic involvement. The covered period was carefully chosen as year 1999 marked the turning point in UN intervention in Africa following the Security Council statement (Ref. S/PRST/1999/34) on 30 November 1999 whereby the Security Council recognized that early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, preventive disarmament and post-conflict peace-building are

⁷ Evans, Gareth (2008), The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come ... and Gone, **International Relations**, 2008; 22; 283

⁸ Collier, Paul (2004), Development and Conflict, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University. Retrieved in September 2009 from : <http://www.un.org/esa/documents/Development.and.Conflict2.pdf> and in Bigombe, Betty, Collier, Paul and Sambanis, Nicholas (2000), Policies for Bulding Post Conflict Peace, **Journal of African Economies**, Vol.9, No. 3, Center for the Study of African Economies

interdependent and complementary components of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy. The Council also emphasized in this statement its continuing commitment to addressing the prevention of armed conflicts in all regions of the world.

Notwithstanding the latter, the researcher will revert to longer period during course of research as needed.

Objectives of the Thesis:

The thesis aims at providing an assessment to United Nations conflict prevention and peacemaking measures in countries emerging from conflict, mainly (Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Central African Republic); and will assess the existing mechanisms put in place to achieve peace. The thesis attempts to provide a clear differentiation between UN post conflict peace-building and peacekeeping. Where these two terms have been extensively used synonymously in the past, the thesis will attempt to come up with accurate definitions and to study the linkages between them and conflict prevention priority actions in addition to study the applicability and necessity of peacekeeping vs. peace-building in achieving durable and sustainable peace and security in post conflict countries.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework:

Peacekeeping and Peace-building are not particularly theorized topics. Though there is no clear reference to when did the literature on conflict prevention through peace-building and peacekeeping emerge, but it is obvious that the topic gained wider

attention from scholars but mostly politicians, diplomats and practitioners following the end of the Cold War and the emerging importance of conflict prevention. With the absence of theorizing peacekeeping and peace-building, case studies, descriptive analysis and definition attempts dominated the literature. In part, this was acceptable as it was hard to divorce any theory from the peacekeeping and peace-building practice. But this had its shortcomings in failure to adapt to commonalities of analysis and building on refinement of existing conceptual frameworks on one hand, and led to more emphasis on explaining mainly theories of conflict resolution and conflict management when attempting to place peacekeeping and peace-building within a theoretical framework to escape the necessity to elaborate a separate coherent theory for peacekeeping and peace-building on the other hand. This is considered partly justified; as the application of the peacekeeping and peace-building has not been consistent or static but witnessed dramatic evolution that resulted in confusion of the definitions at times and widening of the grey area shared by the two concepts to an extent that made it less interesting to attempt to separate between them at other times. The rapid evolution and inconsistencies associated with the application of these two measures on the ground have had direct impact on the absence of theorizing initiatives. The attempt to find the theoretical framework of peace-building and peacekeeping through conflict resolution and conflict management theories was present in literature but is challenged by evidence of realities that peacekeeping and peace-building did not -in their entirety- produce sustainable peace, and though linkages existed, but did not result in conflict resolution nor conflict prevention, and

in some cases even caused negative impact on the conflict situation- demonstrations proving the former logic are examined throughout the thesis.

Writers that argued that bases for theorizing are in fact found in conflict management theories⁹ are also contested because the political dimension of peacekeeping missions was not the main focus in the majority of cases, especially since deployments normally follow the negotiations and mediation efforts in addition to peace agreements, and do not take place before.

Notwithstanding the former, roots of theorizing the two concepts are bound to be found in conflict resolution, conflict management and numerous other theories. This thesis does not aim at developing a new theory or contest the relevance of existing ones with regards to peacekeeping and peace-building practices. This thesis marries between theory and practice, and attempts -in part- to scope peacekeeping and peace-building under a conflict prevention lens; as such it emphasizes the peacekeeping and peace-building in post conflict countries with the ultimate aim of preventing the relapse into conflicts.

The United Nations efforts were highlighted to a large extent during Kofi Anan tenure at the United Nations Secretariat as the UN Secretary General (1997- 2006). UN official conferences and meetings at both the Security Council and General Assembly levels produced lavish source of information and documentation on the subject matter which assisted in the production of literature.

⁹ Fetherston, A B (2000), Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peace-building: A reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks. In Woodhouse, Tom and Ramsbotham, Oliver, **Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution**, Issue 1, UK, Frank Cass Publishers

1. Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, by Michael W. Doyle, Nicholas Sambanis (2006)¹⁰

The authors examine how well United Nations peacekeeping operations work in post civil war context. The book statistically analyzes civil wars since 1945, and book compares peace processes that had UN involvement to those that didn't. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that each mission must be designed to fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new actors committed to the peace, building governing institutions, and monitoring and policing implementation of peace settlements. But the UN is not good at intervening in ongoing wars. If the conflict is controlled by spoilers or if the parties are not ready to make peace, the UN cannot play an effective enforcement role. It can, in the researchers view pint, offer its technical expertise in multidimensional peacekeeping operations that follow enforcement missions undertaken by states or regional organizations such as NATO. Finding that UN missions are most effective in the first few years after the end of war, and that economic development is the best way to decrease the risk of new fighting in the long run, the authors also argue that the UN's role in launching development projects after civil war should be expanded.

2. Short-term and long-term effects of United Nations peace operations by Nicholas Sambanis (2007)¹¹

¹⁰ Doyle, Michael and Sambanis, Nicholas (2006), **Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations**, Princeton University Press, USA

The paper outlines that earlier studies have shown that United Nations peace operations make a positive contribution to peace-building efforts after civil wars. Sambanis tackles the following questions in his paper 1) do the UN effects carry over to the period after the peacekeepers leave? 2) And how do the effects of UN peace operations interact with other determinants of peace-building in the long run? Sambanis addresses these questions using a revised version of the Doyle and Sambanis dataset and by applying different estimation methods to estimate the short-term and long-term effects of UN peace missions. The paper concludes that UN missions have robust, positive effects on peace-building in the short term and that UN missions can help parties implement peace agreements, but the UN cannot fight wars and UN operations contribute more to the quality of the peace, where peace is based on participation, than to the longevity of the peace, where peace is simply the absence of war. The effects of UN missions are also felt in the long run, but they dissipate over time. Sambanis also concludes that what is missing in UN peace-building is a strategy to foster the self-sustaining economic growth that could connect increased participation with sustainable peace.

3. Constructing the Stable State: Goals for Intervention and Peace-building By

Kathleen Hill Hawk (2002)¹²

Hawk addressed the issue of international community's intervention in a number of internal conflicts throughout the 1990s, generally on humanitarian grounds. The

¹¹ Sambanis, Nicholas (2007), **Short-term and long-term effects of United Nations peace operations**, World Bank document WPS4207, Post-Conflict Transitions Working Paper No. 11

¹² Hawk, Kathleen Hill (2002), **Constructing the Stable State: Goals for Intervention and Peace-building**, Praeger Publishers, USA

research illustrates how in most cases, the external military intervention largely halted the fighting and allowed humanitarian assistance to be distributed. However, as Hawk makes clear, simply halting the fighting has not allowed these countries to create stable governments and harmonious societies. This research assumes that if external actors--foreign governments, international organizations, and private groups--can not figure out how to lay a foundation for a stable, longer-term peace, there will be decreasing support for international intervention and peacekeeping/peace-building missions in the future. Although external actors have undertaken many activities in the aftermath of a military intervention in an attempt to consolidate peace, sufficient attention has not been paid to (re)constructing the state as a capable, effective, and legitimate entity. While (re)constructing the state is only a portion of what needs to be done to bring about a stable, long-term peace, it provides a necessary foundation upon which to structure the other activities. Through her examination of external actions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, Hawk draws 23 lessons, nine of which are applicable to interventions in general and the remaining 14 specific to state building efforts.

4. Twenty-first-century Peace Operations by William J. Durch (2006)¹³

The author argues that in the new century, a rising proportion of the world's societal wars are ending not in victory for one side but in stalemate and negotiated peace, outside military intervention, or both, as events in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, and Sierra Leone proved. Additionally, a rising number of

¹³ Durch, William J. (editor) (2006), **Twenty-first-century Peace Operations**, United States Institute for Peace, USA

soldiers, police officers, and other personnel from the international community have helped war-damaged countries regain their footing through peace operations run by the United Nations, NATO, and other organizations. After ten years of sustained effort, what has been accomplished and what lessons have been learned? The research addresses these questions through focused, structured case studies of operations in the above three countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kosovo. The focus of the research is on how peace operations work and why they succeed, fail, drift, or recover. The authors provide guidance for future operations, anticipating how international peace support, its objectives, and its participants may change in the future.

This thesis contributes to the literature developed over the past two decades or so; which concentrated on conflict prevention measures in general terms and covered individual countries at times, and at other times did not state geographic limitations. This thesis differs from the abovementioned work in 1) the focus of the thesis on Africa, 2) the thesis also differs in not limiting the research to UN intervention to civil war conflicts 3) the thesis covered specific period 1999- 2008 4) the thesis differentiate between peacekeeping and peace-building , 5) the thesis focuses on current post conflict cases and absent the longevity of UN intervention and finally 6) the current thesis concentrates on conflict prevention measures presented in peace-building and peacekeeping efforts in post conflict settings.

Research Methods:

This thesis will depend mainly on descriptive critical analysis but will also resort to statistical data to a minor extent, in addition to content analysis for purposes of comparisons and correlations. This thesis will cover United Nations Peacekeeping and Peace-building interventions in African countries in post conflict situation and will focus on three main cases: Burundi, Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic. These three countries were chosen as they are currently on the agenda of the United Nations Peace-building Commission and they have/ had peacekeeping as well as peace-building missions in them¹⁴.

Tools of this thesis will focus on secondary resources. The researcher will depend on international academic journals, various United Nations publications, reports and Security Council resolutions, internet websites and books.

¹⁴ The Peace-building Commission is an intergovernmental advisory body of the United Nations established in 20 December 2005 following the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions 60/180 and resolution 1645 (2005). These resolutions mandated the Commission to support peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict.

Chapter One:

Conceptual Framework



Figure No. 1: Security Council Meets on African Union Peacekeeping on 26 October 2009. www.un.org

Chapter One: Conceptual Framework:

In this thesis, peacekeeping and peace-building are analyzed from a conflict prevention point of view in post conflict countries. In order to analyse the conceptual definitions of the two terms, it is useful to recite common practices and stages associated with the terms, especially "Conflict", "Post Conflict" and "Conflict Prevention" in addition to answering the questions of "How" and "When".

Beginning with the "When" question; there are no fixed set of conflict stages and scholars vary in terms of depicting number of the stages, emphasis and/ or titles given to each stage. Among the sets we find the following list by Eric Brahm¹⁵:

1. No conflict
2. Latent conflict
3. Emergence
4. Escalation
5. (Hurting) Stalemate
6. De-Escalation
7. Settlement/Resolution
8. Post-Conflict Peace-building and Reconciliation

Conflict prevention is normally seen from three angles; 1) to prevent disputes arising between states or between governments and minority parties (political groups, rebels,

¹⁵ Brahm, Eric. (2003), Conflict Stages. Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Retrieved on September 2009 from: <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict_stages/>.

armed groups...etc) within states; 2) to prevent an existing disputes from being transformed into an open conflict; and 3) if a conflict breaks out, to ensure that it spreads as little as possible¹⁶. This thesis looks at a fourth angel in conflict prevention that has to do with preventing conflicts from re-emerging and as such; focuses on this particular phase of conflict cycle where conflicts have reached stages 7 and/ or 8. UN peace interventions accompanied by peacekeeping operations, in particular, have normally occurred within these two stages (7 and/ or 8) which could begin with a wide array of peace processes and conflict resolution mechanisms. The institutionalized UN peace-building on its part focuses on supporting peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict in accordance with the mandate of the UN peace-building commission which also places peace-building within the parameters of stages 7 and 8. Despite the placing of peace-building under the said stages, but peace-building is an undertaking which can be incorporated before, during and post conflicts. The main difference is that more political emphasis is integrated within the post conflict peace-building practice as will be elaborated later.

In African conflicts which the UN was engaged in; reaching conflict prevention throughout these stages normally involved reaching a peace agreement between the conflicting parties. This was the signal to the UN which is called thereafter to monitor the agreement and keep the peace. To that end, peacekeepers are deployed within a peacekeeping mission which normally includes military observers. The evolving role of peacekeeping from traditional to multi-dimensional; established a duality of roles

¹⁶ Bedjaoui, Mohammed (2000), The Fundamentals of Preventive Diplomacy. In the **Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping wars before they start**, edited by Kevin Cahill, Routledge and The Center for International Health and Cooperation

for peacekeepers who were progressively tasked to undertake peace-building assignments. Whether this practice is optimal is analysed throughout this thesis in terms of assessing the efficacy of the timing of the UN peace efforts in addition to successes or failures incurred. Similarly, peace-building efforts are incorporated through ad-hoc UN agencies various interventions or recently more systematically through a mandate from the Security Council; the top of UN pyramid. In some instances, the two practices of peacekeeping and peace-building are intertwined.

The context of UN peace efforts have widened tremendously over the years and most recently, it became unclear how to distinguish between UN peace activities including peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Part of the reason was the fact that the UN has increasingly assumed all mentioned roles and at many times, the UN engagement was a mix of all four activities simultaneously. Another reason could be the unclear mandates of the peace missions and interventions on the one hand, and the broader approach that the UN has adopted in addressing conflict prevention issues on the other hand. These reasons and others are elaborated in the following sections focusing on scoping UN peacekeeping and peace-building in post conflict African countries in both conceptual and practical frameworks.

Peacekeeping:

UN Peacekeeping as a function is not explicitly mentioned in the UN charter. It is a main tool of the UN Security Council and has traditionally been associated with Chapter VI of the Charter (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and more recently with

Chapter VII (Action With Respect To Threats To The Peace, Breaches Of The Peace, And Acts Of Aggression)¹⁷. Ambiguity accompanied the evolution of the concept and its practicalities ever since the establishment of the first peacekeeping mission. The peacekeeping began as early as 1948 with the deployment of military observers in the Middle East. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) military observers remain till this day in the Middle East to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region.

The traditional tasks of peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council include the following¹⁸:

- Observation, monitoring and reporting – using static posts, patrols, over-flights or other technical means, with the agreement of the parties;
- Supervision of cease-fire and support to verification mechanisms;
- Interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measure.

The traditional peacekeeping operations focused on the above pillars and did not have a direct or effective political role in resolving conflicts. The first peacekeeping deployment (UNSTO) is a case in point.

The nature of the mandate and roles that the peacekeeping operations assumed changed dramatically over the years. The reason behind that varies and can be attributed to some extent to the change of the international order and nature of

¹⁷ UN Charter can be found on the following web-link: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml>

¹⁸ United Nations (2008), **United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines**, United Nations Publications, USA. Retrieved in March 2009 from: http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf

conflicts. The change was inevitable, but was unplanned at best as 1956 – almost a decade following the deployment of the first peacekeeping operations- marked the precedence of allowing the peacekeepers to hold arms for self defence. Another consideration to be made when analysing the evolution of the peacekeeping operations is the inadequacy of the UN peacekeeping operations in dealing with complex security and peace operations demonstrated in full strength in Congo (1960-1964). United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was established in July 1960 to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries. ONUC marked a milestone in the history of United Nations peacekeeping in terms of the responsibilities it had to assume, the size of its area of operation and the manpower involved. It included, in addition to a peacekeeping force which consisted of approximately 20,000 persons at its peak strength, an important Civilian Operations component. ONUC was led by the force of circumstances in a chaotic and highly unstable internal situation of extreme complexity and had to assume responsibilities which went beyond normal peacekeeping duties. The Force was mandated to protect the Congo from outside

interference, particularly by evacuating foreign mercenaries and preventing clashes and civil strife, by force if necessary as a last resort.¹⁹

Despite the creation of several UN peacekeeping operations in the 1940s and 1950s, but UN Peacekeeping did not gain its official status until 1965 when the UN General Assembly established the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The Special Committee was tasked to conduct a comprehensive review of all issues relating to peacekeeping; which gave UN Peacekeeping further legitimization and a kind of formal institutional framework.

During the Cold War years, the conflicts were mainly between states and the UN peacekeeping operations were deployed to monitor ceasefire agreements and were considered as interim measure filling the security gap during negotiations on a political level leading to sustainable peace between the conflicting parties. The end of the Cold War brought with it a reconfiguration of the approach of the Security Council in addressing conflicts and promoting for peaceful conflict resolution as a reflection to the emerging trend in intra-state armed conflicts. As opposed to fighting between organized regular armies, main conflicting parties in intrastate conflicts were militias and armed groups and involved weak or no common command. Another feature of post Cold War conflicts was the collapse of state institutions, state failure at large; especially the police, judiciary, breakdown of law and order, and general chaos which made civilians the main victims. As such, Peacekeeping became more complex and more expensive, and failures incurred became more frequent. Peacekeeping

¹⁹ United Nations Resolutions (143, 145, 146 (1960) and 161, 169 (1961)). retrieved in August 2009 from: <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucRS.htm>

missions were required to rid themselves from traditional peacekeeping and come about as multi-dimensional but without clarity, guidance or formalization of the new emerging tasks.

Another reason for the change in nature of peacekeeping operations in post Cold War era was the dissolving of ideological tension between the West and the former Soviet Union where the international society at large found its way to general consensus and commitment to world peace and security. This gave larger freedom for the international society to come together under the UN flagship to maintain world peace; the thing that had its direct impact in unleashing the role of UN peacekeeping.

Another milestone in the evolving role of the UN Peacekeeping was evidenced in 1992, when the Security Council invited the UN Secretary General (Boutros Ghali) to prepare an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping"²⁰. In his report "An Agenda for Peace", the UN Secretary General outlined that with the end of the Cold War, the aim is to "stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;" and "Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements

²⁰ United Nations (1992), **Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, An Agenda for Peace, Prevention Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping**, doc no. A/47/277 - S/24111

achieved by the peacemakers". The report also gave an explicit definition to Peacekeeping; "Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace".²¹ The definition was pervasive, controversial and widened the grey area between the prevention of conflict and the making of peace terms; conceptually and operationally.

The Report also elaborated on the conceptual framework on the "Use of military force" in which the report stipulates that it is the essence of the concept of collective security as contained in the Charter that if peaceful means fail, the measures provided in Chapter VII should be used, on the decision of the Security Council, to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression". The Secretary General acknowledges in his report the limitations of UN Peacekeeping through underscoring the reality that forces under Article 43 of the Charter may never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons; but that they would be useful in meeting threats posed by a weaker military force²².

²¹ Ibid, United Nations (1992)

²² Article 43 of the Charter states:

1. *All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.*

The report served in many ways as a spring board that unleashed the potentials of peacekeeping operations which may be regarded both as a positive thing and a bad thing. Though it gave much needed border lines in effecting peacekeeping but these borders were indefinite and inconclusive and as such, did not bind peace operations to specific set of purposes consistent with the traditional terms of reference of the peacekeeping operations, hence widening the grey area of defining peacekeeping, peace-building, peacemaking, peace enforcement and conflict prevention. This was evidenced drastically on the ground, where the "Agenda for Peace" and progressive UN Security Council Resolutions did not guide the peacekeeping operations with much effectiveness in Somalia and Rwanda in the post Cold War in early nineties and the UN peacekeeping operations failed to prevent or effectively respond to genocides and escalated conflicts leading to the deployment of peacekeepers under a NATO or other organizational umbrella. The UN Peacekeeping operations, in fact, were unable to effectively implement the mandates included in the Security Council Resolutions. The failures incurred in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s also led to accusations that the UN is unable to act in accordance with the ideals it espoused²³. These problems and others were brought to the fore when the General Assembly in February 1999 called for including in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session

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2. *Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.*
 3. *The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.*

²³ Lipson, Micael (2007), Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy, **European Journal of International Relations**, Sage Publications, Vol. 13(1): 5–34/ 2007

the item entitled “Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects”. The continuous and progressive critique on the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the 1990s was accompanied with a trend in decreased overall number of deployed troops and reduced peacekeeping budgets in late nineties though surprisingly produced a rising voice of the international society calling for more presence, larger empowerment and fundamental widening of the scope of peacekeeping operations²⁴.

Table No.1: Complete List of Peacekeeping Operations (1948-2009)

Mission name	Start date	Closing date
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	May 1948	Present
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	January 1949	Present
First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)	November 1956	June 1967
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	June 1958	December 1958
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	July 1960	June 1964
United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF)	October 1962	April 1963
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)	July 1963	September 1964
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	March 1964	Present
Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	May 1965	October 1966
United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)	September 1965	March 1966
Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)	October 1973	July 1979
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	June 1974	Present
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	March 1978	Present
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	May 1988	March 1990
United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG)	August 1988	February 1991
United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)	January 1989	June 1991
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	April 1989	March 1990
United Nations Observer Group in Central America	November 1989	January 1992

²⁴ United Nations (1999), **Report of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects**, Report No. A/54/87 June 1999

(ONUCA)		
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)	April 1991	October 2003
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	April 1991	present
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	June 1991	February 1995
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	July 1991	April 1995
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)	October 1991	March 1992
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	February 1992	March 1995
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	March 1992	September 1993
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)	April 1992	March 1993
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	December 1992	December 1994
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	March 1993	March 1995
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)	June 1993	September 1994
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)	August 1993	June 2009
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	September 1993	September 1997
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)	September 1993	June 1996
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	October 1993	March 1996
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)	May 1994	June 1994
United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)	December 1994	May 2000
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)	February 1995	June 1997
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO)	May 1995	January 1996
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)	March 1995	February 1999
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)	December 1995	December 2002
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)	January 1996	January 1998
United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)	January 1996	December 2002
United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)	July 1996	July 1997
United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)	January 1997	May 1997
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)	June 1997	February 1999
United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)	August 1997	December 1997
United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)	December 1997	March 2000
UN Civilian Police Support Group	January 1998	October 1998
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	April 1998	February 2000
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)	July 1998	October 1999
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	June 1999	Present
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	October 1999	December 2005
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	October 1999	May 2002
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	November 1999	Present
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	July 2000	July 2008
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)	May 2002	May 2005
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	September 2003	Present
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	April 2004	Present

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	June 2004	Present
United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	June 2004	December 2006
United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	March 2005	Present
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	August 2006	Present
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	July 2007	Present
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)	September 2007	Present

The above table reveals a huge increase in the number of peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War. Where there were only 15 peacekeeping operations between 1948 and 1988, the number jumped to 37 during the period 1989- 1999. The change was not only in number but the intensity of the wars, the number of fatalities in addition to the increase in complexity of the operations deployed where it went beyond mere monitoring of cease fire agreements. Through further analysing the trend in the above table, we also note the distinct phases which peacekeeping has gone after the initial start up stage following the end of World War II. The phases alternated between expansion periods and periods of inactivity/ contraction, mainly as a result of political tension prevailing in the Cold War. This was followed by an expansion period which was proven to be over ambitious in conceptualizing UN peacekeeping role; ultimately resulting in shocking failures in the 1990s (such as in Somalia, Mozambique, Liberia, Congo and Rwanda) and leading to an inactivity period but alternating with active engagement.

The UN peacekeeping role evolved over time and more recently, the Security Council Resolutions deviated from acting under Chapter VI and acted more and more under Chapter VII of the UN charter (Action With Respect To Threats to the Peace,

Breaches Of The Peace, And Acts Of Aggression) to deploy the peacekeeping troops and by mid 2008, over 80% of the troops and police deployed in UN-led operations functioned under mandates that invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter (the enforcement chapter).

For example, in UN Security Council Resolution 1289 (2000), "Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations", the Security Council decided to expand the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) military component and the peacekeeping Mission was mandated to provide security at key locations, Government buildings and disarmament demobilization and reintegration sites in addition to coordinate with and assist the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities among other tasks. The successive resolutions on Sierra Leone during the deployment of peacekeeping operations in war years (1990s and early 2000s) reiterated that the situation in Sierra Leone continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.

Security Council Resolutions mandating peacekeeping operations differ from one case to another but have general communalities and are unified in ground bases and principles. It is well understood that the matter on the Security Council agenda of discussion should constitute threat to international peace and security.

Peacekeeping operations are normally deployed to support and monitor the implementation of peace agreements (such as cease fire agreements). Peacekeeping operations have become more diverse and "multidimensional" with a new approach to peacekeeping that includes a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities

addressing both traditional peacekeeping measures in addition to peace-building efforts. In addition to its traditional role, the core functions of the multidimensional United Nations Peacekeeping operation include, among others, creating a secure and stable environment, security sector reform, promoting effective dialogue and reconciliation, strengthening good governance. What can be noticed is the emerging key task which the Security Council frequently mandate peacekeeping operations with which is protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The UN peacekeeping operations have had lower rates of success in effectively addressing the international community and Security Council's responsibility to protect civilians during conflicts and even in post conflict situations.

On 7 March 2000, and following over five decades of peacekeepers and 53 mandated peacekeeping operations throughout the world, the UN Secretary General (Kofi Annan) convened a high-level Panel to undertake a thorough review of the United Nations peace operations, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations for ways in which to enhance that capacity. The report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to the Secretary-General to be later called the "Brahimi report"²⁵ -named after Lakhdar Brahimi who was the chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations- which was submitted in August 2000, represented the first systematic and comprehensive work to assess UN peacekeeping efforts and technical problems impeding its proper functioning. It underlined that

²⁵ United Nations (2000), **Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations**. Retrieved in June 2009 from: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/

there are many tasks that the Peacekeeping forces should not do, but identified peace-building as an important element for the success of complex operations and acknowledged that peace-building is an integral to the success of peacekeeping operations. The panel's recommendations for a more effective peacekeeping necessitated the incapacitation of peacekeeping operations to fulfill their mandates including protecting the troops and civilians through allowing ripostes to respond to deadly fire and not being forced to cede to attackers.

Defining UN post conflict peacekeeping

The evolution of UN peace operations dictated the need for a comprehensive peacekeeping strategy or approach²⁶ which did not materialize until recently. More recently, the Capstone Doctrine became one of the main references for peacekeeping operations. In 2008, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support published a Capstone Doctrine embedded document addressing principles and guidelines for peacekeeping operations outlining evolving role of peacekeeping operations to multi-dimensional nature with the following core functions²⁷:

- a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;

²⁶ Ahmed, Salman, Keating, Paul and Solinas, Ugo (2007), Shaping the future of UN peace operations: is there a doctrine in the house?, **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, Volume 20, Number 1, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group

²⁷ Ibid, United Nations (2008)

- b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
- c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

In addition to monitoring and observing cease-fire agreements, the document outlines other functions of multidimensional peacekeeping operations that include providing support to national enforcement agencies; providing security at key sites, protecting civilians, ensure freedom of mobility of people and humanitarian assistance in addition to assisting in the area of mine action. One of the landmark evolutions was the new political role that the operations assumed especially in providing good offices. Despite the renewed scoping of peacekeeping, the main restriction on peacekeeping is found in the prerequisite of consensual operation. This not only resulted in many limitations to creating new missions in conflict zones but also restrained existing missions especially in case of agreements breach.

As mentioned before, the conceptualization efforts were mainly led by practitioners rather than scholars which resulted in under theorization and focusing on descriptive literature rather than pure analysis of the concept and its applications. Below is an in-exhaustive list of definitions for UN peacekeeping that include both UN and scholarly definitions:

UN Peacekeeping: "...activated with the consent of the parties concerned and it involves deployment of international military personnel in an integrated command with civilian elements, all acting under the authority of the Organization, in order to stop or avert fighting or help facilitate or implement a settlement without resort to offensive use of force".²⁸

Peacekeeping involves the positioning of UN military troops in an area of combat of two or more conflicting parties to achieve the following:

- end ongoing conflicts
- prevent conflicts
- monitor adherence to ceasefire agreements
- supervise withdrawal of troops to territorial lines identified prior to conflict

Peacekeeping (according to Capstone Doctrine): "is one among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations and other international actors to maintain international peace and security throughout the world". It "is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a

²⁸ Former Secretary General, Javier Perez De Cuellar, cited in Report on the Work of the Organization, 1990 (New York: United Nations, 1990), p.14

complex model of many elements- military, police and civilian- working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace"²⁹.

Peacekeeping: hybrid politico-military activity aimed at conflict control, which involves a United Nations presence in the field (usually involving military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces etc.), and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief³⁰.

"**Peacekeeping** missions typically have immediate or at best short-term objectives, such as: stop the hostilities; protect the civilian population; demobilize combatants; restore State authority; relaunch democratic governance processes; and organize multiparty elections"³¹.

²⁹ Ibid, United Nations (2008)

³⁰ United Nations, United Nations Glossary of terms. Retrieved in November 2009 from: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary/p.htm>

³¹ Grey-Johnson, Crispin (2006), Beyond Peacekeeping. The Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace-building in Africa, UN Chronicle Online Edition. Retrieved in March 2009 from: <http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2006/issue1/0106p08.htm#>

UN Peacekeeping: "is considered a meaningful, if not the most visible, activity of the United Nations since its early years towards achieving the common goal of restoration and maintenance of international peace and security".³²

We notice from the above definitions that some of them are comprehensive in terms of giving the overall objective behind peacekeeping, timeline and progress; such as the Capstone doctrine definition, while other definitions touch on some aspects like the objective; leaving other features unattained such as the timing, setting, pre-conditions...etc. This thesis builds on these definitions and understands -based on the analysis of peacekeeping in general and peacekeeping in Africa in particular throughout this thesis- UN peacekeeping as the following:

UN Peacekeeping is a politically driven tool enacted by the Security Council under Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter with the explicit aim of contributing to other conflict prevention efforts. It provides visibility to UN efforts to maintain international peace through the deployment of blue helmet troops and/ or military observers, and offers a short term political leverage to solidify peace-building efforts aiming at preventing conflicts from recurring. Peacekeeping should be formulated in a post conflict setting after reaching a viable and credible peace agreement between conflicting parties with a pre-requisite of their consent on the establishment of a peacekeeping mission.

³² C.S.R. Murthy (2001), United Nations Peacekeeping in Interstate Conflicts: Emerging Trends, **International Studies**, Sage publications.

The above definition captures commonalities found in different peacekeeping missions including that they are all enacted by the Security Council, they are driven by political interests of powerful states, the main aim is international peace, and the consensual nature of all deployments. Other than those features, we find that the tasks, mandate, formulation, duration...etc are all variables that may differ from one case to another depending on the political conditions of the country, the efficacy of the mission (which is also an inconsistent factor), the willingness and ability of the conflicting parties to achieve long term reconciliation among other factors and most importantly, the commitments made by super powers and rich states to contribute financially, technically and logistically to these missions. Taking into consideration the weak correlation between peacekeeping and conflict prevention demonstrated in repeated failures of peacekeeping efforts in preventing post conflict countries from relapsing into conflict, it is recommended to move away from the expressed aim of peacekeeping as a conflict prevention tool unless peacekeeping is married to a number of other UN and international tools among which a sustained diplomatic effort to a long term reconciliation and further alignment with long term peace-building efforts addressing root causes of conflicts. The emancipation from the consensual provision to peace enforcement imperative; giving the authority and mandate to peacekeepers to act as well as react to security disturbances and necessary military confrontations is key. Despite the fact that the former may suggest violating the sovereignty of states, but it is recommended and an almost inevitable action; especially in a situation where we face state failure and dysfunctional state

institutions such as in the case of the Central African Republic as will be assessed later in this thesis, in which case, the UN lacks a credible and strong counterpart to partner with in its peacekeeping efforts. It is generally expected that pre-conditions for an effective traditional peacekeeping are rarely found, if ever, especially in contemporary post conflict settings. The multidimensional solution of peacekeeping - as witnessed throughout this thesis- can successfully attain at times to a number of key deficiencies within peacekeeping in overcoming challenges of contemporary intra-state conflicts, but cannot address all of them. For example, in theory, within a context of a state failure, multidimensional peacekeeping might initiate nation building efforts which seem to be a simple and straight forward answer, and most importantly, applicable within the enlarged scope and mandate of peacekeeping missions. In practice, however, we find that international society is split when coupling peacekeeping and peace-building/ nation building. In his presidential elections debate in October 2000 and responding to a question on Somalia, US former President, George Bush commented that "I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war"³³. This example clearly indicates the counter view of coupling the two measures. Another dimension was brought about with the General Assembly members and the Non- aligned countries in specific where there was an obvious non- enthusiasm over

³³ George Bush (October 11, 2000), the Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate. Retrieved in Sep 2009 from: <http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000b.html>

the notion of broader scope and empowerment of peacekeeping missions³⁴. As such, and unless the UN approach to peacekeeping and perception of the international community are changed in a way that gives more influence and power to peacekeeping missions, peacekeeping should be maintained as a tool to be enacted in its most traditional sense and wherever pre-conditions for successful completion and achievement of the missions' mandate is strongly anticipated. Given the limitations of the peacekeeping- which will be elaborated in the case studies-; it should be practiced with a vision of short term intervention to stabilize a country temporarily; with the aim of giving credibility, leverage and imputes to long term peace-building strategies and to establish foundations for diplomatic mediation and political reconciliation in addition to a more focused, systematic strategies addressing root causes of the problems. Peacekeeping, though could be perfected to establish non-conflict zones temporarily, but it can not be solely depended on to create durable and sustainable peace. The coupling of peacekeeping and peace-building should be conceived through giving more supremacy for peace-building over peacekeeping efforts; where peacekeeping should be part of the longer term systematic peace-building initiatives that properly addresses all root causes of conflicts. The failure to scope peacekeeping within these parameters would deem the peacekeeping efforts ineffective, especially on the medium and long term.

³⁴ Buo, Sammy Kum (2001), Reflections on United Nations Peace Operations in Africa: The Responsibility of African States, **International Law Forum**, 3: 87-94, Kluwer Law International, the Netherlands.

From Peacekeeping to Peace-building:

Peace-building started gaining world wide attention in early 1990s. The concept and its advocates used the Secretary General's report on "Agenda for Peace"³⁵ in June 1992 as a spring board to build international society's interest in conflict prevention and peace-building. The report and the subsequent Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (January 1995) was followed by numerous debates and discussions by the Security Council that evolved to a more systematic attempt to develop a strategic and institutional approach to peace-building. The attempts were directed at times to establish an approximation with peacekeeping resulting in intertwining between the two terms; and causing much confusion about the practice of peace-building, but the need to differentiate between the two practices and defining linkages and relationships between them remain important for establishing the ground work for a robust conceptualization.

Peace-building is a long term undertaking that needs significant commitment from the international community to the process. Peace-building is properly placed in the post conflict stage as will be discussed earlier. Despite the fact that peace-building can be initiated before, during and post conflict, but it takes a humanitarian dimension when undertaken before the outbreak of war or during war; demonstrated mainly by humanitarian agencies ad-hoc and short term quick impact interventions to address urgent human security needs for civil population. It becomes practically impossible to unify all stakeholders' actions in a coherent approach as different parties would have

³⁵ Ibid, United Nations (1992) **An Agenda for Peace report**

distinct views about the priorities. This is taken even further when analysing national versus international interests and priorities. Post conflict peace-building differs mainly in the political dimension it adopts, especially in its liberal vision, and the more systematic and coherent approach that it can impose. The application of peace-building was considered for some as an adoption of the liberal premises³⁶ in freeing the world of its misfortunes, but it is seen that neither the UN nor the international community is fully capable of effectively assisting countries in building peace while the countries are on the verge of war outbreak or transitioning to post conflict peace setting. This will be evidenced in the three case studies researched within this thesis where the UN misinterpreted signals of post conflict; resulting in ineffective conduction of both peace-building and peacekeeping efforts.

In peace-building, as in peacekeeping, commitment of the Security Council in conflict prevention is crucial to the success of peace-building attempts; where listing of a post conflict country on the Security Council agenda signals the importance of durable peace and security in that specific country to the wider international peace. This makes the attempts to mobilize international efforts and resources to assist the country much easier and gives more credibility in addition to political leverage to the peace-building processes.

There were many attempts to identify core tasks of peace-building but the evolution of the concept as well as the inclusiveness of all aspects of nation building into the peace-building initiatives, in addition to the uniqueness of the different cases where

³⁶ David, Charles- Philippe (1999), Does Peacebuilding Build Peace?: Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace Process, **Security Dialogue**, 1999: 30, 25, Sage Publications

peace-building is incorporated; make it hard to determine specific tasks that are applicable in all contexts and conditions. In 2001, the Security Council meeting number 4272 debated on the comprehensive approaches to the question of peace-building, the clear ambiguity on the application and effectiveness of peace-building was apparent. On the one hand, the consensus was in favour of acknowledging the need for systematic peace-building in addition to the linkages with conflict prevention. On the other hand, the unified comprehensive approach was still to be decided.

As in peacekeeping, peace-building has no clear reference in the UN Charter. Similarly and from the above section and the chronology of peacekeeping we notice that the peace-building was significantly and progressively associate with peacekeeping despite the fact that the exact term "peace-building" was frequently missed out in the narrative part of the UN peace measures and Security Council Resolutions mandating peacekeeping operations. In reality and as will be noted in the next chapter of this thesis, out of 25 Peacekeeping operations deployed in Africa, peace-building initiatives accompanied the majority of those operations except for three (United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)); despite the fact that until the end of the Cold War, United Nations peacekeeping operations mostly had traditional ceasefire monitoring mandates and no direct peace-building responsibilities. Since the end of the Cold War, the peacekeeping missions continued their traditional role but were

accompanied by peace-building responsibilities. Subsequently, peacekeeping and peace-building became the two key pillars of the multidimensional, integrated approach to UN operations in post conflict countries. Whether UN systematic Peace-building was orchestrated as a UN tool implemented in post conflict settings because of its association with peacekeeping is unclear and there is no definite answer; but a tendency to give emphasis to peace-building in post conflict countries through establishing peace-building support offices was becoming more prominent in recent years; while peacekeeping is much older than the peace-building in terms of both terminology and application.

Early definitions took many forms and delineations conceptually and practically, and attempts to give peace-building a kind of framework fell short till this day. The first time the concept of peace-building was introduced was in the UN Secretary-General (Butros Ghali) report to the Security Council on 31 January 1992 "An Agenda for Peace, Prevention Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping". The report stipulates that the concept of peace-building should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, and that preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to prevent a recurrence. The report gave special focus on de-mining as a peace-building activity and called for emphasizing de-mining in the terms of reference of peacekeeping operations while leaving out other equally critical elements. In addition, it set out a profound linkage between peacekeeping and peace-building. It also wages a direct causality between specific measures (i.e.

demilitarization) on one hand and preventive diplomacy, keeping the peace in post-conflict peace-building on the other hand. The report however, outlined a shortfall of the UN in predicting and dealing with emerging trends in post conflict peace-building; as it elaborated on "new requirement" for technical assistance to transform deficient national structures and capabilities, to strengthen new democratic institutions and promoting elements of good governance which the United Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when requested. These measures and obligations were conceived long time before being stipulated in the mentioned report, but the whole concept of peace-building gained considerable attention in early 1990s beginning with the said report and gave more weight to the institutional dimension of conflict and peace presented in features of state institutions failure. More and more, the international community acknowledged the linkages between long term peace-building which addresses root causes of the conflicts and conflict prevention. This outlines an impediment in the UN apparatus in comprehending the reality of the situation from the beginning, in addition to finding ways and options to address security situations in countries with peacekeeping deployments.

Several reports by the Secretary-General in the 1990s underlined the importance of conflict prevention and peace-building, among them the 1997 report on "Renewing the United Nations: a programme for reform", and the 13 April 1998 report entitled "The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa". An important milestone in defining and scoping United

Nations Peace-building in connection with UN peacekeeping is found in the presidential statement of the Security Council in December 1998 recognizing peace-building as an important component of peacekeeping³⁷. That followed the report of the Secretary General in April of the same year in which he stated that peace-building elements should be explicitly and clearly identified and integrated into the mandates of the peacekeeping operation to ensure an easy and smooth transit to post conflict peace-building³⁸. The report prioritized the post conflict peace-building efforts on bases of giving recognition to the special needs of countries emerging from conflicts in order to avoid a conflict relapse. Emphasis was made on the encouragement of reconciliation and respect for human rights; fostering political inclusiveness and promoting national unity; ensuring the safe, smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; reintegrating ex-combatants; curtailing the availability of small arms; and mobilizing the domestic and international resources for reconstruction and economic recovery.

Another milestone for peace-building was brought with the recommendations included in the Brahimi Report in August 2000 emphasizing the need for institutionalizing UN peace-building through creating a focal point at the UN Secretariat on peace-building which did not materialize until 2006. The report also emphasized the multidimensional engagement of local parties, budgeting for quick impact peace-building projects in the mission's first year, free and fair elections,

³⁷ United Nations (1998), **Statement By The President Of The Security Council**, No. S/PRST/1998/38, United Nations Publications, USA

³⁸ United Nations (1998), **Report of the UN Secretary-General on "The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa"**, Document No. A/52/871 – S/1998/318, United Nations Publications, USA.

enhanced role of UN civilian police to build the governments' capacity in security sector and upholding rule of law, incorporation of the Human Rights component, effective disarmament, demobilization and re-integration programmes. The cementing of the latter recommendations and previous reports were set in 2001 by a statement of the president of the Security Council emphasizing that peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building are often closely interrelated. The Council reiterated the value of including, as appropriate, peace-building elements in the mandates of peacekeeping operations³⁹. This was followed by a series of Security Council meetings that were held to debate the topic "Peace-building: towards a comprehensive approach". Numerous reports and statements reaffirming the inclusion of peace-building in peacekeeping mandates and reiterated the importance of developing a comprehensive peace-building approach, but confusion persisted in overwhelming the term by all aspects of political, humanitarian, economic, social and developmental considerations to peace-building. One dimension remained missing in the equation of defining peace-building was the elaboration of a coherent and consistent peace-building conceptual framework and plan involving the relevant international and national partners.

³⁹ United Nations (2001), **Statement by the President of the Security Council** No. S/PRST/2001/5 on 20 February 2001

Formalization of peace-building missions

Peace-building is a new term and there is no common definition or consensus on what constitute peace-building. The ambiguity associated with the evolution of the concept and its operationalization in a changing complex conflict context resulted in a confused conduction and direction of peace-building efforts and ultimately; a free range where any measure could be part of peace-building as we notice from the successive milestones that peace-building was conceptually conceived. As previously indicated, it has increasingly become part of peacekeeping, it is considered as a conflict prevention tool and it is closely linked to peacemaking and conflict prevention. At the same time, more systematic and comprehensive approach was being experimented through the establishment of political- peace-building missions. This was taken yet to another new stage through giving peace-building one of the main tasks of classic peacekeeping. In his report "No Exit Without Strategy" to the Security Council in 2001, the Secretary General wrote that "peace-building activities include monitoring the separation of forces"⁴⁰. This emerging approach of widening the scope of work of peace-building practices, not only lacked coherence but also resulted in rivalry among agencies on turfs and specializations, duplication of efforts and competition over funding which contributed to the overall poor success rate of peace-building to date⁴¹. The success rate of peace-building suffered immensely from

⁴⁰ United Nations (2001), **No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations**, Secretary General Report No. S/2001/394 on 20 April 2001

⁴¹ de Coning, Cedric (2008), **Understanding Peacebuilding: Consolidating the Peace Process**, Conflict Trends, ACCORD, Issue 4

the confusion where "nearly 50 percent of all countries receiving assistance slide back into conflict within five years, and 72 percent of peacebuilding operations leave in place authoritarian regimes"⁴².

Arguably, the "No Exit Without Strategy" report outlined an important element in strategizing the exit of the peacekeeping and planning for the transit stage. But it is contended that this blurry line between merging the peacekeeping and peace-building in order to ensure sustainable peace, security and ultimately a localized conflict prevention culture should be undertaken with much caution. This has not been done so far as a recent remark by the UN Assistant Secretary General for Peace-building at the United Nations in September 2009, Judy Cheng-Hopkins explicitly indicated that "Peace-building can comprise conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid or development assistance"⁴³.

It was not until years after the peacekeeping practice was initiated, that the UN Security Council started systematically mandating special political missions and peace-building support offices to engage in conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding, especially in Africa, South and Central Asia and the Middle East. Despite the importance of these missions, they were not well focused

⁴² Paul Collier et al. (2003), *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. In Barnett, Michael, Kim, Hunjoon, O'Donnell, Madalene, and Sitea, Laura (2007), *Peacebuilding: What is in the name?*, **Global Governance**, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 13, 35–58

⁴³ United Nations (2009), speaking note by the Judy Cheng-Hopkins UN Assistant Secretary General for Peace-building at the United Nations in 14 September 2009. Retrieved in September 2009 from: <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Statements/SG/Santiago%20-opening%20-%20final%2013Sep09.pdf>

under the radar of the international community. Currently there are five political and peace-building offices in Africa, among ten ongoing missions established world wide:

Table No. 2: Peace-building and Political Missions

Mission	Geographic Area	Year established	Status	Existence of Peacekeeping operation	On the Agenda of Peace-building Commission
United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)	Africa	1995	Active	yes	No
United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)	Asia	1997	closed	yes	No
Office of the Great Lake Region*	Africa	1997	closed	-	-
United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB)	Asia	1998	closed	No	No
United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS)	Africa	1999	Active	no	yes
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO)	Asia/ Middle East	1999	Active	Yes	No
United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA)	Africa	2000	Active	Yes	Yes
United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building (UNTOP)	Asia	2000	closed	yes	No
United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)*	Africa	2000	Active	-	-
United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)	Asia	2002	Active	yes	No
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)	Asia/ Middle East	2003	Active	No	No
United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra	Africa	2005	Closed	Yes	yes

Leone (UNIOSIL)					
United Nations Office in East Timor (UNOTIL)	Asia	2005	closed	yes	No
United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)	Africa	2006	Active	yes	yes
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA)*	Asia	2006	Active	-	-
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)	Asia/ Middle East	2007	Active	Yes	No
United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)	Asia	2007	Active	No	No
United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)	Africa	2008	Active	Yes	yes

* Mission addresses peace-building in several countries

As noticed from the above table; the first political/ peace-building office was established in African Somalia. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) which was established by the Secretary General on 15 April 1995 taking the lead from two consecutive UN peacekeeping operations.

To date 18 political and peace-building missions were established worldwide. Only four missions were established without presence of a peacekeeping operation before, during or after the establishment of the mission, which proves the solid link between the deployment of peacekeeping operations and the formal establishment of peace-building offices.

Scanning the initial waves of deployments in Africa for example, we witness the incorporation of post conflict peace-building in most of peacekeeping operations; but the emphasis on military versus non-military was confusing. In principle, there was an evident lack of developmental and governance structures in the African countries

which the UN with its direct involvement should have been able to detect and effectively address, but the lack of coherent approach to address conflict prevention through peace-building or/ and peacekeeping led to alternating between the two practices and at times, intertwining the two. In several cases, most recently in the Sudan, political missions supervised by the Department of Political Affairs during the stage of peace negotiations have -following the signing of peace agreements- been replaced by peacekeeping missions supervised by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In yet other instances, such as in Sierra Leone, U.N. peacekeeping operations were replaced by special political missions overseeing peace-building activities.

Notwithstanding the ambiguity associated with the conceptual and theoretical framework of the peacekeeping and peace-building, commonalities should still be emphasized.

For the purposes of formulating the researcher's next argument, the Peacekeeping is considered in its abstract classic military dimension and associated principles; while peace-building would be regarded from its developmental but political angle. The first question to be addressed is; should peace-building precede, be synchronized or follow peacekeeping? The Second Question is; where do peace-building and peacekeeping meet in their ultimate goal? The Third Question; drawing on past experiences; should peacekeeping be separated or unified with peace-building? The following analysis is guided by these questions.

In practice, UN Peacekeeping is mandated under Security Council decision – normally- following a peace agreement is reached between conflicting parties and normally to support the fulfilment of the agreement by and commitments of the conflicting parties. This gives an exact timeline to the birth of the peacekeeping mission and the commencement of deployment which generally takes place between 30- 90 days following the signing of the accord and the Security Council decision; provided the success in achieving consent of troops contributing states to effectively deploy troops under UN auspices. In principle, the term peacekeeping is contested on the ground that it assumes the existence of "peace" in the first place. The UN peacekeepers are then deployed to "keep" this peace, hence the term "peacekeeping". As conveyed and evidenced in this thesis, conflicting parties engage in peace process for different reasons not least to end war and establish peace. The UN at many times followed this suggestion where it brokered a number of peace agreements, but in reality, not all accords were sustained, and in many instances conflict re-emerged such as in Sierra Leone in the late nineties, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo where belligerents have continued engaging in military confrontation in spite of the signing of the All-Inclusive Agreement in Pretoria in December 2002. History gives many proofs of conflicting parties being involved in peace processes, either to gain time to re-arm or to concede for a short term to international or domestic popular pressures, to strategize the next war, to find new allies,...etc. Studies have shown that about half of all post-conflict countries relapse into conflict within a decade; it was

seen that for Africa, the percentage is even over the average⁴⁴. As pointed out before, these percentages suggest that there are major deficiencies in the preventive actions taken by local and/ or international actors, among which the UN and the Security Council and that part of the reason for dissolved peace processes is the illusiveness of intentions of peace partners. The recurrent failure of the UN to pre-empt the potential relapse of conflicts led the UN to take the part of a re-actor of events and at best, remote pacific monitor rather than being a proactive agent in conflict prevention in post conflict countries. Despite the recorded successes incurred besides the failures in preventing conflicts; the fate of nations and countries should be considered as more than a success/ failure ratio and as such, failures should be given more weight in assessing the overall effectiveness. Introducing peacekeeping in post conflict countries should be part of the wider UN involvement in peace-building within these countries. The integration of the two disciplines should be carefully planned through giving peace-building supremacy while maintaining traditional tasks of peacekeeping to provide the needed imputes and political leverage. It is suggested that peacekeepers are best suited to undertake the following tasks in addition to the traditional tasks along the peace-building efforts: a) Maintain the status quo on short term with regards to conflict situation and attempt to prevent armed escalation. b) Maintain Law and order. c) Security Sector Reform (SSR).

⁴⁴ Bigombe, Betty, Collier, Paul and Sambanis, Nicholas (2000), Policies for Bulding Post Conflict Peace, **Journal of African Economies**, Vol.9, No. 3, Center for the Study of African Economies

The commencement of UN peace-building is not as straight forward as indicated before. It is mandated by different UN agencies and organs including the Security Council; separately or jointly and had disguised under humanitarian, developmental, recovery, reconstruction efforts or other undertakings before it was introduced as a formal coherent UN tool for conflict prevention. The former view was contested as some scholars have maintained full separation between peace-building and development for example where development was seen to embrace a longer term involvement as opposed to peace-building⁴⁵. There is no general consensus on the concept, what the term consists of, or when should peace-building efforts start and who should do it. There is, however, a tendency towards focusing on peace-building in post conflict countries in an attempt to prevent countries from relapsing into conflict. And as seen from UN reports and statements, peace-building has become an integral part of the peacekeeping missions to that end.

While peacekeeping is normally maintained for short periods to fulfil specific mandates, peace-building should be considered as a long term undertaking to establish sustainable peace through addressing root causes of problems and conflicts; though recognizing the need for quick impact short term interventions to address urgent situations.

Africa has witnessed, especially after the Cold War, fragile peace and security condition, escalating trend in conflict and emergence of new conflicts and the relapse of old conflicts throughout the continent. Furthermore, this period saw internal and

⁴⁵ Ibid, David, Charles- Philippe (1999)

interstate conflicts in a total of 30 sub-Saharan states. Today, one fifth of the population in Africa still live in conflict zones. This suggests that, in principle, peace-building in Africa is a measure that could be adopted by the UN pre- during and post conflict especially in triggering conflict prevention at large. This is materialized as far as developmental pillars of peace-building are embedded in the UN efforts in different stages of the conflict cycle.

As indicated before, this thesis concentrates on post conflict peace-building following a peace agreement. The notion of post conflict, in itself, connotes the political character of peace-building, which makes corresponding activities distinct from normal development activities in non-crisis situations. It is seen that the needs of a country sliding into conflict, or emerging from war, are qualitatively different from those of a stable society. That required a reordering of normal developmental, humanitarian and other activities, to contribute to the principal goal of preventing the outbreak or recurrence of conflicts.

Post conflict has stages, in simplistic terms; there is the immediate phase, interim/transitional phase and long term. Where peace is one of the main aims of peace-building efforts, "peace" in its abstract sense merely provides for absence of conflict. The absence of conflict suggests a short term in silencing the arms but does not necessarily connotes the sustainability of peace for longer terms. In order to come up with an appropriate and practical definition, we need to look deeply on how to establish sustainable peace? In theory, the answer could be as simple as the aim itself.

We achieve sustainable peace through addressing root causes of the problems that trigger the conflict in the first place. The following question would be, are root causes amendable? And if yes, can the problems be resolved in a short or long term? What measures need to be taken to prevent the problems from re-emerging? are the problems and causes common within the conflicting society or different communities have different problems? Can the conflict be dealt with internally without outside intervention? The list of questions has a tall order. But what can be noticed is that it is not useful to have ready answers or a rigid peace-building model applicable in all conditions. For example, democracy or disarmament could be the panacea for conflict in one country, while economic governance or development of rural areas could be the answers to other problems. We can not foresee the incorporation of disarmament, demobilization of ex-combatants as a necessary measure in all peacekeeping missions and to say that mere signature of a peace agreement would pave a way to sustainable peace; is contested. The UN was one of those contenders with a point of view that was different from the former and from the general community of donors. The report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change "A more secure world: Our shared responsibility " in 2004 clearly stated that "Without demobilization, civil wars cannot be brought to an end and other critical goals - such as democratization, justice and development - have little chance for success" and hence, the Panel recommended the continuation of integrating Disarmament and Demobilization programmes within the peacekeeping missions' mandate. In addition, the report of the high level panel made one out of many attempts to identify the core tasks of peace-

building; and came up with the conclusion that disarmament, demobilizing and reintegration of former combatants, establishing security, building effective public institutions, police, judicial and rule-of-law reform, local capacity-building for human rights and reconciliation are among the core tasks. The panel also recommended the establishment of peace-building support offices to address the need for implementing peace-building strategies⁴⁶ - a recommendation which is still to be properly addressed. The panels' attempt in identifying the core tasks also failed to draw a comprehensive framework or a plan, or even properly strategizing a UN approach to post conflict peace-building and took a short cut in necessitating to have a specialized body to strategize the practice of peace-building.

The Report of the High-level Panel answered another intriguing point on the marrying between peacekeeping and peace-building and whether it is a right conduct. It outlines that the deployment of peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces may be essential in terminating conflicts but are not sufficient for long-term recovery. By virtue of the limited duration nature of peacekeeping missions, peacekeepers, even if they are engaged in peace-building efforts in the short term within the life time of the mission, but are unable to plan long term involvement which is needed to cement peace-building in post conflict countries. The report also points out the inability of neither the United Nations nor the international community to effectively build peace in both the period before the outbreak of civil war and in the transition out of war. For that reason, the panel gave its recommendation to establish an inter-governmental

⁴⁶ United Nations (2004), **A more Secure World: Our shared responsibility**, a report of the high level panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Retrieved in November 2009 from: <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/docsandres.shtml>

organ dedicated to peace-building. Following the World summit in 2005 and in line with the recommendations of the High level panel's report "A more secure world: Our shared responsibility ", the UN Peace-building Commission was established to respond to the much needed reform and a unified strategic formal UN approach to addressing peace-building in post conflict countries. The United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council mandated the Commission, *inter alia*,

- To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on the proposed integrated strategies for post conflict peace-building and recover;
- To help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment;
- To develop best practices on issues in collaboration with political, security, humanitarian and development actors.

Four countries were placed under the UN Peace-building Commission's agenda. These were Sierra Leone, Burundi, Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau. Three out of these countries will be studied carefully in the next chapters.

Defining UN post conflict peace-building

Going back to the definition of UN post conflict peace-building, we find the following non-exhaustive list of scholars and practitioners definitions:

Peace-building: in the aftermath of conflict; it means identifying and supporting measures and structures which will solidify peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict; often involves elections organized, supervised or conducted by the United Nations, the rebuilding of civil physical infrastructures and institutions such as schools and hospitals, and economic reconstruction⁴⁷.

Peace-building: all the efforts required on the way to the creation of sustainable peace zone; imagining a peaceful future; conducting an overall needs assessment; developing a coherent peace plan; and designing an effective implementation of the plan.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Ibid, United Nations Glossary of terms

⁴⁸ Reychler, Luc and Paffenholz, Thania (2001), **Peacebuilding: a field guide**, Lynne Rienner Publishers

Peace-building: "actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation.... Peace-building may involve the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development. Peace-building does not replace ongoing humanitarian and development activities in countries emerging from crisis. It aims rather to build on, add to, or reorient such activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict and contribute to creating the conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery"⁴⁹.

Peace-building: "defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and

⁴⁹United Nations (1998), **The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa**, Report of the UN Secretary-General No. A/52/871 – S/1998/318 delivered on 13 April 1998

support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques"⁵⁰.

Peace-building: "is defined as a post conflict intervention that provides for parallel, concurrent and interlinked short-, medium- and long-term activities that work to prevent disputes from escalating, or avoid a relapse into violent conflict by addressing both the immediate consequences and the root causes of a conflict system. The peace-building or post-conflict intervention starts when a cease-fire agreement or peace agreement, which calls upon the international community to support the peace process, is implemented. It typically progresses through three stages, namely a stabilization phase, a traditional phase, and a consolidation phase. The peace-building intervention ends when the host society has developed the capacity to manage and sustain its own peace process without external support"⁵¹.

Peace-building: "is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short and long term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on

⁵⁰ Ibid, United Nations (2000), Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations

⁵¹ De Coning, Cedric (2008), The Coherence Dilemma in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Systems, **African Journal on Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2008

fostering sustainable institutions and processes in areas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence"⁵².

Peace-building: "is an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution. Strengthening State institutions, increasing political participation, engaging in land reform, strengthening civil society, finding ways to respect ethnic identities: all are seen as ways to improve the prospects for peaceful governance. The aim of peace-building is to build the social, economic and political institutions and attitudes that will prevent the inevitable conflicts that every society generates from turning into violent conflicts. In effect, peace-building is also the front line of preventive action"⁵³.

Based on the above definitions and previous analysis UN post conflict Peace-building can be defined as a politically driven undertaking conducted in credible post settlement conditions, building on initial national peace and reconciliation endeavours, with the aim of achieving sustainable peace conditions conducive for long term development. It is the practice of finding ways to address paramount root

⁵² United Nations (2001), **Statement by the President of the Security Council** No. S/PRST/2001/5 on 20 February 2001

⁵³ Doyle, Michael and Sambanis, Nicholas (2006), **Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations**, Princeton University Press, USA

causes of problems that have led to conflicts, planning a coherent intervention aiming at addressing those causes and implementation. The planning should distinguish between immediate and long term requirements for stability and emphasises long term planning while acknowledging the need for quick impact interventions which could include building government's capacity to hold fair elections, corporatization of state institutions to improve the state function of upholding rule of law, the delivery of essential services and re-construction on the short term extending to five years. These might be extended as needed, but planning for long term interventions should commence in parallel and could include a wider coverage of good governance practices (institutional strengthening, anti-corruption, human rights and capacity building), and general inclusive economic and social recovery.

Chapter Two:

Background on United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building in Africa

Chapter Two: Background on United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building in Africa

UN peacekeeping in post conflict African countries

In 2008, 36 conflicts were active in 26 locations around the world; Africa's share of conflicts was 10⁵⁴. While formal UN peace-building missions counted 12 ongoing missions world wide, Africa's share was six; UN peacekeeping operations counted 8 in Africa, 17 in total worldwide. 'Blue Helmets' advancing in sovereign territories with the task of upholding rule of international law and enforcing security seems to be an unchallenged undertaking from the first glance. But this is far from being an accurate statement. Peacekeeping operations have no obvious legal grounds in the UN

⁵⁴ Harbom, Lotta and Wallensteen, Peter (2009), Armed Conflicts, 1946_2008, *Journal of Peace Research* 2009; 46; 577

charter, and were tested vigorously over the years and throughout the world with fatal mistakes at times, and good impact at other times. The first wave of deployment took place after the Second World War and was justified on bases of restoring a degree of international order by hampering a tsunami of state failure. Share of African states joining the first wave was modest with only United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960- 1964. ONUC was established in 1960 to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The mandate of the operations was later modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries. While UN peacekeepers were deployed to provide policing tasks in the 1960 in Congo, they assumed the military observers role later in Namibia (1989-1990), Angola (1991-1998)- though with no effectiveness nor success- and Mozambique (1992- 1994), a relatively successful mission.

Peacekeeping operations in post Cold War increased in number and intensity with deployments in Western Sahara, Angola, Somalia, Mozambique, Uganda-Rwanda, Liberia, Rwanda, Chad/Libya, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi and Sudan.

The end of the Cold War brought with it intensive UN peacekeeping involvement which was one of the most difficult challenges that the UN had to face⁵⁵. The UN was

⁵⁵ Clapham, C. (1998), **The United Nations and Peacekeeping in Africa**, In Neethling, Theo (2004), "International peacekeeping trends: the significance of African contributions to African peacekeeping requirements", South African Association of Political Studies, Carfax Publishing

un-prepared for neither the intensity nor the complexities of the operations in Africa. The UN incurred administrative, operational and financial failures that exposed the Organization to international scrutiny and affected the credibility of the whole system. For example, the inability to commit sufficient resources to support peace efforts in Angola, contributed to a large degree to the failure of the mission. Africa was plagued with conflict and war torn societies throughout the continent in post Cold War. Fragile peace and security condition, escalating trend in conflict, emergence of new conflicts and the relapse of old conflicts throughout Africa dominated the continent. The end result in the nineties was demonstrated in internal and interstate conflicts in a total of 30 sub-Saharan states.

The UN desperately endeavoured to look for other immediate and long term options; key priority for UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations was to develop the capacities of African peacekeeping capacities.⁵⁶ This has obvious links with the refrain of countries to contribute troops and other resources to peacekeeping operations; an issue which was voiced consistently by the UN relevant bodies and reports.

Overview of UN Peacekeeping in Africa- 1990s- 2008:

Table No. 3 shows the increased number of operations in Africa in the first half of the nineties counting 10 as opposed to the second half (1996-1999) with only 5 operations. The decrease can be largely attributed to the failure of the UN in countries like Somalia and Rwanda which resulted in both hesitance of the Security Council to use peacekeepers, difficulties faced by the Security Council to convince countries to

⁵⁶ United Nations (2009), **Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on the comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects**, report No. A/54/87 delivered in 23 June 1999

contribute troops and general lack of confidence in the UN peacekeeping Missions. The change in the nature and trend of the peacekeeping in Africa is witnessed in 1999 with general extended presence of the operations. While the range of term of operations' mandates was (0- 4 years pre- 1999 (with the exception of the operation in Western Sahara), 1999 brought the longest closed period of Peace mission in Africa with the six-year term of the Mission in Sierra Leone and another still ongoing mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. This was followed by eight-year term of the Mission in Liberia and five still ongoing Missions that have been established after 2000. The longer period of missions was associated with ever increasing size of operations shown in Table No. 4 from 5,695 personnel in 1999 to 54,758 in 2008.

While the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola was about to withdraw its operations early 1999, Central African Republic Mission (MINURA) was ongoing and the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) which was established in July 1998 was being succeeded by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). On 22 October 1999, the Security Council established UNAMSIL with the initial deployment of 4,509 personnel (including Troops, Military Observers and Police) to support the implementation of the Lome' Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. On 7 February 2000, the Council revised UNAMSIL's mandate. It also expanded its size, as it did once again on 19 May 2000 and on 30 March 2001. UNAMSIL completed its mandate in December 2005. Authorized maximum strength was 17,500 military personnel, including 260 military observers and 170 police personnel, which made it the largest peace operation at that time.

In November of the same year of 1999, the peacekeepers returned once again to Congo. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of

Congo (MONUC) was established to monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, investigate violations of the ceasefire and to support humanitarian assistance. Initial authorized strength of MONUC included 16,700 Military personnel, 475 Police personnel and other civilian personnel including specialists in human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, child protection, political affairs, medical and administrative support. Currently, the peacekeeping operation's total strength amounts 18,691 uniformed personnel.

On July 2000, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was established to monitor a cessation of hostilities agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Maximum deployment (31 May 2002) totalled 4,154 uniformed personnel. The Mission was terminated in 2008 by the Security Council in response to restrictions imposed by Eritrea on UNMEE which resulted in the inability of the Mission to fulfil its mandate.

Three years later, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process, support humanitarian and human rights activities, as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military among other tasks. The Security Council authorized the deployment of maximum 15,000 military personnel.

In 2004 the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement by the Ivorian conflicting parties and authorized the initial deployment of 6,240 military personnel.

In the same year of 2004, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was established to help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore

lasting peace under the Arusha Agreement and to promote the re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces. ONUB successfully completed its mandate on 31 December 2006 with peak strength (30 September 2005) 5,665 total uniformed personnel.

The Security Council, by its resolution in 24 March 2005, decided to establish the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to support the implementation of the Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army with authorized strength of up to 10,000 military personnel. This was followed in 2007 by another Mission in Sudan. A joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur was authorized by Security Council resolution in 31 July 2007. UNAMID was mandated to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as to protect its personnel and civilians with authorized strength up to 19,555 military personnel.

Finally, the last peacekeeping operation established by a resolution of the Security Council is the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad in September 2007 and is still ongoing. The multidimensional presence in concert with the European Union intends to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons. The Authorized strength is up to 300 police, 25 military liaison officers, 5,200 military personnel, in addition to civilian personnel.

Complete List of Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

(Table No. 3):

Mission name	Start date	Closing date	Monitoring	Military	Peace-	Interstate	Intra-
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			Peace/ ceasefire agreements	Component (troops)	building activities	conflict	state conflict
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	July 1960	June 1964	No (Security Council called upon Belgium to withdraw its forces)	yes	yes	yes	yes
United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)	January 1989	June 1991	yes	No (military observers)	no	yes	no
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	April 1989	March 1990	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	April 1991	present	Yes	yes	yes	no	yes
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	June 1991	February 1995	yes	No (military observers)	yes	no	yes
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)	April 1992	March 1993	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	December 1992	December 1994	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	March 1993	March 1995	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)	June 1993	September 1994	No	No (military observers)	no	no	yes
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	September 1993	September 1997	yes	No (military observers)	yes	yes	no
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	October 1993	March 1996	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)	May 1994	June 1994	yes	No (military observers)	no	yes	no
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)	February 1995	June 1997	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)	June 1997	February 1999	no	yes	yes	no	yes
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	April 1998	February 2000	no	yes	yes	no	yes
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)	July 1998	October 1999	yes	No (military observers)	yes	no	yes
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	October 1999	December 2005	yes	Yes	yes	no	yes
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	November 1999	Present	yes	Yes	yes	yes	no
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	July 2000	July 2008	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	September 2003	Present	yes	Yes	yes	No	yes
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	April 2004	Present	yes	Yes	yes	no	yes
United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	June 2004	December 2006	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	March 2005	Present	yes	Yes	yes	no	yes
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	July 2007	Present	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	September 2007	Present	no	yes	yes	N/A	N/A

(MINURCAT)							
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Peacekeeping Operations Data

(Table No. 4)

Year	No. of Peace keeping operations in Africa	Size of operations (Figures Include Troops, Military Observers and Police) in Africa*	Size of operations (Figures Include Troops, Military Observers and Police) in all countries*
1999	5	5,695	18,460
2000	4	12,465	37,733
2001	3	24,998	47,108
2002	3	24,790	39,652
2003	4	35,389	45,815
2004	6	48,522	64,720
2005	7	54,260	69,838
2006	6	54,758	80,368
2007	6	54,278	84,309
2008	7	65,148	91,712

* figures at year end (December)

The above table and numbers reflect successful operations that were carried out in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia, but realities dictated the overshadowing of these success stories by the more drastic experiences of peacekeeping operations in countries like Somalia, Congo, Rwanda and Sierra Leone.

African Peacekeeping Operations (1999- 2008):

Traditionally, peacekeeping was straightforward; it starts by a conflict, followed by peace agreements, UN military observers to monitor the cease fire, both military and civilian deployments with the consent of conflicting parties. The Military component was strongly present in nearly all deployments, but the troops were not initially supported by mandates to use force except as a last resort and in self defence. This was changed to some extent in post Cold War in response to enlarged mandates to protect humanitarian missions and civilians under physical threats. Out of the 25 peacekeeping missions in Africa, only three addressed inter-state conflicts, the rest being intra-state conflicts which delineate a degree of consistency in African

countries as opposed to other regions where post Cold War brought dramatic change in conflict trends from inter-state to intra-state and civil conflicts. Despite this consistency, at least in this very aspect of conflicts in Africa, the straight forward line of events for peacekeeping operations was challenged aggressively as peace accords between conflicting parties were breached in countries like Sierra Leone, Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic; leaving the UN attempts to keep peace at odds. Though the UN political dimension and involvement in even reaching peace agreements were uncontested and some would go far as calling it indispensable, the failure to maintain the peace was not attributed to the UN in any way. The researcher contends that on the one hand, though the UN should not be held sole responsibility for the collapse of the agreements but UN insufficient early warning and intelligence mechanisms in addition to ineffective conflict prevention should be given a liability space in the failed peace equation, otherwise, the UN role should not be regarded as an indispensable one in the first place (i.e. at the time when peace agreements are effective). Intelligence was proven to be one of the main causes of UN failures in countries like Somalia, Rwanda, and Darfur in 2008 in addition to others. Despite the former, the UN still maintained that it does not gather intelligence on member states, and does not have direct access to intelligence sources. On the other hand, one of the obvious reasons of this failure – at least from the UN part- was that the UN did not deal with root causes of the problems and its interventions were long lived in many instances. Though for peacekeeping, it was never intended to address root causes, but the complementary mechanisms failed to do that as well. This is also evidenced in a number of peace operations which extended for decades without reaching sustainable peace (such as in the Middle East, India/ Pakistan, Cyprus and others).

While the military nature of the operations tended to be the norm, the idea of unlimited possibilities of peacekeeping spread is alarming. In the realm of reforming the UN, the peacekeeping issue has been always addressed in the notion of "how to strengthen the operations" and in what possible ways should the mandate be stretched to cover more countries, larger troops, further dominance, rapid deployment, more troops contributing countries, widening the scope of involvement...etc. the mounting of strength of operations from 5,695 personnel consisting of troops, Military Observers and Police in 1999 to a dramatic increase of 65,148 in Africa alone at the end of 2008 and from 18,460 personnel in 1999 to 91,712 in December 2008 world wide shows the steep upward trend in the size of peacekeeping operations in the past decade (table no.4). Of the 91,712 personnel in December 2008, large sized deployments were mostly in African countries with a deployment of 18,422 personnel in Congo and 15,136 in military strength in UNAMID Sudan. This was followed by 12,435 in Lebanon, 11,853 in African Liberia, 10,025 in UNMIS Sudan and 9,190 in Côte d'Ivoire- as indicated, the majority were in Africa. In January 2009, addressing the Security Council, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy said " "Today, we are larger and spread more widely than ever before, with mandates that are more complex and robust than ever".⁵⁷ At the same Security Council meeting which aimed to formulate new recommendations on ways to strengthen Peacekeeping, arguments were raised on the political nature of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in addition to new important roles in security, as well as in institution-building, the rule of law, Social-economic development, human rights, protection of civilians... and the list goes on... From the first instant, one would think that Le Roy intended to boost the peace operations and to consider them

⁵⁷ United Nations (2009), Security Council Meeting No. 6075, Ref. SC. 9583, 23 January 2009

as achievements. But the latter list of additions to the traditional tasks of the peacekeeping connotes that what previous and ongoing peace operations are doing is simply not enough, insufficient or/ and ineffective- this is particularly true in failure to protect civilians in conflicts. Another intriguing argument was the need for the council –the decision making body- to be better informed and better advised about military considerations. As important this note was, it is contended that its significance to ongoing and past operations is immense. Through acknowledging the need for better information and military advice, the credibility of previous resolutions and operations' mandates that were set by the Council are put by the Council itself in serious doubt. The calls for monitoring and evaluation of the peacekeeping operations by the Council are hence based on weak grounds jeopardizing not only the credibility of the decision making body but also is furthered to involve the mandates and accomplishments of the peacekeeping operations spread around the world. As such, any assessment to be undertaken, would ideally overlook the original contributing factors of establishing the peacekeeping operations and adversely look more into an independent situation analysis of the past conditions of a particular State, put into perspective, assess the need for the peacekeeping operations, track the progress/ change in the security and peace conditions of that State and ultimately place the direct causality of the actual impact of the peacekeeping operations on the improved security situation under the lens. To what extent this notion is applicable or had been applied in the past is contested. This is not alienated from a reference which was made during the said Security Council meeting on a UN "non-paper" concerning gaps between Council's authorized mandates and their implementation on the ground. The non-paper called for assessing which mandate provisions are under-implemented and

why. In addition, it provided a critique on the oversight and direction to peacekeeping.

Deeper into UN mixed Peacekeeping Results in Africa: Finding UN Approach to Peacekeeping in Africa

If the above 2009 UN statements are to be considered alarming, the recitation of the rhetoric and operational evolution of UN peacekeeping and peace-building will not serve as a better portrait.

Africa's security and peace conditions have always been a concern for the international society and the UN, and more as such for the Security Council and General Assembly, in the post Cold War era. Successive UN Security Council resolutions mandating the deployment of peacekeeping operations in African countries emphasized that conflicts in Africa pose threat to regional and international security and consequently, acted more and more under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (the enforcement chapter) in establishing the successive peacekeeping missions and by mid 2008, over 80% of the troops and police deployed in UN-led operations functioned under mandates that invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Though the UN was originally intended to deal with inter-state conflicts but it progressively faced the challenge to deal with intra-state conflicts and civil wars.

Post Cold War uncovered many of the credibility battles that the UN had to face to defend its mandate in securing peace in Africa. In his report in 1998 to key UN organs, among which, the Security Council, the general Assembly and Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund), the UN Secretary General presented an analysis regarding the sources of conflict in Africa, ways to prevent and address those conflicts, and how to lay the foundation for durable peace

and economic growth following their resolution. The report uncovered the failure of the UN and the international community at large in addressing conflicts in Africa and securing peace⁵⁸. This is tracked to years of UN endeavours in Africa to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcing, peacekeeping and peace-building. This was evidently following UN setbacks in Somalia and Rwanda in early nineties leading the Security Council to terminate the operation in Somalia without completing its mandate after peacekeepers were taken as hostage and they were involved in vicious confrontations with local warlords. And in Rwanda; where the UN was unable to stop massacres and genocides which ultimately affected credibility of the UN as a guarantor of peace. The lack of credibility was evidenced on the ground with apparent curtailment of peacekeepers total numbers in addition to decreased peacekeeping operations budgets and resources from funding countries who became more sceptical about the capability of the UN in performing up to its mandate in ensuring international peace and security. The Secretary General stressed on the importance of re-examining the UN experience in Africa in various reports and statements implying existing deficiencies in the system. But that failure of the UN in Africa should not be attributed to the UN alone. In his paper, "Peace Operations in Africa: Preserving the Brittle State", Malaquias argues that the mixed UN results in Africa are only partly attributed to the organization and that the main problem is in the anarchic and state-centric systems where peacekeeping missions are established, which ultimately fail all efforts to secure peace⁵⁹. Examples of the former are found

⁵⁸ United Nations (1998), **The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa**, Report of the UN Secretary-General No. A/52/871 – S/1998/318 delivered on 13 April 1998

⁵⁹ Malaquias, Assis (2002), Peace Operations in Africa: Preserving the Brittle State, **Journal of International Affairs**, Vol.55, no.2, Spring 2002

in countries like Angola and Mozambique where internal factors count while external factors had little -if nothing- to do with the state of war and peace. However, even within the internal parameters of intra-state conflicts, brokering peace agreements by the UN gives it a certain liability for failure to sustain peace accords. In Angola, for example, UN peace operation was doomed from the beginning because the peace agreement negotiated between the conflicting parties did not resolve underlying causes of the problems. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) like other missions lacked the mandate and means to halt spoilers from destroying the peace agreement⁶⁰. The underpinning question is whether the UN should not have been engaged in peacekeeping efforts in such contexts in the first place or if it should have undertaken a different approach. The answer is simple, the failure of the mission means that the UN went the wrong approach and that peacekeeping was not the answer or even part of the solution to the conflict in these countries. Why did it fail? Again, because of the wrong approach which the UN adopted. The peacekeeping as well as the peace-building efforts should not be regarded as a panacea from all diseases and all conflicts. For peacekeeping in specific, it was not intended to deal with root causes of the problems even with the emerging trend in giving peacekeeping political and social dimensions in addition to integrating peace-building components within the operations' mandates. Another major mistake which is still not being properly absorbed by the Security Council or the international society; is considering peacekeeping as equivalent to soldiering; a mistake for which the UN paid and is still paying the price. Even with a mandate to do so; the peacekeepers are not fit for soldiering and engaging in wars⁶¹.

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ Tripodi, Paolo (2001), Peacekeeping: Let the Conscripts do the Job, *Security Dialogue*, 32; 155, Sage Publications

It is also argued that increasing existing troops and enlarging the mission size and mandate, though could solve certain problems and deficiencies but do not always lead to better results for the final outcome. In principle, the UN should get the appropriate mandate and level of authority in addition to the right size and needed resources for the mission upfront. These should not be causes for mission incapacitation or failure in any way. Suitable intelligence and credible information and military advice should guide these variables before the deployment even starts.

In a presidential statement of the Security Council in December 1998, the Council gave an incoherent framework with wide range of undefined prerequisites for the quest for peace in Africa that included, a comprehensive, concerted and determined approach, encompassing the eradication of poverty, the promotion of democracy, sustainable development and respect for human rights, as well as conflict prevention and resolution, including peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance⁶². The notion was that peacekeeping operations in Africa and elsewhere did not portray a definite set of rules and roles. The token principles were the deployment following consent of conflicting parties, impartiality, assurance of state sovereignty and non-use of force except in self defence. The latter, basically does not say much on what and how things are to be done under which circumstances, and what are the border lines, if any, that peacekeeping and peace-building should be operational within to ensure peace and security. And even these principles were hard to follow completely as the Security Council was obliged at many instances to mandate the Peacekeeping operation to use force to protect civilian lives under physical threat and humanitarian

⁶² United Nations (1998), Statement by The President Of The Security Council, No. S/PRST/1998/29 delivered on 24 September 1998

assistance. The traditional terms associated with the peacekeeping were proven to be insufficient and ineffective framework for action. Not only did it negatively reflect - many times- on the countries where peacekeeping operations were deployed, but it evidently back fired on the UN itself at other times such as in Sierra Leone in late nineties where peacekeeping operations became a target and part of the conflict. In August 2000, the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations challenged the principles of consent, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence. Where the panel agreed that these should remain the basis for the principles of peacekeeping, it argued that consent may be manipulated in many ways, and hence, impartiality by the United Nations in dealing with conflicting parties caused much damage to the credibility of the UN especially in the nineties as a result of its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor⁶³. The contradiction in stressing necessity while acknowledging the ineffectiveness associated with the said measures can only cause confusion. Real life scenarios cause even more confusion, for example, Alain Le Roy, Under Secretary General for peacekeeping operations, said in February 2009 that the Congo mission had tottered on the "brink of catastrophe" after it was forced to take sides in recent fighting⁶⁴, which leads us to believe that scarcity of options in the hands of the UN cripples any attempts to reform or improve the peace operations on a strategic level.

Despite evident successes, the UN peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts failed in many ways, especially during the nineties, transparency of the UN in dealing with this issue went as far as 1) acknowledging the problem by Secretary Generals and

⁶³ Ibid, United Nations (2000), Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations

⁶⁴ Tisdall, Simon (2009), Peacekeeping without the Peace, The Guardian, February 12, 2009 Retrieved in October 2009 from: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199/40879.html>

different UN officials and reports 2) rethinking peace operations and seeking frank assessment and recommendations from expert panels (Brahimi Report) which acknowledged the UN impasse 3) emphasizing the need for Peacekeeping reform and many other measures. In his report "No Exit Without Strategy" to the Security Council in 2001, the Secretary General recognized the many difficulties and challenges that Peacekeeping operations faced in the nineties and the ineffectiveness of UN measures to ensure peace and security where it had to withdraw its operations in some cases and modified the mandates of other missions in other cases; all of which failed to prevent the relapse into conflict⁶⁵.

One of the answers that the UN approached in Africa to overcome the challenges it faced in the continent was empowering African peacekeeping and partnering with African countries and organizations in securing regional peace. This approach was largely forwarded by Africa itself especially in the nineties in response to continued UN inertia in attending to African conflicts.

Notwithstanding the tempting idea of transferring housekeeping responsibilities to the household, this too, remains a fundamental aspect that the UN must perfect if it were to ever live up to the expected potential. The issue of turfs should also be handled with great care in order to maintain the notion of "shared responsibility". During the early eighties, the former Organization of African Unity was the first to field an operation in Chad, followed by Treaty on Non- Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence (ANAD) between Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo which in 1986, deployed a small group of military observers to monitor the border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali. This was followed by the more sizeable operations undertaken by ECOMOG (Economic Community of

⁶⁵ Ibid, United Nations (2001),

West African States Monitoring Group)⁶⁶ including in Sierra Leone and SADC (Southern African Development Community)⁶⁷ in addition to other organizations. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ECOMOG interventions served as the foundation upon which subsequent deployment of larger United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and international humanitarian missions were built upon in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire.

On the ground, systematic peacekeeping involvement was brought with the declaration of the establishment of, within the former Organization of African Unity, of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was adopted in 1993. Another milestone was reached with the establishment of the African Union which in 1999 with the objective to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent among other objectives. The establishment of the African Union marked a turning point towards "Africa taking care of Africa" in the different security and developmental aspects and hence the direction of African solutions to Africa Problems. The central organ of the former OAU on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was later incorporated in the African Union in 2001. Another land mark of the security dimension was brought about with the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

The activation of the UN-African partnership in peacekeeping faced many hurdles at the beginning. This is evidenced in the report of the special committee on

⁶⁶ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is a non-standing military force consisting of land, sea and air components, that was set up by member states of the ECOWAS to deal with the security problem that followed the collapse of the formal state structure in the Republic of Liberia in 1990.


⁶⁷ The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been in existence since 1980, when it was formed as a loose alliance of nine majority-ruled States in Southern Africa known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), with the main aim of coordinating development projects in order to lessen economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa. The founding Member States are: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For more information : <http://www.sadc.int/>

peacekeeping operations which addressed the "comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects" in 2001 where the report outlined that efforts aimed at enhancing the capacity of African countries in the various aspects of peacekeeping in Africa are complementary to the obligations of all United Nations Member States and are not intended to replace or reduce engagement of non-African countries in peacekeeping operations on the continent. This became less apparent later; as the UN focused more on the need for African substantive involvement, coupled with rather acute reluctance from Western countries to contribute troops. As this reluctance was maintained; the establishment of the African Union came and eyes were drawn to a more substantial role of African countries in peacekeeping which was materialized in the first African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003. The main task of AMIB was to oversee the implementation and verification of the ceasefire agreements, as well as to assist in the disarmament and demobilization. In the World Summit of 2005, clear reference was made to UN peacekeeping in Africa and support to the African Union and African peacekeeping⁶⁸. Today, African peacekeeping troops are found in Sudan and Somalia. But African peacekeeping as an operational mechanism for the African Union is still considered new and there is no clear evidence showing that African Union peacekeeping missions have an easier task than UN led operations', and as such, African troops are still involved in UN led as well as hybrid operations as outlined below.

Figure No. 2

⁶⁸ United Nations (2005), **2005 World Summit** Outcome Ref. A/RES/60/1 on 24 October 2005

Top 20 Contributors of Uniformed Personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations



* Figures as of 30th April 2009

* Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. www.un.org

We notice from the above chart that eight African countries are ranked at the top 20 contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations with Nigeria leading the African league (5,792 troopers). While countries with strong armies such as the USA, Germany and UK did not make the top 20 list, sub-optimal ranking was given to countries like France (2,543 troopers) and China (2,150 troopers). There is no reason to believe that the past and present trend of frail involvement of Western countries will change except in cases where political considerations and states interests dictate otherwise.

Post conflict Peace-building in Africa

Post conflict Peace-building in Africa followed a different pattern(s) than the one adopted in peacekeeping, though went hand in hand in nearly all peacekeeping missions deployed in Africa. Out of a total 24 peacekeeping missions in Africa, only three did not have peace-building components. It is seen that the integration of peace-building activities in Peacekeeping missions' mandates have marginalized the overall ultimate objective of peace-building in the immediate post conflict peacekeeping and allowed for more emphasis on peacekeeping itself. Hence, even with positive impact

of the peace-building efforts, this was attributed to the multidimensional nature and enlarged mandate of the peacekeeping operation. This has also confused any attempt to separately assess the actual impact of peace-building activities. As opposed to peacekeeping efforts, peace-building is regarded as a long term undertaking that addresses root causes of conflicts. Though it may start as an integral part of peacekeeping but goes beyond the timeframe of the peacekeeping and is sustained by the UN, local governments, organizations and international partners. The immediate short term peace-building interventions associated with peacekeeping aims at materializing short term gains to solidify peace, build confidence in the peace process and stimulate a vision for a better future⁶⁹. This integral approach was not always favoured by the international partners. In his presidential elections debate in October 2000 and responding to a question on Somalia, President Bush commented that "I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war"⁷⁰. In addition to the latter, the peace-building efforts lacked a coherent approach in general. Ever since the concept of post conflict peace-building was introduced in 1992, UN peace-building appeared to stick to its infant phase and failed to mature to a strategic and structured UN policy or direction.

In post Cold War, Africa suffered from fragile peace and security conditions that resulted in war spillovers, conflict escalations, and even the birth of new conflicts, especially civil wars throughout the continent. This period also saw internal and interstate conflicts in a total of 30 sub-Saharan states. Today, one fifth of the population in Africa still lives in conflict zones. This suggests that, in principle,

⁶⁹Ibid, De Coning, Cedric (2008)

⁷⁰ Ibid, George Bush (2000)

peace-building as a conflict prevention tool is a necessary pre-emptive undertaking throughout the conflict stages. In order to maintain the focus of this thesis on the UN conflict prevention through post conflict peace-building, we look first at the peace-building activities associated with peacekeeping missions during the period 1999-2008 and then attention will be drawn to UN institutionalized peace-building initiatives in post conflict African countries including officially mandated peace-building support missions and finally; country listing under the UN peace-building Commission is analysed.

UN Post Conflict Peace-building Associated With Peacekeeping Missions During the Period 1999- 2008

The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola which was completed in 1999 was mandated with political, human rights, and humanitarian aspects in addition to policing and military issues to support the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country. The Mission in Central African Republic Mission (MINURA) which ended in 2000 was mandated to support the conduction of presidential elections and supervise the destruction of confiscated weapons in addition to other tasks. In Sierra Leone, the United Nations Missions (1999- 2005) encouraged the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning and was also mandated to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to provide support to the elections and security sector reform activities in addition other tasks.

In November of 1999, the peacekeepers were deployed in Congo to work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war, military captives and cooperate with international humanitarian agencies in addition to mine action activities,

disarmament demobilization and reintegration, support to elections, security sector reform; strengthening democratic institutions and strengthening the capacity of the judicial and correctional systems, including the military justice system among other tasks.

On July 2000, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was established to coordinate and provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine-action activities and support to human rights among other tasks.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (2003- present) was established to undertake disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties, support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance, support for security reform and state institutions.

In 2004 the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was mandated to support disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement plans, reform of the security sector, support for humanitarian assistance, support for the redeployment of State administration, elections, human rights, law and order among others.

In the same year of 2004, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was established to assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, support to security sector reform, elections and human rights, judiciary and improving correction system.

In 2005, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and mandated the mission to undertake disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in addressing the need for a national inclusive approach, including the role of women, towards reconciliation and peace-building; training police,

promoting rule of law and human rights, supporting democratic electoral process, mine action among other tasks. This was followed in 2007 by another Mission in Sudan. A joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) which was mandated to assist the political process in order to ensure that it is inclusive, and to support the African Union-United Nations joint mediation in its efforts to broaden and deepen commitment to the peace process, to contribute to a secure environment for economic reconstruction and development, as well as the sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes, and to contribute to the promotion of respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Darfur. The mission is also tasked to assist in the promotion of the rule of law in Darfur, including through support for strengthening an independent judiciary and the prison system, and assistance in the development and consolidation of the legal framework.

Finally, the last peacekeeping operation established in 2007 by a resolution of the Security Council is the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT); also has significant peace-building components as well. The multidimensional presence intended to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, support to human rights and rule of law, humanitarian assistance in addition to support to regional peace.

Taking into consideration that the concept of post conflict peace-building was introduced in 1992 within the report of the UN Secretary General on Agenda for Peace, we may consider that the peace missions established post 1992 with mandates that included non- peacekeeping tasks, were authorized as part of peace-building

efforts in spite of not having clear reference to the term in the mandates issued by the Security Council at all times. In other words, the intention was to incorporate peace-building activities. The mere association of these activities with traditional peacekeeping gives the activities a unique position in considering them peace-building activities, even though many of these programmes and activities could and are being implemented in different parts of the world in non- post conflict settings and under different naming like recovery, reform, development and others. The list of activities that were architected to formulate peace-building within the above mentioned missions (1999- present) is long. This gives an indication of the lack of strategic approach towards peace-building and does not necessarily denote the effectiveness of these activities. This also gives a clear signal of the over stretched parameters of peacekeeping and peace-building in a manner that makes it difficult to categorize and operationalize the conceptual frameworks of the UN peace work. For example, one of key UN development organs is UNDP working in different countries and various settings. UNDP normally undertakes mine action activities in peaceful countries as well as in conflict zones as part of its developmental or humanitarian assistance without even mentioning its impact as a conflict prevention measure most times. By placing the mine action activity in post conflict setting it automatically becomes a peace-building activity. In this light, it makes sense to say that development and humanitarian assistance is regarded as part of peace-building or vice versa. The same applies to other measures such as good governance, rule of law, human rights and others. In reality there are no clear border lines or guidelines governing this categorization.

Peace-building Missions in Africa (1990s – Till the Present)

Table No. 5: Peace-building and Political Missions in Africa

Mission	Year established	Status	Existence of Peacekeeping Operation	Security Council mandate	On the Agenda of Peace-building Commission
United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)	1995	Active	yes	No	No
Office of the Great Lake Region*	1997	closed	-	No	-
United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS)	1999	Active	no	Yes	yes
United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA)	2000	Active	Yes	No	Yes
United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)**	2000	Active	-	Yes	-
United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)	2005	Closed	Yes	Yes	yes
United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)	2006	Active	yes	Yes	yes
United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)	2008	Active	Yes	Yes	yes

* Great Lake Region includes the following countries: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia

** West Africa region includes the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte D'ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togolese.

The above table indicates, five African countries, two regional missions, the total is eight African missions with "peace-building" term integrated in the name of three of the missions, despite the fact that all of eight had peace-building mandates. Out of 18 political and peace-building missions, Africa's share was 8 missions, almost 45% in total. Another observation could be made on the fact that excluding (United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) and regional missions), all countries with peace-building missions had presence of a peacekeeping operation

before, during or after the establishment of the mission, which proves the solid link between the deployment of peacekeeping operations and the formal establishment of peace-building offices. From 1999, all countries with peace-building missions were also listed on the UN Peace-building Commission agenda (except for United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA); which is a regional mission that addresses many countries; two of which are listed on the agenda). This connotes that security and peace conditions in these countries were considered important for international peace. Going back to the mandates of the peacekeeping operations of these countries, we notice that the Security Council reiterated the threat that these countries continue to pose on international peace and security. The commitment shown in asserting the need for peace interventions through peacekeeping (which integrated peace-building components), establishing peace-building support offices and listing on the peace-building commission agenda outlines important conclusions; first, that peace-building was emphasized by the UN in post conflict countries, second; that the UN addresses peace-building needs through different modalities of intervention; third, that the need for these different methods of operations implies the sub-optimal results/ impact that the previous methods conceived; fourth; that the lessons learned from past experiences necessitated the establishment of a more comprehensive and strategic approach to peace-building ; and finally that the implicit and explicit priority action by the UN in post conflict countries was peace-building .

We also noticed from the above table that the first political/ peace-building office was established in African Somalia. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) which was established by the Secretary General on 15 April 1995 taking the lead from two consecutive UN peacekeeping operations; the United Nations Operation In Somalia I & II, to advance the cause of peace and reconciliation through

contacts with Somali leaders, civic organizations and the States and organizations concerned. The mission stands as a proof of the inconsistency the UN had in the method of establishing formal peace-building offices that were not always authorized by the Security Council. Though the mission was not originally authorized by the Council, but the Council acknowledged the important peace-building role which the mission assumed. The Council authorized UNPOS: to promote reconciliation through dialogue between Somali parties; to assist efforts to address the “Somaliland” issue; to coordinate support for the peace process by Somalia’s neighbours and other international partners; and to play a leading political role in peace-building activities.

In 1999, the Security Council established the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), with a mandate to promote national reconciliation, respect for human rights and the rule of law; support national capacity for conflict prevention; encourage security sector reform and stable civil-military relations; encourage government efforts to crack down on small arms trafficking; and to work within a comprehensive peace-building strategy to strengthen state institutions and mobilize international resources.

In 2000, the Security Council welcomed a decision by the Secretary-General to establish a United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA). BONUCA was mandated to support the Government’s efforts to consolidate peace and national reconciliation, strengthen democratic institutions and facilitate the mobilization at the international level of political support and resources for national reconstruction and economic recovery in the country. In addition, the Office is tasked with promoting public awareness of human rights issues in the country and monitoring developments in this field. BONUCA also includes a small number of military and civilian police advisers to follow up on security-related

reforms and to assist in the implementation of the training programmes for the national police, which were initiated by the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA).

Also in 2000, the Security Council welcomed the Secretary General's intention to establish of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA). The Office was tasked to enhance linkages in the work of the United Nations and other partners in the sub-region, by promoting an integrated sub-regional approach and facilitating coordination and information exchange, with due regard to specific mandates of United Nations organizations as well as peacekeeping operations and peace-building support offices; to liaise with and assisting, as appropriate, the Economic Community of West African States and the Mano River Union, in consultation with other sub-regional organizations and international partners; and to carry out good offices roles and special assignments in countries of the sub-region, on behalf of the Secretary General, including in the areas of conflict prevention and peace-building efforts. The office deals with disarmament demobilisation and re-integration initiatives in addition to cross border security, youth employment, security sectors reform among other tasks.

In 2005, United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was established by a Security Council resolution to in order to ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peace-building and to enable the continuation of the efforts to assist the Government of Sierra Leone to consolidate peace by enhancing political and economic governance, building the national capacity for conflict prevention, and preparing for elections in 2007.

In 2006, the Security Council authorized the established of United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) to enable a smooth transition to peace-building following

the withdrawal United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) to provide continued peace-building assistance to the Burundian Government by strengthening national capacity to address the root causes of Conflict.

The United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) was authorized by United Nations Security Council resolution 1829 of 4 August 2008, to ensure the continued support of the Organization and the international community for the long-term peace, security and development of Sierra Leone. UNIPSIL is mandated to strengthen and promote human rights; support the activities of the Peace-building Commission and the Peace-building Fund; provide political support to efforts aimed at finding solutions to political tensions and potential conflict; consolidate good governance reform (with a special focus on anti-corruption); support the police and the Armed Forces to ensure that they are able to carry out their tasks effectively; support decentralization; and assist in reviewing the Constitution.

The peace-building missions included a wide variety of mandates and tasks that attempted to address root causes of conflicts of each state individually. Despite the fact that the missions were increasingly mandated by the Security Council, but it was not considered as a rule for the establishment of these missions as in the case of peacekeeping operations. The commitment shown by the UN for a more robust peace-building in post conflict countries was still to be demonstrated through implementing recommendations calling for a more comprehensive institutional approach to peace-building.

Towards an Institutional Approach to UN Post Conflict Peace-building- the Establishment of UN Peace-building Commission

We notice from table no. 5, the more recent involvement of the Security Council in mandating peace-building and political missions. Since 1999, six peace-building missions were established, five of which were authorized by the Security Council and one by the Secretary General; welcomed by the Security Council. The direction towards a more solid approach to peace-building came in the World Summit of 2005 which emphasized the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peace-building to achieve sustainable peace, and recognized the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development. The Summit concluded with a recommendation to establish a Peace-building Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body to address the critical gap in the international community's ability to meet the needs of countries emerging from violent conflicts. This was considered as a measure "born of the realization that the international community was not succeeding in its engagements in post-conflict countries"⁷¹. The Summit also requested the Secretary-General to establish a multi-year standing Peace-building Fund for post-conflict peace-building. The objectives of the Peace-building Fund included ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peace-building activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery.

⁷¹ United Nations (2008), speech by Carolyn McAskie, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, UN Peacebuilding Commission: Lessons Learned & Future Challenges, 7 March 2008. Retrieved in September 2009 from: <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Statements/ASG%20Carolyn%20McAskie/ASG%20key%20note%20Berlin%2007.03.2008.pdf>

The official establishment of the mission was authorized by the Security Council resolution 1645 in December 2005.

In a more recent speaking note of the UN Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding at the United Nations in September 2009, Judy Cheng-Hopkins stated that "Peace-building can comprise conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid or development assistance"⁷². This renewed inclusive approach does not permit a well defined UN approach to post conflict peace-building as this is seen to provide for a continuation of the lack of coherence which the Peace-building Commission was originally established to address.

In its first year of operations, the Peace-building Commission focused its attention on two African countries; Burundi and Sierra Leone. In July 2006, and in response to a request by the Security Council, Burundi and Sierra Leone were formally placed on the agenda of the Commission. Both countries had already expressed a desire to be included on the Peace-building Commission agenda. The same desire was expressed by Guinea-Bissau which was admitted onto the Commission's agenda in December 2007.

The Central African Republic became the fourth country to be added to the PBC agenda in June 2008, following a referral of the country by the Security Council to the Commission in response to a letter from the foreign minister of the CAR to the chair of the Commission requesting that the country be placed on the Commission's agenda. In terms of associating peace-building with peacekeeping and building in the mentioned four cases on the agenda of the peace-building Commission we notice the following; Sierra Leone was admitted onto the agenda in July 2006, almost seven

⁷² United Nations (2009), speaking note by the Judy Cheng-Hopkins UN Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding at the United Nations in 14 September 2009. Retrieved in September 2009 from: <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Statements/SG/Santiago%20-opening%20-%20final%2013Sep09.pdf>

months after the completion of the peacekeeping mission in the country. Burundi was admitted three months before the end of the peacekeeping operation. Guinea-Bissau has never had a peacekeeping mission and finally CAR was placed under the agenda after nine months of the establishment of the peacekeeping mission and both are currently going in parallel. The trend is missed out and that is mostly because of political influence of states, though commonalities between peace-building and peacekeeping were leveraged by the Security Council decisions qualifying countries for peace-building support in addition to the consensual provision which was apparent in all four cases.

The Terms of Reference for the Peace-building fund, the financial arm of the Peace-building Commission scopes peace-building activities as follows⁷³:

- (a) Activities designed to respond to imminent threats to the peace process, support for the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue, in particular in relation to strengthening of national institutions and processes set up under those agreements;
- (b) Activities undertaken to build and/or strengthen national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict and to carry out peace-building activities;
- (c) Activities undertaken in support of efforts to revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends for the population at large;
- (d) Establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities which may include, in exceptional circumstances and

⁷³ United Nations (2009), Report of the Secretary-General on Arrangements for the revision of the terms of reference for the Peacebuilding Fund, doc No. A/63/818, April 2009. Retrieved in September 2009 from: <http://www.unpbf.org/docs/TOR.pdf>

over a limited period of time, the payment of civil service salaries and other recurrent costs.

Critical peace-building priorities in Burundi were given to promoting good governance, strengthening rule of law, reform of security sector and ensuring community recovery while priorities in Sierra Leone were youth unemployment and disempowerment, justice and security sector reform, democracy consolidation and good governance and capacity development. Guinea-Bissau's priorities included reform of public administration; consolidation of the rule of law and security sector reform; combating drug trafficking and organised crime; promotion of professional technical training and youth employment; addressing the needs of vulnerable groups; rehabilitation of infrastructure, in particular the energy sector; and reactivation of the economy. And finally CAR priority action plan included security sector reform, promotion of good governance and the rule of law and revitalization of communities affected by conflicts.

As for the Peace-building Fund, out of the nine countries benefiting from the fund, eight are African countries (Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Comoros, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire) with a total budget of over \$ 141 million. The Commission is still young and the number of cases it deals with is very limited to have a credible assessment of the effectiveness of this structure in preventing post conflict countries from relapsing into conflict. In addition to working on a limited number of cases, the Commission was preoccupied during the inception years in organizational and procedural matters.

The Commission's establishment and work is still too recent to start evaluating its long term impact on security and peace conditions in the countries it deals with. In line with all arguments concerning the confused or lack of strategic approach to

peace-building, association with peacekeeping or stand alone processes of peace-building activities in post conflict countries, we need to concentrate on an important issue. It is difficult to measure successes of peace-building efforts in achieving sustainable peace, especially in the short term since economic factors drive the long-term prospects of peace in the average post-civil war country⁷⁴.

Similarly, it is difficult to attribute recurrence of war in post conflict countries to failed UN peace-building activities as normally numerous factors and actors come into play. This leads us to a very naive but true assumption that even if peace-building efforts were ineffective, they can not be harmful. For example, if the UN did not have much success in reforming the security sector, the worst thing that can result from this failure within the limited involvement of the UN would be modest progress or maintaining the status quo in terms of security sector capacities; but still, the road for reform would have been paved preparing for stronger efforts. In all cases and in all what peace-building potentially encompasses, one reality should be emphasized which is that the responsibility of peace and security through peace-building or any other measure is on the states themselves not the UN and not the international community, despite the fact that these actors can play an important role in supporting countries emerging from conflicts to build and keep peace.

⁷⁴ Sambanis, Nicholas (2007), Short-Term and Long-Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4207. Retrieved in June 2009 from http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2007/04/13/000016406_20070413150931/Rendered/PDF/wps4207.pdf

Chapter Three: Analysis of United Nations' Intervention in Selected African Countries



Figure No. 3: Map of Africa

3. Chapter Three: Analysis of United Nations' Intervention in Selected African Countries

This thesis covers United Nations Peacekeeping and Peace-building interventions in African countries in post conflict situation and focuses on three main cases: Burundi, Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic. As previously mentioned, these three countries were chosen as they are currently on the agenda of the United Nations Peace-building Commission and they have/ had peacekeeping operations as well as formal peace-building missions in them. As such, they constitute perfect sample for analysing the practice and application of systemic UN post conflict peacekeeping and peace-building.

3.1. Burundi Case Study:

Background: Burundi as in other parts of Africa was plagued by civil war which resulted in the death of half a million Burundian and the displacement of another half a million. The geographic fact of common boundaries with Rwanda tells part of the story of the conflict, especially when recognising that the ethnic composition is similar to Rwanda which was branded by ethnic antagonism between the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi who controlled the main institutions of the State in Burundi. The preliminary triggers of the conflict in the nineties included conflicts over political participation and struggle for power, coupled with regional imbalances and the heavy militarization of society⁷⁵. The military coup which resulted in the assassination of the Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye in 1993 and the subsequent large scale massacres of the minority Tutsi, followed by the Tutsi dominated army

⁷⁵ M. Khadiagala, Gilbert (2003), *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*, edited by Jane Boulden, Palgrave Macmillan

retaliation against Hutus⁷⁶ caused a break out of conflict that would severely impact the political stability and security conditions in Burundi for years to come. Following the assassination of Ndadaye, the then UN Secretary General; Butros Ghali proposed an international military intervention force to restore stability in Burundi, but the Secretary General statements only resulted in October 1993 in another statement by the Security Council demanding the reinstatement of democracy and constitutional rule in Burundi, in addition to condemnation of the military act against the democratically elected Government.

It was clear from the outset of the conflict that the Security Council members are reluctant to deploy UN peacekeepers. This was majorly attributed to the challenges that the UN faced in Somalia. Instead, the Security Council sent the UN Under Secretary General, James Jonah on a fact finding mission late October 1993. Jonah immediately after his mission ruled out the UN military intervention because of the high costs and dangers to member states and called for a bigger role by the former Organization of African Unity to prevent conflict in Burundi. The African states reacted positively, especially the ones that hosted Burundian refugees and as a result, the African Mission for Protection and Restoration of Trust in Burundi (MIPROBU) was deployed with 180 soldiers and 20 civilians strength to restore order and mediate the selection of a new president and the military withdrawal power, but not all Burundian parties welcomed this move as the Tutsi military and other sides considered the former OAU as an interference. African and UN mediation resumed, with UN mediation role presented through the appointment of Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah as the Special Representative of the Secretary General to facilitate the

⁷⁶ International Crisis Group (1998), **Burundi Under Siege: Lift the Sanctions; Re-Launch the Peace Process**, Rapport Burundi No. 127. Retrieved in October 2009 from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400217_28041998.pdf

dialogue between the conflicting parties, restore the democratic institutions and to work in close collaboration with the new OAU mission to that end. But in comparison with the regional African role led by the former OAU and key figures such as former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Nelson Mandela afterwards; the UN role remained shy and supplementary throughout the majority of the peace process. Eventually, and at some point, both African and UN threats of peace enforcement lost credibility as threats were not coupled with action and hence, the fighting was prolonged.

1994 negotiations in Burundi resulted in the elections of Cyprien Ntaryamira as new president by the parliament, but only lasted for few months after which he was killed in a shooting down of a plane which was also carrying the Rwandan president (Juvenal Habyarimana). The negotiations also brought about the signature of the Government convention by twelve political parties in September of the same year of 1994. In 1996, another president (Leonard Nyangoma) was ousted in a military coup by former president Pierre Buyoya (Tutsi Party) failing all regional mediation efforts of Arusha.

Ebbs and flows in security and peace conditions in addition to signing and breaching ceasefire agreements, resumption and freezing of peace processes continued; leading to the Arusha II agreement in 1998 between 18 Burundian parties. Nelson Mandela succeeded Nyerere after the former's demise and managed to persuade 13 of Arusha parties to sign the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000 followed by transitional power sharing period as provided in the Accord. This led to 2005 democratic elections, deployment of an African then UN peacekeeping operations and the marking of the end of spiral of violence in Burundi with the signed cease-fire

agreement in September 2006, between the Government of Burundi and the last rebel movement- the PALIPEHUTU-FNL.⁷⁷ Notwithstanding the former, and the progress in security conditions in Burundi, but Burundi is still far from establishing durable peace with major security concerns still looming threatening the peace accomplishments so far.

UN Role in Burundi:

The UN formal role began as shy political attempts with no solid support from the UN Security Council, clear opposition by some Burundian parties of UN presence, especially through peacekeeping and an undecided relation/ supremacy of UN vs. African mission. But the main attribute of the road to peace in Burundi included extensive negotiations, political regional and international mediation, sanctions and numerous agreements and peace conferences.

To examine the UN role we begin by the UN Secretary General; Butros Ghali's calls for UN military intervention in 1993 to restore stability. Despite the fact that the intervention did not happen at the time, and instead the UN reacted by sending a small fact finding mission in addition to Security Council condemnations; but this incident merits a pose and reflection. The military intervention at that point would have in fact been an unprecedented act by the UN and a new re-configuration of peacekeeping operations mandate in intra-state conflicts that dominated the security instabilities in post Cold War. The un-orthodox call would have served the UN peace operations a great deal of novelty in ending civil wars and protecting civilians in conflicts; in adverse to deploying in what is called "post-conflict" situations. The practicality of this matter, however, needs to be applied in the proper context and

⁷⁷ Smaller Hutu rebel group, Forces for National Liberation

realities on the ground which evidenced at that time, the incapacity of the UN to successfully administer the armed soldier role in Africa. The tragic successive failures of peace missions in the nineties; is a case in point. The subsequent new roles which the UN has assumed in conflict zones such as Kosovo demonstrate an un-tapped potential which the UN is yet to properly explore provided the existence of international will and/ or political interest. In the case of 1993 Burundi, the fact finding mission led by under-secretary general, James Jonah, explicitly voiced the un-readiness of the international community and particularly the Security Council members to bear the costs of ending the war in Burundi. But the opening of the door for an evolved role of the UN in protecting civilians in conflicts including by peacekeeping missions was maintained as an option. In UN Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999) on the Protection of civilians in armed conflict the Council expressed its "willingness to consider how peacekeeping mandates might better address the negative impact of armed conflict on civilians" without explicitly defining the measures to be taken⁷⁸. The emphasis was reiterated numerous by the Council as well as the international community thereafter without effective scoping of actual steps to be taken, especially through peacekeeping practice, to oblige parties to conflicts to abide by the Council's non-mandatory acts.

While the former OAU mission was being prepared to deploy in Burundi in 1993, the Security Council approved on sending a small mediation team led by Special Representative of the Secretary General, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, which resulted in a great disappointment for Burundian government which was expecting the

⁷⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999)

deployment of no fewer than 5,000 men⁷⁹. Ould-Abdallah forged a strong partnership with the former OAU and worked together towards political reconciliation and confidence building process which produced a power sharing agreement in 1994 whereby the National Assembly selected a Hutu President Cyprien Ntaryamira who appointed a Tutsi Prime Minister of a multi-party government. An event which failed to hold or maintain peace, and violent clashes resumed shortly afterwards and situation further worsened when Ntaryamira was killed. At that time, the UN drew its attention to Rwanda and all efforts –including UN's- fell short to avoid a Rwandan impact on Burundi and hence affects on Burundian power sharing negotiations in 1994. Internal and external factors shaping the Burundian power struggle and peace processes were coupled by frail UN mediation obstructed by the resignation of Ould-Abdallah who accused Butros Ghali of taking actions "threatening to further destabilize the entire region"⁸⁰. In 1996, the United Nations Office in Burundi was established as a confidence building measure to facilitate the restoration of constitutional rule in Burundi.

The attention was drawn once again in 1997, this time away from Burundi and to the Democratic Republic of Congo's struggle of power which resulted in overthrowing President Mobutu. The attention was narrowed even more with the establishment of the UN political mission; the Office of the Great Lake Region which overlooked over eleven countries; many of which were deeply inflicted with civil conflicts. In a way, and from the start of the Burundian conflict, it seemed that the UN Security Council placed modest importance around the conflict in Burundi and its consequences,

⁷⁹ Ibid, M. Khadiagala, Gilbert (2003)

⁸⁰ Ould-Abdallah, Ahmedou, cited in M. Khadiagala, Gilbert, Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations, edited by Jane Boulden, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003

especially when comparing the UN role to that of the African countries'. The UN efforts in 1999 were directed towards short term peace-building initiatives embraced in the "extended humanitarian aid" strategy which included the rehabilitation of schools, houses, water and health in addition to focusing on the resettlement of displaced and returning refugees. Contemplating the preceding of UN peace-building to the peacekeeping operations, we do not necessarily step into a unique situation. In reality and as mentioned in a previous section, numerous UN measures are applied in different country contexts are called peace-building when introduced in a post conflict situation. Though in 1999, the context in which Burundi was in, did not perfectly qualify as a post conflict situation but the peace process was ongoing and efforts to sustain peace were being put in place and more factions were joining in the peace process and abandoning the arms. The question here is why peacekeeping was not an option at this point? If we look into the traditional application of peacekeeping measures, we clearly notice that the postponement of peacekeeping was the right conduct as the end of war was not concluded. The UN reports and resolutions throughout 2004 implicitly or explicitly asserted the right moment for a peace operation in Burundi which meant reaching a peace agreement between all conflicting Burundian parties. That explanation puts an end to the question, but when comparing it to other missions and deployments; we miss out the trend as the peacekeeping operations were not always deployed in accordance with the latter principle. Going back to the peacekeeping phases rationale previously discussed, we notice again that this is not an obvious ground to base a direct answer on. The only reality that persisted during the nineties in Burundi was that the international community was not completely ready to deal with the conflict in Burundi and the reluctance of the UN was compensated by a more credible role played by regional actors.

Diplomatic and political initiatives continued to lead the work of regional and international actors with the signing of the 2000 Arusha Accord for Peace and Reconciliation which provided for a three year transition period whereby only parties to the peace negotiations who signed the Arusha accord would be entitled to participate in the transitional government. This was followed by a series of agreements and negotiations but till this point, a number of Burundian conflicting factions had not joined the peace negotiations, especially the FNL. In addition, the Arusha marked the creation of the International Monitoring Committee chaired by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General to the Great Lakes region and the donors' conference followed in 2001 to put together an aid package to revive Burundi's economy. The Arusha Accord brought about another task for the UN in monitoring ceasefire provision as part of the Ceasefire Commission work which also included representatives of the Government of Burundi, the combatants of the political parties and movements, the former Organization of African Unity and the Regional Peace Initiative; but most importantly, Article 8 of Protocol V of the Accord stated that "Immediately following the signature of the Agreement, the Burundian Government shall submit to the United Nations a request for an international peacekeeping force in conformity with and for the purposes set forth in article 27, paragraph 5 of Protocol III to the Agreement. Account must be taken of United Nations practice in this respect. This force shall be responsible inter alia for:

- (a) Ensuring respect for the ceasefire;
- (b) Supervising integration;
- (c) Providing technical support for demobilization aid and training;
- (d) Ensuring protection of the institutions and of any public figure who so wishes;
- (e) Assisting in the establishment and training of an ethnically balanced special unit for the protection of the institutions"⁸¹.

⁸¹ Arusha Accord for Peace and Reconciliation 2000, Article 27 (a) and Article 8 of Protocol V.

In addition, the United Nations was granted chairmanship as well as membership on the Implementation Monitoring Committee of the Accord. The Accord also stated the "unity within the defence and security forces" as one of the prerequisites for the establishment and maintenance of peace and security. While African peacekeeping troops (and not UN) were deployed in 2001 to protect returning political leaders, this measure was coupled by a Security Council Resolution No. 1375 supporting the establishment of an interim multinational security presence in Burundi, at the request of its Government to protect returning political leaders and train an all-Burundian protection force. The resolution, notably did not enact chapter VI or VII, and additionally did not portray the Burundian conflict as a threat to international peace and security like other resolutions establishing peace missions did, despite the fact that the resolution acknowledged the threat to regional peace at a minimum. Till this point, the UN gave the lead on security situation to Africans and priority was given to peace-building, but mainly political role, despite the explicit reference to UN peacekeeping in the Accord. The Arusha Accord, like previous agreements, failed to decisively enforce ceasefire and despite active diplomatic movement; rebels stepped up their attacks in Burundi. The numerous Burundian factions and wings made it difficult to gain buy-in from all conflicting parties which led to cautious culmination in the conflict cycle which was inflicted regularly by attacks by rebels and factions that remained outside the peace process. Again, it seemed that the UN's maintained ease in overlooking the deployment of peacekeepers was justified; as post-conflict feature had not prevailed till that point, despite the overall improvement in security conditions, while at the same time, it could be argued that the peace-building initiatives did not succeed in building peace and security.

The case of Burundi and UN involvement is unique in its effective demonstration of the ability of Africa to mediate and to partner with the UN in conflict resolution in African countries. The initial deployment of African peacekeepers and African leadership in monitoring ceasefires and brokering peace agreements with the UN as a key actor sends a clear message of how defined roles can be elaborated with the UN mobilizing international support and assistance while peace process is brokered by the African countries. Notwithstanding the postponement of the deployment of UN peacekeepers following the Arusha Accord; the game on the ground voiced a clear division of labour. Whether this arrangement was deliberate or was born out of the stalemate of ineffective and unproductive UN is questioned. But still, this case proves that the notion of "Africa taking care of Africa" can actually work. This was evidenced again in 2003 through the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) by the newly found African Union. AMIB's mandate included overseeing the implementation of ceasefire agreements, supporting the demobilization, disarmament and re-integration, promoting political and economic stability and working to achieve conditions that are favourable for the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission. AMIB's presence on the ground was effective but faced many difficulties which rendered many challenges in keeping peace in the country. The lack of financial resources to sustain the mission in addition to weak international support and assistance threatened the peace efforts and as a result, Burundi was on verge of relapsing into a renewed spiral of violent conflict, especially with the existence of armed factions that were still outside the peace negotiations. In the meantime, the UN was still waiting for the right moment to intervene. The right moment in UN terms meant the already established security conditions and the inclusion of all conflicting parties in the peace accord. In that year of 2003, the Security Council decided on 66

resolutions, half of which addressed conflict situations in Africa, none of them on Burundi despite the fact that the President of Burundi in a statement to the Security Council in September 2003 requested the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission. The same request was reiterated in December 2003 by the Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Jacob Zuma who was mandated by the African Union to report to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi and to request urgent direct assistance for the Burundian peace process. On the one hand, Zuma reported on the tremendous progress which had been made over the past year, including the deployment of AMIB. On the other hand, he voiced the urgency for financial resources to be found without delay to enable the AMIB to continue to fulfill its mandate.

He also reiterated that the continued success of the Burundi peace process requires more direct United Nations involvement and that the African and Burundian parties have made their contribution and have brought Burundi this far. He emphasized that the international community must now help to consolidate those positive gains and sought to that end, UN urgent and direct involvement by taking over the African mission and transferring it into a UN peace operation⁸².

Soon afterwards in January 2004, two missions visited Burundi. The first one was a joint mission by the AU, EU and UN to assess the financial and logistical arrangements needed to sustain AMIB till its replacement by a UN mission and the other mission was headed by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General in Congo and was tasked to look into the possibility of transferring the AMIB to a UN mission.

⁸² United Nations (2003), Security Council meeting 4876 Record No. S/PV.4876 on 4 December 2003

The Creation of the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)

Having determined that the situation in Burundi constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1545, finally decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), despite the fact that not all Burundian factions were included in the accord. Initially ONUB was to be composed of existing AMIB forces, in order to support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation, as provided under the Arusha Agreement. The Council further decided that ONUB shall consist of a maximum of 5,650 military personnel, including 200 observers and 125 staff officers, up to 120 civilian police personnel, in addition to civilian personnel. ONUB's mandate included the following, *inter alia*⁸³;

- to ensure the respect of ceasefire agreements
- to promote the re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces present, monitor and provide security at their pre-disarmament assembly sites, collect and secure weapons and military materiel to dispose of it as appropriate, and contribute to the dismantling of militias as called for in the ceasefire agreements,
- to carry out the disarmament and demobilization portions of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants,
- to monitor the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi and their heavy weapons, as well as the disarmament and demobilization of the elements that need to be disarmed and demobilized,
- to monitor, to the extent possible, the illegal flow of arms across the national borders,

⁸³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1545 on 21 May 2004

- to contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons,
- to contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the Arusha Agreement, by ensuring a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections to take place,
- to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,
- to ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, as well as the security and freedom of movement of ONUB's personnel, and to coordinate and conduct, as appropriate, mine action activities in support of its mandate;

In addition to the former, ONUB was tasked to provide advice and assistance to the transitional Government and authorities to contribute to their efforts:

- to monitor Burundi's borders,
- to carry out institutional reforms as well as the constitution of the integrated national defence and internal security forces and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police
- to proceed with electoral activities,
- to complete implementation of the reform of the judiciary and correction system,
- to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights,
- extending State authority and utilities throughout the territory, including civilian police and judicial institutions,
- carrying out the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants

The long list is seen as a heavy back log that the UN postponed for years. ONUB had a lot to do and too little time to do it. The three year transitional period of the Burundian government was about to expire with an urgent need to prepare for the elections and other arrangements to move out of the transitional setting including the power sharing and the attempt to include all factions and wings in the peace process. The situation was fragile and the newly established UN peace operation failed preliminary attempts to maintain security in the country and to mediate with Burundian factions outside the peace process (mainly FNL). ONUB also faced difficulties with the army and confirmed frequent violations by the National Defence Force and other Government security forces. The violations included executions, torture, looting, extortion, forced labour and arbitrary arrests and detention.

The height of violence turmoil was brought by the FNL with the Gatumba massacre of August 2004. The ONUB also faced the challenge of gaining trust from the other Burundian parties in the advent of the elections as an impartial actor; where the UN was seen by some as favouring the then Burundian leadership over other wings/parties. This was mainly caused by the unique transition exit setting which Burundi was witnessing at the time. Similarly, the relationship between Burundi's army and ONUB faced many difficulties⁸⁴, and that caused many calls for downsizing the UN forces by some Burundian factions. Despite these challenges, progress was witnessed in the inclusion of the last rebel faction FLN in a ceasefire agreement and maintenance of the democratic process in addition to the support provided to the government according to the authorized mandate.

⁸⁴ Jackson, Stephen (2006), **The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)- Political and Strategic Lessons Learned**, United Nations, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, NY

A study launched in 2006 examining the lessons learned by the UN in Burundi provided that having a peace to keep needs to be balanced against the pressures introduced by intervening late in a peace process⁸⁵. Understanding and focusing on the limitations of peacekeeping suggests that the notion of pre-condition of existing peace to keep should override any ambition or belief in the prospects of peacekeeping and what a peacekeeping mission can potentially do. While the number of civilian casualties over the conflict years was intolerable, but peacekeeping –along the limitations' baggage- was definitely not the answer. A supporting argument can be found in the UN Secretary General's ninth report to the Security Council on the UN operations in Burundi in which he reported in December 2006, almost one and a half years following the deployment of the ONUB that "the incidence of crime, including murder, theft and rape, remained high. The large-scale circulation among the population of small arms and ammunition, including grenades, remained a major security concern. Many of the crimes committed were attributed to uniformed elements, compounding the impact of human rights violations, allegedly involving the national security forces, on the overall security situation."⁸⁶. As such, the peacekeeping operations and its complementary peace-building component could not completely fulfil its mandate through ensuring the promotion and protection of human rights and providing the needed assistance to the Government and security forces to that end.

Clearly, the deployment of the peacekeepers in the nineties would not have contributed in realizing different results. Though late in the peace process, the UN peacekeeping had a better chance of making a real effect with the mandate it had;

⁸⁵ Ibid,

⁸⁶ United Nations (2006), Secretary General's ninth report to the Security Council on the UN Operations in Burundi No. S/2006/994 on 18 December 2006

stipulated in the resolution; than if it had been established early on in the process. As will be noticed in the analysis of the peace-building activities later, UN peace-building started long before the peacekeeping and then became part of the peacekeeping and eventually was resumed post conflict following the completion of the ONUB mandate and the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) in 1 January 2007.

Key messages can also be derived from the reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council in which he recommended the withdrawal of ONUB. The messages provide a lesson learning opportunity through analysing the necessity of the peacekeeping operation to implement peace-building in post conflict Burundi. To that end, we draw the following facts:

- Seventh report of the Secretary General to the Security Council in June 2006 provides that political tension between main political wings overwhelmed the political scene in Burundi in 2006 resulting in massive critique against the Government, withdrawals from the Government and parliament, mutual condemnations and accusations in the media, political arrests which almost jeopardized the peace accords and put national reconciliation in peril.
- The Secretary General also reported that security situation continued to be destabilized by clashes between FNL and the National Defence Forces (FDN), and
- that illicit cross-border activities have continued.
- The report outlined that there had been limited progress in the area of security sector reform and
- that human rights abuses though decreased but still happen⁸⁷.

⁸⁷ United Nations (2006), **Secretary General's seventh report to the Security Council on the UN Operations in Burundi** No. S/2006/429, 21 June 2006

The list of negative, positive and sub-optimal security, governance, political, economic and social conditions goes on, which gave the notion that peacekeeping mission still had a long list of tasks to fulfil both on the peacekeeping and peace-building aspects. Notwithstanding the former, the Security Council resolution 1719 in October 2006 took note of Secretary General's reports and notes stated above and more; acknowledging with concern the possible attempt to perpetrate a coup d'état in Burundi, welcomed the Secretary General's recommendation on the establishment of a United Nations integrated office in Burundi following the withdrawal of ONUB.⁸⁸ The peacekeeping tasks were to be resumed by transferring some of those tasks to the AU special task force which assumed the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres.

As such, ONUB peacekeeping tasks were resumed by the AU while peace-building responsibilities were given to the newly established United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi which was mandated to provide assistance in the areas of Peace consolidation and democratic governance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and reform of the security sector, Promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity which the Office inherited from the peacekeeping mission. The latter suggests the unnecessary and ineffective presence of

⁸⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1719 in 25 October 2006

peacekeeping mission and the ability to effectively transfer the mandate of the peacekeeping mission to other players. The mission's establishment was born out of political context and pressure; as was its completion. This conclusion serves to direct our recommendation of future deployments of peacekeeping operations that are basically a political tool of the Security Council which can be employed to introduce new political context in a given country, develop key partnerships (such as with the AU) and to send political messages to the region and other countries where these missions are deployed. The argument of this thesis deviates from the endeavour to find whether this conduct is right or wrong. It is a mere explanation of what actually is taking place, why, how and when. For example, it could be noted that protection of civilians in armed conflicts should be the main aim of the international community (which provides the answer to the "what" and "why" questions), and that peacekeeping should be deployed (which provides the answer to the "how" question) to protect civilians under physical threat (which provides the answer to the "when" question). But reality is different, and protecting civilians under eminent threat is considered as a by-product of the deployment of peacekeeping and not a reason. The practical view to be comprehended when analysing peacekeeping options should take into account the general principles of peacekeeping and the classic spirit which accompanied the evolution of the peacekeeping, remembering all the time, the political nature and limitations of the employment of peacekeeping measures.

Despite all progress made following the 2004/ 2005 elections and the signing of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement with the last rebel group (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), political scene in 2008 was not promising and the power struggle resumed over government leadership. In addition the disarmament of the last rebel group

PALIPEHUTU-FNL is still to be done⁸⁹. The poor political dialogue continues to be a major concern with real threats of some Burundian wings resorting to violence, especially in 2010 elections⁹⁰. In light of these facts, the UN and regional actors should maintain conflict prevention efforts through reviving the political dialogue, national reconciliation and extensive mediation in addition to resuming peace-building programmes included in the Burundi priority plan as will be discussed later as well as leading the armed parties to DDR camps.

UN Peace-building in Burundi

Peace-building in Burundi commenced during the conflict. The UN peace-building work was multifaceted and included humanitarian as well as development and human rights assistance in addition to other areas. In tracking one of the main activities which started in 1994 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, we notice that human rights monitoring and investigation, promoting human rights and support through capacity building in the fields of rule of law and judiciary was on the UN agenda during and post conflict era, though not necessarily with much effectiveness all the time. As will be pointed out later in this section, strengthening rule of law and the protection of human rights was maintained as part of BINUB mandate and later as a UN priority by the UN peace-building commission in 2006- 2007. This is a classic example of the applicability of peace-building activities in different security contexts. Despite all efforts, political and others to promote human rights, violations persisted and massacres still happened in Burundi

⁸⁹ International Crisis Group (2008), **Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue**, Policy Briefing No. 53, 19 August 2008. Retrieved in June from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1172&l=1>

⁹⁰ International Crisis Group (2009), **Burundi: To Integrate the FNL successfully**, Africa Briefing N°63 30 July 2009. Retrieved in June from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1172&l=1>

leading to the killing of over half a million Burundians in addition to the hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced. This was also coupled with horrendous actions against the civilians. But even in the down times of conflict, there is no much evidence supporting the argument that the peace-building activities had a direct impact on conflict culmination, though could take credit for improved livelihoods through emergency humanitarian assistance provided to the refugees and other communities on local levels. On the one hand, pacific interventions by the UN and regional actors were not in advantage of those who were killed or displaced. On the other hand, the international community was not ready for enforcing peace through military means and to bear the costs associated with ending the war in Burundi. Alternatively, mediation coupled with the sub-optimal peace-building activities seemed to be the only choice and hence became the UN priority during the war years. Whether the UN was right or not in halting the choice of deployment of peacekeepers, is not difficult to conceive as previously explained. In the nineties, peacekeeping would have been a wrong choice. The spiral of conflict would have made the peacekeepers part of the conflict. As indicated before, the ONUB was perceived by some Burundian groups as a biased broker and was resented by a number of factions. The peacekeeping missions; though can be authorized to use force –which ONUB had in 2004- but experience shows that UN peacekeeping missions, in general, are jeopardized massively when acting under this authorization and over expectations demolish any undertaking which produces sub-optimal results. Burundi started the peace process and remained during the negotiations with acute social, economic, political and developmental conditions in addition to a highly militarized society. Massive refugees flows, huge numbers of internally displaced persons, dysfunctional education system, poor economic conditions, and general

violence against civilians who bear the expensive costs of war in Burundi in addition to many other demonstrations of dysfunctional society and bad governance.

In his report to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi in March 2004, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan listed among other things, the economic development as one of the prerequisites for sustainable peace. Annan emphasized that "the nature of the Burundian economy has been a factor in the hostilities, which can, simply put, be considered as competition between the haves and have-nots in a zero-sum game". He also stressed on the fact that "in Burundi, even more so than in other post conflict countries, the equitable expansion of economic and social opportunities is essential for sustainable peace"⁹¹. This was not a surprise to the Security Council or the international community as previous attempts by the UN and other regional and international actors voiced the necessity to address economic recovery in Burundi through financial and aid packages and as a result a number of donor conferences pledging assistance for economic development were organized, but ultimately did not create the needed impetus to find an environment conducive to economic development.

The call for a bigger UN role in peace-building activities was also voiced by the Government of Burundi itself, even when the peacekeeping mission was functioning. In his fifth report to the Security Council In November 2005, the UN Secretary General reported on the Government of Burundi view that reconstruction, development, good governance, human rights and the return of refugees were key

⁹¹ United Nations (2004), Secretary General report to the Security Council on Burundi, S/ 2004/ 210, 16 March 2004

priorities and that the United Nations should primarily focus on providing reconstruction and development assistance.

ONUB completed its mandate on 31 December 2006 as mentioned. It was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), established by Security Council resolution 1719 in October 2006. This peace-building mission was intended to enable a smooth transition after the withdrawal of the peacekeeping operation and to support the Government in its effort towards long-term peace and stability throughout the peace consolidation phase in Burundi. The mandate of BINUB included⁹², inter alia:

- Peace consolidation and democratic governance; which included (a) Strengthening the capacity of national institutions and civil society to address the root causes of conflict and to prevent, manage and resolve internal conflicts, particularly through reforms in the political and administrative spheres; (b) Strengthening good governance and the transparency and accountability of public institutions; (c) Promotion of freedom of the press and strengthening the legal and regulatory framework for the media and communications, and enhancing the professionalization of the media; (d) Consolidation of the rule of law, in particular by strengthening the justice and corrections system, including independence and capacity of the judiciary;
- Disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reform of the security sector;
- Promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity

Shortly afterwards, the Peace-building Commission recommended, in December 2006, that an allocation of at least US\$ 25 million be granted to Burundi in support of

⁹² United Nations Security Council Resolution 1719 on 25 October 2006

its peace-building programme. The Priority Plan was subsequently finalized by the Government of Burundi and the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). On 29 January 2007, the Secretary-General formally announced that an allocation over US\$35 million from the Peace-building Fund had been made towards Burundi, during his address to the summit of the African Union.

The Burundi PBF Priority Plan of 2007 identified the following priority areas⁹³; Governance, strengthening rule of law and the security sector, strengthening the protection of human rights in addition to property/land issues.

For the most of these areas, support was already being provided to the government, but with a long way to go. The priority action plan further stated the prioritization criteria which resulted in identifying the mentioned four areas of interventions. The criteria included, inter alia:

- The priority area is already receiving support, but interventions are not planned before 2007 or 2008, while quick interventions are needed to avoid relapse into conflict.
- The priority area is already receiving substantial support, but some critical components linked to peace-building have not been considered;
- The impact on peace-building is immediate and the amplitude of the risk of relapse into conflict is evident;
- Envisaged results from the interventions have a long term sustainable impact.

The interventions support the establishment of concrete foundations of a state including public institutions, security, judiciary and protection which ideally need to be established in a post conflict situation. It has to be noted that none of these could have given the expected results during the war years. For example, the Burundian

⁹³ United Nations (2007), **Priority Plan for Peace-building in Burundi**, Strategic Note 1, February 2007, United Nations.

military was in fact dominated by Tutsis and the exclusive support of the army during the war years would have been considered as a partisan support to one conflicting party over others and not a distinct technical support to the people of Burundi and the government. By the same token, the public institution was dominated by political minorities and the capacity building long impact on public institutions faced the risk of losing all efforts to new government bringing about new cadres. Based on the former, it is seen that post conflict peace-building is an urgent matter to supplement and sustain the peace accords in Burundi. The BINUB mandate and the Peace-building Fund priority action plan were complemented by socio-economic development strategies addressing poverty alleviation and economic development needed to improve the lives of Burundians.

The long term nature of the peace-building activities and impact does not support an instant assessment of the short term effect of these activities on the government and people of Burundi. The systematic UN post conflict peace-building has only started recently, but what should be noted is that it was emphasized by the Government of Burundi itself, even when the peacekeeping mission was still functioning. Consecutive UN reports and missions following the deployment of ONUB indicated progress in key peace-building areas which ONUB was mandated to undertake including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and militias, security sector reform including national military forces and police, elections, judiciary and the reintegration of returnees in addition to numerous other areas, however the progress was only progress and the need for further assistance in peace-building is still a key to durable peace and security. United Nations Human Development Report for 2009 places Burundi in rank 174 out of 182 countries in the

human development index⁹⁴ which suggests the need for robust and continuous attempts by the UN and international community to build strong state institutions capable of guaranteeing human security in Burundi. As such, multifaceted and continuous peace-building including political and developmental assistance should remain as a priority of the UN in Burundi for the years to come.

⁹⁴ United Nations Human Development Report 2009

3.2. Sierra Leone Case Study:

Background: Security and peace conditions in Sierra Leone have witnessed major shifts in the past two decades. Struggle over power, typical adversary between armed opposition and government, coups, state failure, negotiations, peace agreements and external regional and international interventions were among the main political features. The name of the game was black diamond, corruption and groups interests that evidently fueled the intra state conflict outrage. The roots of the conflict were found in a perceived government corruption and bad governance, neglect of provinces, poverty, alienated youth and influence of external actors; namely former Liberian President Charles Taylor who supported the rebel leaders in Sierra Leone.

The conflict in Sierra Leone dates back to March 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), backed by the Liberian leader, launched a war against – what RUF claimed to be a "corrupt"- All Peoples Congress (APC) government that had ruled the country since 1968, exposing the deterioration of the APC regime and the eminent state failure. In 1992, the Army overthrew the government and established a military junta. In the years to come, the successive Governments would all adopt a war strategy against the RUF even in times of peace negotiations. The first UN Special Envoy was not to be appointed until 1995. Mr. Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia) was appointed in February 1995 to negotiate a settlement and worked with the former Organization of African Unity and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In 1996, parliamentary and presidential elections were held with RUF boycott and amidst the military's notion of staying in power. Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah won the elections and became Sierra Leone president while the RUF did not recognize the elections. As the conflict continued, in November 1996, Special Envoy

Dinka assisted in negotiating a peace agreement -Abidjan Accord- between the civil Government and RUF. The Accord was short lived as a military coup d'état took place in May 1997 with collaboration with RUF and a ruling junta was formed, sending president Kabbah into exile in neighboring Guinea.

The UN Secretary General appointed a new Special Envoy, Francis G. Okelo (Uganda) but Okelo was unsuccessful in ending the junta. This was followed by an oil and arms embargo by the Security Council in October 1997.

In October, a peace plan was signed whereby a ceasefire was agreed to be monitored by ECOMOG. President Kabbah accepted the agreement, and stated his Government's willingness to cooperate with ECOWAS, ECOMOG and the United Nations, but the agreement was never implemented.

In February 1998, ECOMOG, responding to an attack by army junta forces, launched a military attack and ended the junta. On March, President Kabbah was returned to office. The Security Council terminated the oil and arms embargo and strengthened the office of the Special Envoy to include UN military liaison officers and security advisory personnel.

On June 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). The Secretary-General appointed Special Envoy Okelo as his Special Representative and Chief of Mission. The mission mandate included monitoring disarmament of ex-combatants, security situation and respect to international humanitarian law.⁹⁵ Unarmed UNOMSIL teams, under the protection of ECOMOG, documented reports of on-going atrocities and human rights abuses committed against civilians.

⁹⁵ Security Council Resolution 1181(1998). Retrieved in July 2009 from:
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/203/28/PDF/N9820328.pdf?OpenElement>

Late 1998, witnessed an offensive by the rebels overtaking the capital and obliging the UNOMSIL personnel to evacuate from the country, but soon in the same month, ECOMOG troops retook the capital and again installed the civilian government.

Mid year 1999, and with regional collaboration, Okelo; the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, initiated a series of diplomatic efforts and negotiations between the Government and the rebels, to successfully reach an agreement in Lomé to end the conflict and to form a government of national unity as it became obvious that the war could not be won militarily by any of the conflicting parties.⁹⁶ In August 1999, the UN Security Council authorized an increase in the size of the Mission and the number of military observers upon the conflicting parties' request.

Two months later, in October 1999, UNOMSIL was terminated to be replaced by a new mission. The Security Council decision 1270 authorized the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), a new and much larger mission with a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the Government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lomé peace agreement.

In February 2000, the Security Council amended the mandate of UNAMSIL by which the military component was expanded to a maximum of 11,100 military personnel, including the 260 military observers already deployed. The Council also authorized increases in the civil affairs, civilian police, administrative and technical components of UNAMSIL. Three months later, the UNAMSIL was further strengthened to include 13,000 military personnel raised to 17,500 military personnel in March 2001.

As the security situation deteriorated farther, the parties to the conflict signed another ceasefire agreement in Abuja in November 2000 and the Security Council urged the

⁹⁶ Francis, David (2001), Torturous Path to Peace: The Lomé' Accord and Postwar Peace-building in Sierra Leone, *Security Dialogue* 2000; 31; 357

warring parties to abide by the agreement numerous times. In the following year, significant progress was made and the disarmament, demobilization and re-integration plan was officially completed, peaceful elections was assisted by UNAMSIL in May 2002, a special court for war crimes was established and reduction of troops was made as a draw down of UNAMSIL troops started.

However, the UN role in reaching peace settlements as distinct as it was, but was among key other players, mainly civil society domestic support for political settlement on one hand and external support represented by the ECOWAS, the former Organization of African Unity (OAU), Western Governments in addition to the direct involvement of the UN on the other hand. In analyzing the political role that the UN assumed and its contribution to the end of war, the researcher will address part of the negotiated peace settlement process which was evidenced by four key peace accords as stated above. First, the short lived Abidjan Accord in November 1996 which was signed by the Government and the RUF, and negotiated under the auspices of the President of Cote D'Ivoire with the support of the UN, OAU, ESCWAS, the Commonwealth, Western Governments and international Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The Conakry Peace Plan in October 1997 followed and was brokered by ECOWAS with UN support. In March 1998 the plan failed following the restoration of constitutional order and third, the Lomé accord which provided for a national unity government and was considered the first real attempt to end the war but was followed an unprecedented level of casualties and brutal assaults after RUF attack on Freetown in January 1999 but also could not secure peace and stability for the Sierra Leoneans for long. And finally, the November 2000 ceasefire agreement signed in Abuja.

UN Distinct Role in Sierra Leone From the 1990s- 2008:

By large, the UN involvement in Sierra Leonean conflict was one of the most difficult and challenging undertakings that the UN had been involved in, at the time. Having the largest deployment of peacekeepers in the late nineties, was one of the manifestations for the enormity of the UN endeavor in Sierra Leone.

In July 1998, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was established to monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone, and was tasked to disarm and demobilize ex-combatants in addition to monitoring respect for international humanitarian law. The UNOMSIL was terminated on October 1999 by the Security Council which authorized deployment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)⁹⁷; a significantly larger peacekeeping operation than the former.

The UNAMSIL main task was to cooperate with the Government and the stakeholders in implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. On February 2000, the Council further expanded the size of the Mission and again in May 2000 and in March 2001.

UNAMSIL mission was withdrawn in December 2005 by the Security Council decision 1620 to be replaced by a new peace-building mission- the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) – which was established by the Security Council to help consolidate peace in the country. And in 2008, the United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) was authorized by United Nations Security Council resolution 1829 of 4 August 2008, to ensure the

⁹⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1270 on 22 October 1999

continued support of the Organization and the international community for the long-term peace, security and development of Sierra Leone.

The role of the UN was preliminarily manifested in mediation and mostly continuous growing presence making the UNAMSIL the largest UN peacekeeping deployment back then. With a record of disarming and demobilizing more than 75,000 ex-fighters by early 2002, and reaching a declaration of war end, UNAMSIL had contributed to organizing presidential and parliamentary elections, assisted the voluntary return of more than half a million refugees and internally displaced persons and trained thousands of police personnel, and constructed or reconstructed dozens of police stations. UNAMSIL also monitored and trained Sierra Leoneans in human rights and supported the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone on war crimes.

Notwithstanding the previous, UNAMSIL's ever changing mandate caused confusion of the exact priority and tasks of the Mission where it was somewhere in the middle between peacekeeping and peace enforcement⁹⁸ mainly with peace-building components.

Questions of why, when and how peace efforts were conducted, as well as whether there was a well defined role for the UN or even a coherent and consistent approach of conflict prevention and finally if the UN operations were successful, are addressed next.

Chronology of events in Sierra Leone which started as early as 1991 highlights a key attribute in UN role in the conflict. An observer would notice that the UN has

⁹⁸ Chawla, Shalini (2000), United Nations mission in Sierra Leone: A search for peace, **Strategic Analysis**, Routledge Publisher, 24:9,1745-1755

followed a reaction mode of conduct rather than a proactive or preventive one. The ever growing and changing of size and mandate of the successive missions also connote the adoption of a trial and error policy in dealing with the conflict. The root causes, actors and the many factors contributing to the escalation and re-emerging of the conflict in Sierra Leone were maintained over the years to a significant extent but it appears that the steep learning curve of the UN in engaging and dealing with the conflict swayed the ever changing size, number and mandate. The obvious unpreparedness and incapability of the UN of military deterrence made the UN an easy target for the rebels. All in all, the UN assumed a role of a follower of events and shadow of key actors, and had a tendency to attempt to deal with the after math of events by enlarging the troops and widening missions' mandates rather than assuming a conflict prevention role. This latter role was missed not only between the warring parties but also the Mission itself leading it to become part of the conflict. The previous outlook is derived from basic facts and figures of the recurrence of conflict after peace agreements in addition to the political and peacekeeping roles that the UN engaged in. This was voiced by political analysts and the UN officials as well. On 18 December 1998, the Chairman of the Security Council Sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone, Hans Dahlgren (Sweden), told the Council that sanctions on Sierra Leone "were not being effectively implemented and the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone continued to deteriorate"⁹⁹.

Following the failure of the Conakry Peace Plan signed in October 1997, the Security Council Resolution 1162 (1998) was passed Urging "all States and international organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone, in response

⁹⁹ United Nations press Release No. SC/6613, Security Council Meets In Open Session To Consider Situation In Sierra Leone. Retrieved in July 2009 from: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19981218.sc6613.html>

to the consolidated inter-agency appeal launched on 3 March 1998" and encouraging "all States and international organizations to assist and participate in the longer term tasks of reconstruction and economic and social recovery and development in Sierra Leone"¹⁰⁰. Giving an urgent impetus to the over-mature reconstruction and recovery efforts amidst the failure of the Conakry peace plan and the obvious re-lapse into conflict, the Resolution balanced between the reconstruction and recovery efforts on one hand with the peacekeeping operations on the other hand and as such, the Resolution urged "all States to make contributions to the Trust Fund which has been established to support peacekeeping and peacebuilding related activities in Sierra Leone, and to provide technical and logistical support to assist ECOMOG to continue to carry out its peacekeeping role".

Similarly, after two months of negotiations, parties to the conflict signed the Lomé agreement in July 1999. In September of the same year, a joint team representing international financial institutions, UN bodies (including UNOMSIL) and donors started assessing Sierra Leone's reconstruction needs. This was followed by other high level donor missions to the country, and hence; risking an unproductive overlap between peacekeeping versus peace-building immature initiatives. Significant as it was, but the Lomé accord did not entirely succeed in ending the conflict and starting peace-building plans that were not based on peace distorted all efforts.

From its side, the Security Council announced the accord as a historic turning point for Sierra Leone and its people. The Council reacted by terminating the UNOMSIL and establishing a new and much larger peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL)¹⁰¹ to aid

¹⁰⁰ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1162 (1998)

¹⁰¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1270 (1999)

in the implementation of the peace agreement through Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration plan in addition to monitoring the adherence of ceasefire among other measures specified in the Security Council resolution.

A new Special Representative; Obyemi Adessiji (Nigeria) was also appointed in December 1999 to head the new mission. Despite these and other measures among which the revising of the UNAMSIL mandate, a number of UN Security Council resolutions and the extension of the Mission in addition to emerging hopes where "many Sierra Leoneans believed {...} that the country was at long last on path towards real reconciliation and an end to violence, destruction and human rights abuses was in sight"¹⁰². Skeptics were not at odds as the conflict resumed shortly after the signing of the Lomé accord. Certainly, many factors contributed to the re-emergence of conflict, but some of the prominent UN relevant facts reported included; that many of the peacekeepers were ill-equipped and poorly trained, the rebels managed to steal UN weapons, tanks and uniforms, and kidnap hundreds of UN peacekeepers¹⁰³. Notwithstanding the signing of peace agreement, but reality persisted as many rebels were not in accord and UN presence and initiatives were not welcomed by all parties. At some instances, the UN spokesmen reported that the peacekeepers will use force to defend themselves following threats targeting UN troops; a threat which eventually materialized. The British Broadcasting Corporation reported on rebel military commander, Sam Bokari who said the UN peacekeepers were not welcome in territory which he controls¹⁰⁴. Furthermore, in February 2000,

¹⁰² Ibid, Chawla, Shalini (2000)

¹⁰³ BBC News, UN peacekeeping record, Wednesday, 23 August, 2000

¹⁰⁴ BBC News, UN troops arrive in Sierra Leone, 30 November, 1999. Retrieved in July 2009 from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/543292.stm>

Former Sierra Leonean rebel leader Foday Sankoh said that the UN has no reason to be in Sierra Leone and that an armed peacekeeping force was "a threat to the security of our people"¹⁰⁵. The UNAMSIL repeatedly complained about being blocked by rebels of the (RUF) building illegal roadblocks, and obstructing deployment of troops. In reacting to these violations, the UNAMSIL tried to maintain its three tactics; neutrality, persuasion and diplomacy, and met the mobility hindrances by withdrawing back to the UN bases with occasional minor armed confrontations with rebels; mainly in self defense. Slow UN disarmament programme also had a negative impact in discouraging soldiers in entering the disarmament camps and hence, impeding the much needed UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration initiatives and affecting the UN role and image where disarmament camps were emptied in parts of the country. In a reported incident, the RUF rebels obliged UN military observers to dismantle a reception centre for combatants (Reception centres are where the peacekeepers make the "first contact" with the combatants ahead of the DDR)¹⁰⁶. In February 2000, the Security Council took a decision in its resolution no. 1289 authorizing the UNAMSIL "to provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme"; and affirmed that "in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and movement of its personnel".¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ BBC News, Sierra Leone rebel chief scorns UN, 4 February, 2000. Retrieved in July 2009 from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/629753.stm>

¹⁰⁶ IRIN News Network, 26 April 2000. Retrieved in July 2009 from: <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=13994>

¹⁰⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1289 (2000)

In March 2000, UN Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette urged the international community for greater involvement in recovery efforts in Sierra Leone, and said that “Having taken on this responsibility, we can ill afford the price of failure {...} in terms of the damage such a setback could inflict on the world’s faith in the international community’s ability to address conflicts in Africa and elsewhere,”¹⁰⁸. At the time that recovery and mainly humanitarian assistance should be maintained in peace and war times in order to secure minimum level of decent living conditions for civilians, but robust peace-building and peacekeeping operations should gain more attention following the end of war and concluding peace. The view point of the researcher stipulates that the UN was at fault in recognizing the Lomé and the previous accords as guarantor of peace and end of war. If anything, the three peace agreements (1996- 1999) served as spring boards for the conflicting parties to re-lapse into conflict. It was at best, strategy of the rebels/ government to re-arm and to prepare for the next war rather than prepare for the peace time. Tracking the successive UN resolutions on the situation in Sierra Leone, we notice the same text re-iterated in the resolutions calling all parties to implement the provisions of the accords. The difference is observed in the names of the accords – UN had brokered-which change upon signing each new agreement.

For example, UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997) states that the UN "Reaffirming its view that the Abidjan Agreement (S/1996/1034) continues to serve as a viable framework for peace, stability and reconciliation in Sierra Leone,". Resolution 1270 (1999) called "upon the parties to fulfill all their commitments under the {Lomé} Peace Agreement to facilitate the restoration of peace, stability, national reconciliation and development in Sierra Leone". Successive resolutions following

¹⁰⁸ IRIN News Network, SIERRA LEONE: UN urges greater help for recovery effort, 28 March 2000. Retrieved in July 2009 from: <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=13219>

the Abuja agreement which was signed in November 2000 adopted similar notion of supporting the UN brokered peace agreement and urging the conflicting parties to abide by the agreed terms to ensure a lasting peace. As such, Resolution 1346 (2001) called " upon all the parties to the Sierra Leone conflict to intensify their efforts towards the full and peaceful implementation of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement and the resumption of the peace process, taking into account the basis of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement".

Despite the different accords, conflict resumed each time and agreements were breached repeatedly including violations and targeted hostilities against UN peacekeeping missions. The height of the hostility was reached when around 500 UN peacekeepers and civilian personnel were abducted in Sierra Leone by rebel forces in May 2000. In a way, as opposed to being a mediator in negotiations and monitor of Peace agreements and ceasefire between the warring parties, the largest UN peacekeeping operation and Mission became part of the conflict and a cause of a fragile peace process. The abduction crisis, which nearly caused the collapse of the Mission, started when the RUF fighters destroyed two UN disarmament camps, and was the most serious challenge to the peace process in Sierra Leone for over a year; as the RUF renounced the ceasefire in a move that endangered the credibility of UN peacekeeping. In his Fourth report to the Security Council on Sierra Leone in 19 May 2000, Kofi Annan (UN Secretary General) acknowledged that "the peace process suffered a very serious setback as a result of the unprovoked armed attacks on United

Nations peacekeepers, the detention of several hundred United Nations personnel, and the destruction of disarmament and demobilization camps by fighters of the RUF".¹⁰⁹ The UN found itself mediating and negotiating its own way out of the hands of rebels and as expressed by UN Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette; these incidents inflicted "on the world's faith in the international community's ability to address conflicts in Africa and elsewhere", especially the UN peacekeeping operations. Most importantly, the peacekeepers have been undermined by Sierra Leoneans for their failure to halt RUF advances in addition to their inability to defend themselves against capture by the rebels. The peacekeepers also lost much of their influence that they had over the government.¹¹⁰ Many ex- pro government combatants re-armed to fight against the RUF rebels bringing the DDR programme that the UNAMSIL had launched to a standstill. As a result, the Security Council passed a resolution in August 2000 recognizing that "the RUF offensive against UNAMSIL since May 2000 revealed serious inherent weaknesses in the mission's structure, command and control and resources" and prioritizing the UNAMSIL tasks to "deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force"¹¹¹

Up to this point critics argued that shortcomings of UNAMSIL operations difficulties had a serious impact over the security situation in the country. The soldiers were poorly equipped, ill-trained for direct engagement, troops command and control was fragmented and there was an obvious lack of common operational cultures of UN

¹⁰⁹ United Nations (2000), **Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone**, No. S/2000/455, 19 May 2000. Retrieved in July 2009 from: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/407/22/IMG/N0040722.pdf?OpenElement>

¹¹⁰ IRIN News Network, 22 May 2000, "SIERRA LEONE: Peacekeepers have uphill task. Retrieved in July 2009 from: <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=15051>

¹¹¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1313 (2000)

forces. Refrain of countries with organized strong armies to contribute with troops was a major issue as well. In addition to the previous, the UN has its own internal problems that further distorted its external image; the gravest being accusations that United Nations personnel may have been involved in sexual abuse of women and children in camps for refugees and internally displaced people in the region¹¹². Observers also noted the internal fraction within peacekeeping battalions from different countries, mainly Nigerian and Indian caused by the illicit trade in diamond by peacekeepers. Ethical scandals overwhelmed the peace mission and kept the UN Headquarter in a turmoil which was difficult to recover from, for years to come.

Despite all difficulties, UNAMSIL continued its mediation efforts and brought in more troops to monitor the ceasefires and resumed disarming fighters. But it was apparent that the UNAMSIL is incapable of restoring peace alone and as a result, the United Kingdom, which had sent a force to restore peace following RUF's breach of the ceasefire, later started restructuring the army while UNAMSIL focused on training the local police force and implementing income generating projects targeting unemployed youth and ex-combatants. The support of the British para-troopers sent a clear message that UNAMSIL is not left alone and is backed up by international partners. UNAMSIL forces have deployed throughout the country and all districts, troops reconstructed schools and clinics, launched and funded agricultural projects, and sponsored free medical clinics in remote areas. Displaced people and refugees moved back and national elections were peacefully held in May 2002. Finally the end of the war was declared in 2002 and Sierra Leone began to move to a new transitional stage of peace-building and recovery.

¹¹² United Nations Security Council Resolution 1400 (2002)

UN Peacekeeping vs. Peace-building in Sierra Leone

Following the end of war, there was a tendency to shift direction towards more focused peace-building initiatives while maintaining peacekeepers role. The UN (presented in UNAMSIL and other agencies), the Government of Sierra Leone and other partners, initiated a number of recovery strategies, among which was a Peace-building and Recovery Strategy for 2004–07. The strategy outlined the transition from humanitarian relief to a longer-term vision of UN assistance to Sierra Leone in the post conflict era.¹¹³ Five focus inter-related areas for UN strategy were strengthening the security framework and regional collaboration, facilitating reintegration, reducing poverty, fostering good governance and promoting human rights and encouraging reconciliation. The strategy acknowledged both UNAMSIL's peacekeeping and peace-building roles while opening the door for other humanitarian and developmental agencies to build on UNAMSIL's achievements in areas beyond security. The question here remains on the nature of the peacekeeping mission and tasks associated with the mandate. If the argument was that the UNAMSIL has in fact successfully conducted peace-building programmes, so how do we justify multi agency presence in practical and financial terms? The issue goes beyond the mere involvement of partners or agencies in peace-building initiatives; the main obstacle found was the lack of collective efforts and coordination between the different partners which signals the need for a comprehensive approach and a unified strategic direction driving all efforts towards common goals. With those common goals, only competition over available funds and ad-hoc short term interventions can be enacted by the different players.

¹¹³ United Nations (2002), **From Peacekeeping to Peace-building: UN Strategy to Support National Recovery and Peace-building in Sierra Leone**, United Nations, October 2002.

A disproportionate share of income from diamond mining still found its way into private hands, rather than Government's. Despite reintegration programmes, thousands of ex-combatants and youths were unemployed, key developmental issues such as education, health and economy suffered and remained fragile.

Amidst this setting, UNAMSIL completed its mandate in December 2005 to be succeeded by a new mission—the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)—established by the Security Council to help consolidate peace in the country and meet the many challenges facing Sierra Leone. The importance of establishing the mission was emphasized by the Secretary General in addition to the Sierra Leonean president following the withdrawal of the peacekeeping mission in order to ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peace-building and to enable the continuation of the efforts to assist the Government of Sierra Leone to consolidate peace by enhancing political and economic governance, building the national capacity for conflict prevention, and preparing for elections in 2007. More specifically, the peace-building mission was tasked with the following¹¹⁴:

- (a) to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in:
 - (i) building the capacity of State institutions to address further the root causes of the conflict, provide basic services and accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals through poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth, including through the creation of an enabling framework for private investment and systematic efforts to address HIV/AIDS;

¹¹⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1620 on 31 August 2005

- (ii) developing a national action plan for human rights and establishing the national human rights commission;
 - (iii) building the capacity of the National Electoral Commission to conduct a free, fair and credible electoral process in 2007;
 - (iv) enhancing good governance, transparency and accountability of public institutions, including through anti-corruption measures and improved fiscal management;
 - (v) strengthening the rule of law, including by developing the independence and capacity of the justice system and the capacity of the police and corrections system;
 - (vi) strengthening the Sierra Leonean security sector, in cooperation with the International Military Advisory and Training Team and other partners;
 - (vii) promoting a culture of peace, dialogue, and participation in critical national issues through a strategic approach to public information and communication, including through building an independent and capable public radio capacity;
 - (viii) developing initiatives for the protection and well-being of youth, women and children;
- (b) to liaise with the Sierra Leonean security sector and other partners, to report on the security situation and make recommendations concerning external and internal security threats;

(c) to coordinate with United Nations missions and offices and regional organizations in West Africa in dealing with cross-border challenges such as the illicit movement of small arms, human trafficking and smuggling and illegal trade in natural resources;

(d) to coordinate with the Special Court for Sierra Leone;

In October 2006, the UN Peace-building Commission selected Sierra Leone to be one of the first countries eligible to receive support from the Peace-building Fund (PBF). According to the Commission, despite the achievements made in restoring peace and security as well as economic growth, key challenges facing Sierra Leone and impeding the consolidation of peace were; 1) Social and youth empowerment and employment, 2) Consolidating democracy and good governance, 3) Justice and Security Sector Reform and finally, Capacity building.¹¹⁵

To better correspond to the challenges; the United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) was authorized by United Nations Security Council resolution 1829 of 4 August 2008, to ensure the continued support of the Organization and the international community for the long term peace, security and development of Sierra Leone. UNIPSIL replaced the larger United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) and is mandated to strengthen and promote human rights; support the activities of the Peace-building Commission and the Peace-building Fund; provide political support to efforts aimed at finding solutions to political tensions and potential conflict; consolidate good governance reform (with a special focus on anti-corruption); support the police and the Armed Forces to ensure

¹¹⁵United Nations (2006), Chairman's summary Sierra Leone Country-Specific Meeting Peace-building Commission, 12 October 2006. Retrieved in July 2009 from: <http://www.unpbf.org/docs/sierraleone-chair-12oct20061.pdf>

that they are able to carry out their tasks effectively; support decentralization; and assist in reviewing the Constitution.

UNIPSIL works in close coordination with the Peace-building Commission to ensure implementation of the Peace-building Cooperation Framework and projects supported through the Peace-building Fund.

In taking a quick look at the previous mandates of the peacekeeping missions we notice that the Security Council Resolutions focused mainly on the role of the Missions in the 1) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 2) monitoring ceasefires, 3) Security Sector Reform, 4) protection of civilians, refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), humanitarian and UN personnel, 5) children and especially child soldiers, 6) violations of Human Rights, 7) special courts on war crimes, 8) elections, 9) securing free mobility, 10) mine action, 11) exploitation of diamonds, 12) control of HIV/ AIDS.

The above elements provides a clear understanding of the unrestricted role of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions during war years which allowed for going beyond the traditional role of a peacekeeping mission despite the large size of the UNAMSIL. To what degree did the merging of peacekeeping, peace enforcing and peace-building roles of the missions reflect a positive outcome is questionable. The fact of the embedded weaknesses that the peacekeepers had especially in the military component might (as previously discussed) have a direct impact on such ambiguity of the effectiveness. And whether the justification behind the dual or even triple role the missions had assumed was to override the inefficacy of the UN army is also a serious possibility. For some, the peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone were successful. This is however not entirely false; on the one hand, the war ended officially in 2002, those who adopt this view point also argue about the successful DDR programmes

acknowledged by the Security Council, in addition to the democratic process crowned by the first non-violent elections in the country's history in 2002 which saw President Kabbah re-elected with just over 70 per cent of the votes and his party winning an overwhelming majority of seats in parliament. This was followed by a smooth draw down of the UNAMSIL forces; which was completed in December 2005.

On the other hand, when these achievements are put in a proper context, we find that the ill-equipped and badly trained peacekeeping troops lacked a unified command and the needed mandate to defend even themselves (before passing specific resolutions in this regard). They were aggressively and repeatedly targeted and incurred losses in lives in addition to massive abduction cases. The troops were underfunded and the UN failed in many instances to persuade countries with strong armies to contribute with troops. The major achievement of Disarmament and Demobilization of ex-combatants was continuously halted by rebels and was not an easy ride. The Peacekeeping mission was also under a different kind of fire when allegations that UN personnel practiced sexual abuse and other accusations of misconduct stormed the UN and the international community at large. The lack of trust and faith from Sierra Leoneans in the peacekeeping mission and its DDR programme emptied disarmament camps and caused many of the disarmed ex-combatants to re-arm to defend themselves and the government. The slow and lack of international funding of the DDR programmes left the dis-armed without the money that they were promised to be paid upon joining the DDR programmes, and hence caused massive refrain of the combatants from registering and handing over their weapons. The disarmament and demobilization initiatives also lacked the continuity as they fell short in securing employment and re-integration of the disarmed youth. The former could have had its impact even if not in its entirety to the re-lapse of the conflict, where widening the

grey area between peacemaking (through diplomatic mediation, political negotiations...etc) on one hand and peacekeeping and peace-building did not serve well in preventing the conflict from re-emerging. The Brahimi report in August 2000 gave a coherent analysis on this deficiency and the incapacitation of the orthodox peacekeeping missions that was incurred as a result of blindly following the impartiality and rules of engagements principles in peacekeepers dynamics in addition to the consent of the parties. The report provided an analysis to causes for the less than optimal performance of the peace operations and outlined a number of key issues, many of which apply to Sierra Leone case:

- 1) The consent of the conflicting parties may be manipulated in many ways. This case applies to Sierra Leone where both parties committed to peace agreements merely to gain time either to re-arm or to plan the next war strategy against the other party. In other words, the commitment to peace was not there and the UN while brokering peace, failed to spot this.
- 2) The fragile command of the warring parties where the consent of one party does not necessarily secure the needed commitment from all factions of the militias. This element too, was present in the Sierra Leonean war, where the lack of unified command from the RUF put the peacekeepers frequently under fire of the rebels. In addition, some rebel commanders explicitly expressed their resentment from the UN presence in Sierra Leone.
- 3) Inability of the peacekeepers to carry out their duties professionally successfully (i.e. the ability of peacekeepers to defend themselves and their mandate). The peacekeepers were ill-equipped; ill trained and lacked a unified and effective command and control. By abiding to the principle of non-use of force except in self defense and as a last resort, the UN peacekeepers were unable to defend

themselves effectively and had to yield to rebel fighters numerous times. They were obstructed, incapacitated and 500 of them were abducted in addition to losses incurred in the lives of civilians. Though successive changes made to the mandate of the UN peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone finally provided minimum level of empowerment for UN troops defend themselves and their mandates, the Brahimi report recommendations came to effect the necessity to re-interpret the rules of engagement and gave it a wider framework of action beyond the tit-for-tat limitations to allow for ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are charged to Protect. The report gave particularity to dangerous situations that should not force United Nations troops to cede the initiative to their attackers. Ideally, the peacekeepers would not be forced to go as far as engaging in military confrontations and armed combats, but the Security Council missed when it applied ideal mandate to non-ideal security conditions, and hence was the impasse.

- 4) The report recommended not to apply best-case planning assumptions which the UN peacekeeping missions exactly did over the eleven years of civil war in Sierra Leone through brokering, sponsoring, adopting the consecutive peace agreements in Security Council resolutions and planning future interventions accordingly without having a safety net; which resulted in loosing credibility of the UN by the Sierra Leoneans and the international community and loss of lives among peacekeepers and civilians during the war years. Though the Security Council endeavored to detach from the best-case planning through adopting certain measures (especially increasing the size of the operations and number of troops)

but not all measures were successful as the larger number of peacekeepers did not compensate for their lack of training for example.

- 5) Recommendations also included ensuring effective command and control, logistical and financial support to peacekeeping operations, commitment from countries to contribute with troops among others.

Furthermore, and taking into consideration the dual peacekeeping and peace-building role that the UN assumed before 2002, we find that the second part of the UN role (peace-building) has not been particularly successful either. The Priority Action Plan for Sierra Leone which was finalized by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) in 2007 and later revision in 2008, clearly outlined that despite the considerable progress that has been made in the Sierra Leone peace-building process since the end of the conflict in 2002, but "the root causes of the conflict among which, bad governance, corruption, denial of basic human rights and political and economic exclusion still need to be fully addressed¹¹⁶". The reality of the matter is that social and economic time bombs still need to be defused if a sustainable peace is to be established in Sierra Leone. In 2004, Sierra Leone ranked bottom in the UN Human Development Index, about 26 percent of the population is food poor, 70% were in poverty, HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis severely affected the Sierra Leoneans. Social indicators marked low as well.

The new Government of Sierra Leone which was elected in 2007, declared energy, power, agricultural development and securing food as a critical peace-building challenge.

¹¹⁶ United Nations (2008), **Priority Action Plan for the Peace-building Fund (Sierra Leone), revised October 2008**. retrieved in July 2009 from: <http://www.unpbf.org/docs/PBF-Sierra-Leone-Priority-Plan.pdf>

As such, the peace-building role assumed prior to 2002 was not comprehensive enough and left the country with acute aid-dependency and reliance on the promises of the international community for peace dividends. With a number of economic recovery plans and programmes sponsored by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other international donors, Sierra Leone is progressing slowly and peace-building through economic reconstruction and recovery in addition to poverty alleviation; are crucial to building and sustaining peace.

The four key areas that were identified by the peace-building commission and the Government included: 1) Social and youth empowerment and employment, 2) Consolidating democracy and good governance, 3) Justice and Security Sector Reform and finally, Capacity building are of utmost importance but should be embedded in national strategies. Despite the free elections and general culmination of the security environment in Sierra Leone following the end of the war, but the pillars set by the peace-building commission, especially governance and upholding rule of law are seen to be as indispensable prerequisites for long term sustainable peace.

Given the chronology of events and UN involvement in Sierra Leone, and taking into consideration the most recent Security Council statements on Sierra Leone still emphasizing peace-building efforts after seven years of end of war¹¹⁷ and extending the UN presence in the country, we are left with the conclusion that UN peace efforts in Sierra Leone though yielded gains for Sierra Leoneans to some extent, but the impact was sub-optimal and at best unsustainable. This conclusion was voiced by the former Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno in July 2008 shortly before stepping down from his position. Guéhenno said that he has "seen in a number of places from Liberia to Haiti to Sierra Leone that a difference

¹¹⁷United Nations News Center, 15 September 2009. Retrieved in July 2009 from: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32059&Cr=unmil&Cr1=>

was made – insufficient, imperfect – but a difference was made and I think it's important for the United Nations to be able to continue to make that difference... because for many people it's their only hope and the UN is the institution of last resort"¹¹⁸.

Neither UNIOSIL, nor UNIPSIL were mandated long enough to have a proper assessment on the impact these missions have made on the ground, but the adoption of a clear and comprehensive strategic approach by the peace-building commission is seen as a positive improvement on strategizing the peace-building work in Sierra Leone. Evidently, all the priority actions adopted by the commission are important to the establishment of durable peace and security in Sierra Leone, what is need, is continuous commitment first and foremost from the Sierra Leoneans who have the prime responsibility to build peace and second through the international community to provide the needed resources and assistance to that end.

¹¹⁸ Guéhenno, Jean-Marie (2008) UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, cited in World News Network article published in 29 Jul 2008. Retrieved in October 2009 from: <http://cgi.wn.com/?action=display&article=75281215&template=worldnews/paidnews.txt&index=recent>

3.3. The Central African Republic (CAR) Case Study:¹¹⁹

Background: A failed nation with no prospects for any kind of future. It is a less statement if we describe CAR by a shadow of a state; CAR was and is still anything but a functioning state. Inflicted with French colonial and then post-colonial hegemony, CAR's history is swamped by bloody scenes and human rights atrocities; that are by no means less horrific than it's present or future. From self proclaimed emperor in the 1960s, numerous coups, killings and massacres, organized crime, mutiny and rebellion, totalitarian regimes, terrible economic and social conditions, ethnicity presented in antagonism between people of Savannah and people of the river in addition to the counting of over 80 ethnicities, no governance, permanent paralysis of state institutions, and last but not least the French dominance and regional interference and conflict spill over effects... CAR is beyond remedy, be it by UN or other, be it peacekeeping, peace-building, peace enforcement, or peacemaking..... all tools in the peace book could not fix CAR, evidenced by numerous peace-building attempts and successive peacekeeping missions, African, regional, international and even UN.

CAR has not experienced political stability since its independence from France in 1960. The independence was superficial *par excellence*, as France has maintained its dominance over CAR. The first president of CAR came to rule –with French blessing- after surrounding the parliament with a gang armed with poison arrows and forcing the members of parliament to elect him as a president of sovereign CAR. Instantly, David Dacko established a totalitarian regime taking the country back to the

¹¹⁹ More information can be found in International Crisis Group, "Central African Republic Anatomy of Phantom State", Africa Report No. 136- 13 December 2007 and in US department of state website www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4007.htm

dark colonial era if not worse, abandoning all freedoms and confidently finding his way to re-election voted by every elector in 1964.

During and over thirty years later, the political scene in CAR could not have been any dimmer, with numerous coups, fatal violence and conflicts, and general inhuman living conditions for the people of CAR. 1993 brought with it the first free elections of CAR and Ange-Felix Patassé became the first democratically elected president. As the first president from the North; Patassé brought tribalism to the government and the army, and induced the notion of people of Savannah against people of the River. Additionally, though was elected democratically, but his ruling was anything but democratic. The ethnicity he planted within the government and army will last till this very day. Abuse of power, large scale corruption, political assassination, the deteriorating financial situation which prolonged non-payment of salary arrears soon caused one mutiny after another, mainly by the army factions. As conflict escalated, French troops still based in CAR compelled rebels to negotiate with the government time and again, but security situation kept on deteriorating. In 1996 an African regional peacekeeping force was established under the auspices of France and African leaders. The Inter-African Commission to Monitor Implementation of the Bangui Accords (MISAB) consisted of 750 soldiers, and was financed by France. MISAB undertook fierce retaliation acts against rebels which affected civilians but the mission was generally perceived as a success. With paralyzed state institutions, CAR became a soldier game with the president formulating military militias outside the dysfunctional army to pacify the North and suppress guerilla warfare areas, in

addition to recruiting mercenaries to ensure his own security. In 1998, the last French soldier on CAR soil was withdrawn, an event which was a result of clash between the previously French-supported Patassé who failed to blackmail France into staying in the country. Shortly afterwards, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was authorized by the Security Council and deployed 1,350 blue helmets in CAR taking the place of MISAB and French troops. The Mission was established for two years and was mandated to assist in maintaining and enhancing security and stability in Bangui (the capital of CAR) and vicinity; supervise, control storage, and monitor the disposition of weapons retrieved in disarmament exercise; assist in capacity-building of national police; provide advice and technical support for legislative elections. Later, MINURCA was also mandated to supervise the destruction of confiscated weapons and to support the conduct of presidential elections and, a task which became the main focus of the mission.

France which finally convinced the Security Council to deploy the UN troops changed the berets of 200 French soldiers in Bangui to blue, but eventually the French penetrated their way out of CAR in 1999 with the departure of the last French soldier, but the French influence remained. In 1999, Patassé won the elections again and the MINURCA mission was withdrawn to be replaced by the United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) in 2000, with no military contingent. BONUCA -which was established by the Secretary General- was mandated to support the Government's efforts to consolidate peace and national reconciliation, strengthen democratic institutions and facilitate the mobilization at the international level of political support and resources for national reconstruction and

economic recovery in the country. In addition, the Office is tasked with promoting public awareness of human rights issues in the country and monitoring developments in this field. BONUCA also includes a small number of military and civilian police advisers to follow up on security-related reforms and to assist in the implementation of the training programmes for the national police, which were initiated by the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA).

In May 2001, violence returned to CAR with a failed coup against Patassé who received the support of Libyan troops and the ethnic conflict re-escalated. The instigators of the attempted coup fled to neighboring Congo causing diplomatic distress between Congo and CAR. Security conditions remained fragile and Patassé went after the Chief of Staff of the Central African Armed Forces, General Francois Bozizé after discovering a cache of weapons in his residence and an arrest warrant was filed against him but Bozizé succeeded in fleeing to neighboring Chad. At a time of complete failure of state institutions including the military, in December of the same year of 2001, regional peacekeeping force was deployed upon Patassé's request with 300 troops' strength to secure the capital Bangui. And a year later, another African peacekeeping force replaced the former by a request from the president.

The two peacekeeping missions in CAR failed to secure the country and Bozizé supporters managed to destabilize the capital in 2002 by a raid which disrupted the diplomatic relations with Chad –from where Bozizé's rebels came. Patassé accused Chad of attempting to occupy the oil-rich North of CAR and conflict, violence and massacres followed, but eventually Patassé succeeded in securing the North again. Another African peacekeeping force was deployed and replaced the existing ones following an African- French led national dialogue for reconciliation. Patassé, in an

attempt to re-gain French support, pleaded to bring back French soldiers in CAR but Paris was planning a different political game.

With regional blessing, Bozizé took over the capital in 2003 while Patassé was out of the country. The frail army and the African peacekeeping force stood as witnesses of the coup, while France remained silent at first and then sent a military contingent to help stabilizing the new regime, and Patassé went into his exile in Togo.

Starting his presidency in resuming the national dialogue and including the opposition, it was not long before the CAR political and security scene became familiar again with the massive looting and crimes by the liberators and Chadian mercenaries in addition to lack of progress in governance and security sector reform. Upon the request of the new president Bozizé, 500 Chadian soldiers joined the African peacekeeping troops to secure Bangui and safe guard his person. Bozizé power was limited by the dependence on Chad, weak army and France's influence which remained high as always. Bozizé never had full control beyond the capital thereafter, especially in the north eastern and north western part of the country.

In May 2005, Bozizé won the presidential elections and established a new regime which failed to guarantee freedoms and exercise democratic governance. While the rebellions in northern west started shortly after the elections- led by supporters of the former regime, 2006 witnessed insurrection in the northern east of the country which was fueled even more with the atrocities of the army against ethnic communities of the northern CAR causing the displacement of nearly 300,000 citizens and thousands fleeing to neighboring Chad. External interference mainly from Chad –state and mercenaries- but also from Sudan sparked up violence. The reasons giving rise to the conflict and violence remained generally the same, with no clear political agendas, rebel groups used force to claim power, to oppose power, to respond to bad

governance and poor economic situations, to claim their salaries and perhaps out of force of habit.

In January 2007, Libya led peace and reconciliation efforts between the Government of CAR and rebel groups which resulted in a peace agreement between the government and the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FPDC), a rebel group operating in the northeastern part of CAR and by May 2008, most rebel groups had either entered into a peace agreement with the government or declared a cease-fire, but there is little evidence that these agreements were and/ or are applied on the ground. Despite the agreements, it seems that ethnic violence and unrest have permanently contaminated the country. On September 2007, the Security Council, by its resolution 1778, approved the establishment in Chad and the Central African Republic, in concert with the European Union, of a multidimensional presence intended to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons. The Council decided that the multidimensional presence shall include a United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) which is still deployed to date.

United Nations Role in CAR

It was not until 1996 mutinies and calls of Patassé for the African communities to intervene to mediate a truce between his government and the rebels; that the attention of the African community was drawn to the plight of the CAR people with a view of changing the current situation at the time. The subsequent series of agreements signed between the government and rebels (named Bangui agreements) decided in the Conference on Consensus building and Dialogue which was held in Bangui in January 1997 stipulated the deployment of an inter-African force in the Central

African Republic (MISAB). The mission which was mandated for an initial period of three months and was extended at the request of President Patassé, was aimed at restoring peace and security in CAR by monitoring the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and conducting operations to disarm the former rebels and armed groups. The UN Security Council remained silent to the atrocities and humanitarian crisis in CAR where the conflict was not even discussed in the Council until formal contact from African leaders including president Patassé was initiated with the Council in July 1997 pointing out the threats that the conflict in CAR pose on regional and international peace and security. The African leaders also came with a request to re-hat the MISAB into a UN peacekeeping mission through acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In response to these requests, the UN Security Council fielded a UN multidisciplinary technical mission to Bangui in 1997 to assess the political, military, security, economic and social situation in addition to formulate recommendations concerning the deployment of a peacekeeping mission. The mission came back to the Security Council and acknowledged the difficult political, economic, social and security conditions in CAR, in addition to the vulnerability to regional tensions and instabilities. It reported positive steps undertaken by president Patassé towards national unity and reconciliation, democratization and economic development as well as determination of implementing the Bangui agreements. Most importantly, in light of France's intention to halt logistical support provided to MISAB through pulling out the French troops from CAR, the mission reported that "Since MISAB would not be able to maintain its presence in Bangui without adequate financial and logistical

support, the only viable option for the maintenance of stability in the Central African Republic appears to be the establishment and deployment of another peacekeeping operation authorized by the international community"¹²⁰. Patassé also sought United Nations' assistance in supervising the legislative and presidential elections¹²¹.

In 4 March 1998, CAR political parties adopted a National Reconciliation Pact banning the use of force as an instrument of achieving political power and emphasizing that political power be gained through elections. In response to the former and determining that the situation in the Central African Republic continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and that CAR is a post-conflict country, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was established by Security Council Resolution 1159 (1998) of 27 March 1998 for an initial period of three months.

The initial mandate included the 1) assisting in maintaining and enhancing security and stability, including freedom of movement, in Bangui and the immediate vicinity of the city; 2) to assist the national security forces in maintaining law and order and in protecting key installations in Bangui; 3) to supervise, control storage, and monitor the final disposition of all weapons retrieved in the course of the disarmament exercise; 4) to assist in a short-term police trainers programme and in other capacity-building efforts of the national police, and to provide advice on the restructuring of

¹²⁰ United Nations (1998), report of the secretary-general pursuant to resolution 1136 (1997) concerning the situation in the Central African Republic no. S/1998/61- 23 January 1998

¹²¹ President Patassé, Letter dated 8 January 1998 from the President of the Central African Republic addressed to the Secretary-General, United Nations Document No. S/1998/61

the national police and special police forces; 5) to provide advice and technical support to the national electoral bodies regarding the electoral code and plans for the conduct of the legislative elections¹²². Despite the fact that the UN multidisciplinary mission in its report confirmed the difficult security situation and the inability of security forces to protect civilians, the Council's resolution addressed the needs for security sector reform and did not touch on the protection of civilians under physical threat. In addition, it initially authorized the operation to cover only Bangui and the immediate vicinity of the city. As a result, banditry and organized crimes got free hand in many parts of CAR, especially the North of the country. The mission was effectively deployed in April 1998 and few months later, the Council authorized MINURCA to conduct limited-duration reconnaissance missions outside Bangui¹²³, and another Resolution was passed in October of the same year of 1998 mandating MINURCA to support the conduct of legislative elections which were held in November/ December 1998¹²⁴, and was later mandated to support the presidential elections¹²⁵.

Political delineations branded the UN peace mission from the initial phase of taking up the matter in the Security Council. The infant peace process and innovative -to CAR- democratic orientation was not allowed to properly mature as there was no institutional nor popular base which could absorb the new political direction.

¹²² United Nations Security Council Resolution 1159 of 27 March 1998

¹²³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1182 of 14 July 1998

¹²⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1201 of 15 October 1998

¹²⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1230 of 26 February 1999

However, the backstage of Security Council did not debate the political environment in CAR, but mostly, the political interests of the Council member states, mainly France and hence was the decision to authorize the deployment of a peacekeeping mission. Two months after the deployment of MINURCA, the UN Secretary General presented a situation report on CAR to the Security Council and confirming that division and distrust persist in CAR, and that the national unity government is facing critical challenges in demonstrating impartiality and actual unity leading opposition to threaten to withdraw from the government¹²⁶. With the lack of progress in disarmament and demobilization programmes, this signaled the relapse into violent and possible armed conflict. Despite full engagement of the UN and the mission in the political reform and promotion of national reconciliation in addition to extended support for democratic and free elections, coupled with consistent reminders to the CAR parties of their commitments and obligations under the Bangui agreements, support to the security sector and governance reform; lack of confidence between the political parties could not be dismissed. The presence of a peacekeeping operation was seen by the UN to have a positive impact on the overall security conditions and on the progress in implementing the provisions of the Bangui agreements by the government and the opposition. The UN also took some credit for the holding of the legislative elections despite the fact that the elections proved that strong divisions continue to exist in the country along ethnic and regional lines¹²⁷. The UN, possibly

¹²⁶ United Nations (1998), **report of the UN Secretary General on MINURCA**, No. S/ 1998/ 540 on 19 June 1998

¹²⁷ United Nations (1998), **third report of the secretary-general on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic** no. S/1998/1203 on 18 December 1998

in an attempt to plan a clean and quick exit strategy maintained its position in withdrawing MINURCA following the presidential elections, a notion which brought the majority of the focus of the mission tasks into elections and electoral support.

The UN Secretary General reiterated in his successive reports to the Security Council on the situation of CAR and MINURCA the importance of security sector reform, improving good governance through democratic elections and capacity building of state institutions, and economic development to be key to sustain culmination and peace in CAR. The peacekeeping mission presence in CAR mainly served to show credibility of the reform processes and building confidence between the conflicting parties. It also gave leverage to the Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of MINURCA in his political mediation role. As such, it was seen to be crucial to keeping peace and security conditions while state institutions are being strengthened. The same view of the need for extending MINURCA presence was held by Patassé. Based on this analysis of MINURCA role, we find that the peacekeeping force was maintained to facilitate and validate the UN political and peace-building role. The UN administered and supervised the electoral processes, disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of militias, trained police, assisted in the restructuring of the army and security sector reform, pushed with the international financial institutions the economic development and structural adjustments of the economy in addition to the direct involvement in the national political reconciliation in addition to other peace-building activities. The enormous work that needed to be done and the little time that the peace mission had to complete to fulfill its mandate,

adding to the previous the fragile peace and security conditions did not halt the Secretary General from declaring that the firm link of the exit strategy for the operation with the conduct of presidential elections, which are scheduled to be held by the fall of 1999. The Mission was scheduled to be terminated no later than 60 days after the announcement of the election results. Obviously, the UN did not anticipate the end of political and security instability following an election, and it was highly unlikely that the peace-building work that the UN started within MINURCA would be completed in few months time. Soon after the UN took credit for consolidating fair and peaceful legislative elections, the conflict erupted again in the country between the government and the opposition and despite all UN political efforts to contain the problem, the impasse persisted. In addition, the political impasse was heightened by the Congolese conflict which escalated early 1999 leading refugee influx (over 20,000) to the neighboring CAR and the subsequent involvement of the CAR government in the Congolese conflict which was opposed by the CAR opposition. The Congolese rebel soldiers frequently patrolled the borders with CAR causing unrest to CAR population. Human rights violations including summary executions and arbitrary detentions were confirmed by MINURCA which responded by demanding respect to human rights without physical action. This was a glimpse of what the internal political environment in CAR looked like and served as examples demonstrating the vulnerability of the country and fragility of peace and security conditions. Despite all that, the UN was planning the draw down of the troops and closure of the mission. The road to presidential elections was harder as political

tension soar and the opposition accused MINURCA of being impartial and that it biased Patassé over the opposition. Patassé won the presidential elections, a result which was rejected by the opposition and led to further political instability.

In line with the recited facts, a pose to re-think the priorities of the UN in 1999 and how to move forward leads the debate through the following argument; the deployment of the mission was politically driven. Though the seeds for peace were being planted, but peace did not exist to be kept by the peacekeeping operation. It has to be acknowledged that the mere existence of blue helmets assisted in the culmination of the Capital, but at the same time, the priority should have been given to the restructuring of the army to eliminate the ethnicity notion within the security forces. This is by no means a peacekeeping task, it is a peace-building activity which though was advocated strongly by the UN with sub-optimal verbal responsiveness from the government; but proper application was lacking. On another aspect, the economic and financial deterioration was one of the main reasons sparking mutinies in 1996. The efforts which were put into action for economic recovery did not yield the needed results. The governance reform was another important priority which was in the core of root causes of the conflict but little progress was being done to address good governance beyond the electoral process. On the one hand, the mapping of UN priorities was spot on, especially in identifying the root causes of the conflict and problems in CAR. The execution, on the other hand, did not meet the expectations and did not bring the aspired results. A main issue to be considered is the need for a holistic approach to deal with the different problems. At the time where the elements

of the approach were properly identified, but the framework of action; including the timeframe for the different measures was difficult to attain. The peacekeeping mission was intended for short term, authorized at the beginning for three months, extended for two more and then six... but the general knowledge stipulated the short term of the mission which by default would not allow it to plan long term engagement and hence focused on what could be done- legislative and presidential elections. This measure however, even if perfected, would not qualify as a comprehensive conflict prevention modality by itself. This was evidenced as mentioned, in the resumption of the political tensions following the legislative elections.

This view was asserted by the Secretary General, Kofi Annan in saying that peace-building "whether it started before, after or during the eruption of conflict, peace-building must be seen as a long-term exercise. At the same time, there was an unmistakable element of urgency -- a need to achieve tangible progress on a number of fronts in a short time"¹²⁸. In his report to the Security Council on MINURCAT in October 1999, after the presidential elections took place, the Secretary General noted that several vital reforms which the government of CAR has committed itself to, needed to take place for durable security to exist but that the government has failed so far to address them. The Secretary General also recommended the gradual transition from peacekeeping to peace-building through the establishment of a political

¹²⁸ United Nations (2001), UN Secretary General Kofi Annan addressing the Security Council meeting no. 4272 on 5 February 2001

office¹²⁹. Despite the CAR's president and opposition's call for extending the mandate of MINURCAT to ensure stability and security following the political tensions post elections, the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) was established in February 2000 for an initial period of one year while MINURCA withdrew.

The Office which was a field office of the Department of Political Affairs operated under a mandate from the Security Council to promote peace and stability in the country and reduce cross-border insecurity. This in itself is an important and commendable action by the UN to follow up on situation in CAR post peacekeeping, while acknowledging the security threat that CAR poses. BONUCA, headed by the Representative of the Secretary-General, was mandated with supporting the Government's efforts to consolidate peace and national reconciliation, strengthening democratic institutions and facilitating the mobilization at the international level of political support and resources for national reconstruction and economic recovery in the country and promoting public awareness of human rights.

BONUCA also included a small number of military and civilian police advisers to follow up on security-related reforms and to assist in the implementation of the training programmes for the national police, which were initiated by MINURCA. The Security Council requested that the Secretary General keeps the Council members

¹²⁹ United Nations (1999), **Ninth Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the MINURCA** No. S/1999/1038 on 7 October 1999

regularly informed about the situation in CAR and the progress of BONUCA work through regular updating. As such, CAR was frequently and repeatedly discussed and debated in the Security Council giving the security conditions in CAR the much needed international society's attention and political support at the highest levels. This was a dramatic change in the Security Council's agendas which only paid attention to CAR and the threat it poses on regional and international peace and security in 1998.

In May 2001, violence returned to CAR with a failed coup against Patassé and the ethnic conflict re-escalated with a high number of casualties and further thousands of displaced while summary execution, armed banditry and arbitrary detention continued, and the economy suffered. The attempt was condemned by the Security Council and the Secretary General. The UN remained very active in the political arena at the top level mediating between the government and the opposition, and pushing for the implementation of the Bangui agreements provisions. In addition, BONUCA resumed its peace-building programmes including training of police, judicial assistance and human rights awareness among others but it was not enough. Political dialogue was brought to an end, and the security, social and economic conditions continued to deteriorate. The fleeing of the main instigators of the attempted coup to Congo caused more political tension between Congo and CAR further threatening the regional security. The Security Council realized the fact that it will need to do more, if the UN is to have a real and sustainable impact on the security situation in CAR and requested the Secretary General in July 2001 to submit to it recommendations on how the United Nations might further contribute to the economic recovery of CAR and to the strengthening of the role of BONUCA. Accordingly, the Secretary General recommended strengthening BONUCA and

revising its mandate to enable the Office to better contribute in the areas of the judicial system, institution-building, enhancing the effectiveness of its early-warning capabilities and human rights¹³⁰. The report reiterated the need for international assistance to CAR in virtually all areas and emphasized on poverty to be one of the major causes of the conflict. In light of the analysis of the UN, there were many problems and the answer was not peacekeeping but more intensive peace-building closely associated with solid political role. While the political and security situation was hit by the Bozizé affair in May 2001, regional movement was initiated to find a peaceful solution to the political impasse in CAR and eventually resulted in December 2001; in the deployment of a regional African peacekeeping force following a mini-summit of the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which was held in Khartoum on 3 December 2001. The 300 troops' strength mission was mandated to secure the capital Bangui and to support national reconciliation. Another summit was organized in Libreville on 4 and 5 December 2001, decided to create an ad hoc committee of heads of State to promote a resumption of the political dialogue. The African peacekeeping missions failed to secure the country and Bozizé supporters managed to destabilize the capital in October 2002 by a raid which disrupted the diplomatic relations with Chad –from where Bozizé's rebels came. Political tension between CAR and Chad escalated as Patassé accused Chad of attempting to occupy the North of CAR, and conflict, violence and massacres followed. Chad accused CAR government of killing tens of Chadians in Bangui and denied supporting the CAR rebels. The political tension between CAR and Chad was a source of concern for the Security Council which attempted to mediate between the

¹³⁰ United Nations (2001), **Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in the Central African Republic pursuant to the statement by the President No. S/2001/886** on 21 September 2001

two countries to prevent further escalation of the conflict. The deteriorating security situation and escalation of conflict between Bozizé armed militias and the army induced African leaders to interfere once again through deciding in October 2002 to establish an observation and security force to ensure the safety of President Patassé; observe security on the border between the CAR and Chad; and participate in the restructuring of CAR armed forces.

African efforts were welcomed by the UN which invited the international community to provide financial and logistical support to the observation force while assisting the new observation force and maintaining good offices between conflicting parties. In parallel, BONUCA supported the Government's efforts in security and military aspects, and its military advisers participated in several African hybrid verification missions in addition to assisting DDR efforts and collection of weapons.

BONUCA seemed to be well placed in supporting the African led missions which validated the UN security role despite the non-deployment of UN blue helmet peacekeepers. Meanwhile, BONUCA continued its peace-building activities including improving the penitentiary system, investigation and monitoring of human rights abuses, supporting to capacity building of police and restructuring of security forces among others, but economic situation was terrible with the failure of the government to meet its financial obligations with the International Monetary Fund and the subsequent rejection of the Fund to provide budgetary support to CAR government causing civil servants salary arrears was adding up to the instability in the country jeopardizing social peace.

With regional blessing, Bozizé overthrew Patassé in March 2003 with the support of Chad. Bozizé promised to hold elections in 2004, establish a democratic regime,

return to constitutional legality by 2005 and resume the political dialogue and national reconciliation during the transitional period.

Despite the amnesty given to ex- instigators of political coup of 2001 including military contingents in addition to the exiled, the resumption of national reconciliation and engagement of opposition, and the deployment of the new African peacekeeping force, the security and military conditions did not improve throughout the country. Proliferation of weapons, looting and organized crime continued and the economy collapsed.

Whether a UN peacekeeping force would have prevented the 2003 coup is questioned. From experience, the mandates of the peacekeeping missions do not permit the use of force against other parties except in self defense, nor to take sides in a conflict. The Bozizé coup was mainly supported by Chadian army which would have pushed the UN peacekeeping force into an international conflict if reacted against the coup. Moreover, though peace-building initiatives were ongoing at the time of the coup, but security conditions did not establish a suitable environment for peacekeepers to operate in. The deployment would have definitely made the UN part of the conflict with limited options and authority that normally peacekeeping missions have. For example, though BONUCA monitored, investigated and frequently reported on the human rights violations leading to summary executions by the army in the northern part of the country, a peacekeeping mission would not have had a stronger mandate to react to these atrocities. The deployment of a number of African peacekeeping forces between 2001- 2003 – which will be extended till 2007- further proved the difficulty in making a dramatic shift in security conditions in CAR, and most importantly durable peace through peacekeeping. Despite positive impact on security situation attributed to the presence of the African peacekeeping force, the

security conditions remained a source of concern and an aspired prerequisite for a functioning state- a matter which was far fetched.

The UN appealed once again to the international donor community to assist CAR in its renewed attempt to peace-building and security. The international community was up against a nation building attempt addressing all aspects to establish a functioning viable state, among which were strong state institutions with suitable capacities and resources to manage public affairs and protect human rights, ensuring individuals freedoms, a committed and unaffiliated security force and civil defense, rule of law, national unity, freedom of political parties, democratic process, separation of powers, social and economic development and safe borders. The list went on and the risk of relapse into conflict stood as the only future for CAR if any of the mentioned elements was ignored or not fully addressed. The costs associated with peace-building of CAR were high and successive appeals by the UN to the donor community to provide the assistance did not match the needs. With no coherent and comprehensive strategy for all international efforts to build peace in CAR, the country was left with ad-hoc attempts and project based interventions that lacked the seriousness of addressing root causes of the problems systematically. It was not until after 2005 legislative and presidential elections – which Bozizé won- that the UN together with the Government of CAR and partners started addressing strategies; including a development exit strategy, and initiated the UN Development Assistance Framework for CAR and the consolidated appeal process which concerned the UN system as a whole with all UN agencies and involvement of national and international partners while the government of CAR was developing a post conflict reconstruction and poverty reduction strategies.

The priorities identified by the government of CAR included the following¹³¹:

Short term (2005-2006)

- Immediate streamlining of public finances
- Resolution of the external debt-servicing problem
- Introduction of a transparent management and good governance mechanism to combat fraud and corruption.
- Limiting the number of civil servants and State officials in order to control the wage bill
- Improvement of the management and functioning of public financial administrations
- Providing security throughout the national territory by strengthening the defence and security forces both in personnel and in equipment.
- Expansion and effective development of the private sector by improving the existing legal, judicial and regulatory framework.

Medium term (2007-2010)

- Rehabilitation of the basic infrastructure
- Modernization of the telecommunications sector
- Development of the agricultural sector.
- Increased exploitation of mineral and forestry resources
- Promotion of a policy of national unity based on tolerance, a culture of peace, dialogue and justice.

¹³¹ United Nations (2005), **Report of the Secretary-General in follow-up to the statement by the President of the Security Council of 22 July 2005 on the situation in the Central African Republic** No. S/2005/679 of 27 October 2005

The African peacekeeping force continued to help the national armed forces combat the “roadblockers”, the groups of bandits and armed gangs operating in CAR regions and beyond Central African borders, hence improving the security situation temporarily in the affected regions, while BONUCA further facilitated the regional initiatives to secure the borders with neighboring countries.

From the first glance, one could assume that CAR is on the right track to peace and security, but old habits are hard to give up and it was not too long before security conditions deteriorated again especially in the northern part of the country sparked by the emergence of new rebel armed groups in 2006 near the borders with Darfur. In October 2006, a CAR rebel group attacked and occupied the town of Birao in the north eastern region of Vakaga and further occupied the towns of Ouanda Djallé and Sam Ouadja in the same region in November and December. The Government of CAR accused Sudan of supporting the rebels. The Government of Sudan which was overwhelmed with its own internal conflict in Darfur denied the accusations and intensified diplomatic efforts to assure CAR government about its good intentions. Speculations of the involvement of Chadian rebels also caused additional political tensions across the CAR borders with Sudan and Chad, and African regional peace initiatives led by Libya were mobilized to ease the tensions. The CAR army regained control of those areas, with support from African peacekeeping force and France-through military confrontations that a UN Peacekeeping force would not have been able to engage in; had it been deployed at the time. This is a clear proof of the well positioning of regional African peacekeeping forces as opposed to UN operation. As witnessed in other countries covered by this thesis such as Sierra Leone for example, the UN peacekeeping operations failed time after time to act as a soldier, be it for

limitations imposed in their mandates issues by the Security Council or the lack of liberty to take sides in an internal conflict, because of the poor logistical support, poor training and ill equipped troops,....etc. In CAR, the regional troops had a clear target and used the available military means to accomplish their objectives successfully.

Despite the successful mission of the African regional peacekeeping force and French contingents in assisting the CAR army in repelling the offensive by armed rebels who were advancing south, the renewed conflict between the government of CAR and the rebels had its effect on the civilians and thousands fled their homes as a result of the clashes and became displaced. It also had a negative impact on the overall human rights situation and abuses of all kinds were reported including in Bangui.

The worsening of the security condition in 2006 was also seen to have been affected by the conflict in Darfur causing the influx of refugees to neighboring CAR and also impacted the security situation in Eastern Chad. The national army in CAR was incapable of securing the country and the borders without the external assistance from the regional peacekeeping force and the French contingents. The Security Council decided that the regional dimension and spread of conflict was not to be ignored and attempted to plan the establishment of a multidimensional presence consisting of political, humanitarian, military and civilian police liaison officers in key locations in Chad, including in the internally displaced persons and refugee camps, and if necessary, in the CAR¹³². CAR government welcomed the Security Council's initiative and called for the deployment of UN peacekeepers while the rebels opposed. 2006 witnessed not only poor military security that totally depended on

¹³² Security Council resolution 1706 On 31 August 2006

external actors- especially in the north eastern part of the country-, but difficult human rights, social, political, economic and humanitarian situation.

In February 2007, political progress was made under Libyan auspices as the Government of the CAR and major rebel groups signed a peace agreement that provided, inter alia, for the immediate cessation of hostilities and political dialogue was resumed with some rebel groups outside the process.

Consequently, the UN fielded two successive missions to assess the security situation in both CAR and Chad and to assess the applicability of deploying a peacekeeping operation. In his report to Security Council, in February 2007, the Secretary General presented a report to the Council elaborating on the conclusions and recommendations of the assessment mission. "The assessment team concluded that the military operation would require high-quality military commanders and troops, able to operate in complex scenarios of external and internal threats; good liaison, reconnaissance, information and surveillance; high operational mobility; and robust military capability to deal with any armed threat"¹³³.

In September 2007, having determined that the situation in the region of the border between the Sudan, Chad and the CAR constituted a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council, in accordance with the Secretary General's recommendations stipulated in February 2007 report, authorized by its resolution 1778 the establishment in Chad and the CAR, a multidimensional presence to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of

¹³³ United Nations (2007), **Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the CAR** No. S/2007/97 on 23 February 2007

humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the north eastern Central African Republic and by creating favorable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas. The Council further decided that the multidimensional presence shall include, for a period of one year, a United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) to include a maximum of 300 police and 50 military liaison officers and an appropriate number of civilian personnel, with the mandate to operate in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic in the areas of security and protection of civilians as well as human rights and rule of law to conduct the following activities, inter alia¹³⁴:

- To select, train, advise and facilitate support to elements of the Police
- To liaise closely with the relevant governments, regional partners and international missions including BONUCA to exchange information on emerging threats to humanitarian activities in the region;
- To contribute to the monitoring and to the promotion and protection of human rights
- To assist the Government of CAR -notwithstanding the mandate of BONUCA- in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system, in close coordination with United Nations agencies;

Clearly, the size and mandate of the MINURCAT did not place the mission in a position to make an effective long term or short term impact on the security and peace conditions. In comparison with the mandate of BONUCA, the mission seemed almost aimless and its focus on the north eastern part of CAR exacerbated the limitations already imposed on the scope of peacekeeping intervention which the mission is authorized to do and in terms of overall impact on peace and security throughout

¹³⁴ Security Council resolution 1778 on 25 September 2007

CAR. The main aim of the small security presence was intended to assist in confidence-building and deter conflict.

The answer of the Security Council was ready and the resolution authorized the European Union to deploy the European Union operation (EUFOR) aimed at supporting the MINURCAT in fulfilling its tasks mentioned above. The Security Council also authorized the European Union operation to take all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, to contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations. The activities of EUFOR in the CAR were limited to securing the Birao airfield and the conduct of patrols in and around its immediate vicinity.

The military component of MINURCAT was not authorized until 2009 whereby currently, MINURCAT consists of 2,940 total uniformed personnel, including 2,675 troops, 17 military observers and 248 police officers, and civilian personnel to follow up from the EUFOR after its withdrawal, of which only a small number will be in CAR. The Security Council further mandated MINURCAT to contribute to the creation of more secure environment and execute operations of a limited character in order to protect civilians under immanent physical threat¹³⁵.

It is noteworthy that the main focus of the multidimensional presence and the proposed MINURCAT interventions, though included part of CAR, but was motivated by the security conditions in Darfur and Chad; something that was obvious from the initiation of the deployment attempt by the Security Council. This gives an

¹³⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1861 of 14 January 2009

answer to the less-optimal concentration on the security and peace conditions to the rest of the CAR beyond the north eastern borders with Sudan and Chad which was seen to be inflicted by the surrounding conflicts in these two countries.

The situation of CAR in 2008 was very similar to that prior to the establishment of BONUCA and the deployment of UN multidimensional presence, including the economic impasse and human rights concerns, accusations of human rights atrocities by the army were still being reported, in addition to the instability of security conditions and the continuation of clashes between rebels and the army.

The peace-building efforts were still being administered by BONUCA and the political dialogue was re-initiated in 2008, but the MINURCAT's impact was minimal. The specificities of the insecurity of the north eastern part of CAR where the multidimensional presence and MINURCAT were deployed made peace-building efforts less significant were politics was not the main issue and as previously discussed, UN post conflict peace-building is a political tool in nature. Dealing with gangs, roadblockers, criminals was not to be confused with the humanitarian needs compelled by the refugees and internally displaced persons in the region. By 2008, 300,000 Central Africans were displaced throughout the region, including 80,000 refugees in Chad, Cameroon and the Darfur region of the Sudan, including 197,000 internally displaced persons, mostly in the north-western part of the CAR¹³⁶. The Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon declared on 8 January 2008 that the Central African Republic is eligible to receive assistance from the Peace-building Fund, giving additional impetus to UN peace-building. The subsequent priority action plan in June 2008 identified three priority areas for work which included security Sector Reform,

¹³⁶ United Nations (2007), **Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad** No. S/2007/739 on 17 December 2007

promotion of Good Governance and the Rule of Law, and finally revitalization of Communities affected by Conflicts. These priorities however, overlapped with the BONUCA and MINURCAT mandate. But given the necessity of these elements for achieving security and stability in CAR, the country, government, people and state institutions were and are still in need for any kind of assistance provided to them in all aspects.

In terms of prioritizing UN actions with regards to peacekeeping versus peace-building and as indicated, in principle, the country is and will need all the assistance it can get. The security conditions though in need of effective military and police forces, but in no way, would a pacific military presence, with limitations to use force against those actors who cause security threats and put civilians in danger, be able to guarantee the needed security including the protection of civilians. Another obstacle is demonstrated in the fact that human rights violations and atrocities are being done by all conflicting parties including the national authorities. Mandating the UN peacekeeping force, in CAR, to protect civilians under physical threat and put an end to violence against civilians would result in one of three scenarios; first the peacekeepers could protect civilians from rebels and bandits threats while keeping hands off against the national authorities' misconduct against civilians which would result in losing credibility of the UN as an impartial actor affecting its political leverage in mediating peace between the conflicting parties. Second, the peacekeepers would maintain hands off against human rights abuses by all actors which would result in mistrust in peacekeepers' capacities and seriousness of the UN to secure lasting peace. The last scenario is peacekeepers to protect civilians against any acts of human rights violation by any party which would risk placing the UN peacekeepers as a party to the conflict. On the other hand, a peacekeeping mission with the

traditional tasks seems to be less important at a time when peace conditions are not met, as in the case of CAR. In light of the former, the UN priority action should be drawn towards an effective multifaceted nation building strategy addressing, political, developmental and humanitarian aspects. The post conflict peace-building is seen to have many of the elements of intervention needed by CAR, however, the UN approach of inclusion of national and international partners to assist in formulating and shaping a peaceful future for CAR should be intensely sought as the needed work in CAR can not be done by one institution and/ or party.

It has to be reiterated that the responsibility for security durable peace ultimately lies upon CAR. Despite the sub-optimal peace and security conditions that prevailed in recent years, but as concluded before, peace-building would still be a viable option in a context of political instability. Enacting peace-building efforts as such; should be targeting conflict prevention to avoid relapse into conflict; when post conflict conditions do not fully apply, in addition to directing UN peace-building efforts towards avoiding conflict escalation.

Identifying Measures of Success or Failure:

The sub optimal UN post conflict peacekeeping and peace-building record in the African Continent reflected largely on the trend of UN involvement in new conflicts which steeped downward especially during the nineties where reluctant Security Council members left the international community on the side watching civil conflicts soaring in countries like Burundi with modest reaction from the UN which found in regional actors involvement a leeway to avoid engaging in other messes in Africa. This was accompanied by an international loss of confidence in the UN operations in

addition to a general lax from the Security Council which became more reluctant in mandating new missions. The lack of commitment and unwillingness of powerful countries of the Security Council to contribute troops and commit resources to peacekeeping missions or even to effectively influence troop contributing countries; only added up to the already frail operations and put the Security Council's mandate of maintaining international peace and security under scrutiny. As a result, the failures of the UN in countries like Angola, Rwanda and Sierra Leone overshadowed success stories witnessed in countries like Namibia and Mozambique. Some of those so-called success stories had minimal impact on the ground and was dwarfed significantly to attain modest results such as in the case of the CAR where MINURCA's emphasis was on electoral assistance and the operation withdrew shortly after the conduction of the elections despite the acute security and developmental conditions which CAR was facing. As such, the success was measured in terms of achieving short term gains, mostly political in nature such as those reached in UN good offices and mediation in addition to the cessation of hostilities and major armed violence where UN peacekeeping was deployed. The success, normally, was not measured against the achievement of durable peace.

The Brahimi report in 2000, which gave a frank assessment and recommendations on UN peace operations, stands relevant till this day. It states that the UN has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge of peacekeeping and that without "renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the UN will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-

building tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming months and years". The reality of the matter does not allow for the prediction of significant change in the tendency of the powerful countries to refrain from deploying their troops under UN leadership, especially in Africa, unless dictated by pure political interests such as France- CAR relationship. It is also pointed out that the "costs and other challenges associated with peacekeeping in Africa simply outweigh the altruism of contributing to peacekeeping in Africa"¹³⁷. Another dimension which is still valid to date is that many countries in the General Assembly, mainly members consisting Non- Aligned Movement saw that peacekeeping is interference and jeopardize state sovereignty, and hence refrained to lend the needed support or resources to peacekeeping. This dictates the necessity of African states to handle its own housekeeping through playing a bigger role in securing Africa and maintaining peace in the continent.

One might think that the main question to be answered is whether the UN Peace operations have succeeded? As Guehenno put it, "One interpretation of the question might be whether UN peacekeeping has managed to reduce the incidence of major armed conflict. Such an interpretation would be like trying to evaluate the effectiveness of insulin on the reduction of all diseases known to humankind"¹³⁸; which is a ridiculous endeavor as it is well known that insulin cures only diabetes. This is why the Question of this thesis was directed to finding "To what extent have the United Nations peace-building and peacekeeping efforts succeeded in establishing

¹³⁷ Ibid, Neethling, Theo (2004)

¹³⁸ Guehenno, Jean-Marie, United Nations Peacekeeping, **Conflict Trends**, Accord, issue 3, 2002

durable non-conflict zones in the countries where peacekeeping missions were deployed". The answer derived from the analysis conducted in this thesis states that it failed miserably in some cases such as in Sierra Leone, CAR, Angola and Rwanda while had some success in countries like Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique which basically connotes the inconsistency in UN action in Africa where it faced the most challenges, sore difficulties and shameful failures. Scholars, on the other hand, had mixed views and evaluations on the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping and peace-building. The mixed results were driven by the ultimate objective which peacekeeping and peace-building was aiming to achieve on both short term and long term.

Yet another way to put the question is to ask whether the UN should still be engaged in peacekeeping operations despite repeated failures and limitations imposed on the deployments? And if yes, whether these operations should be limited to the classical pacific peacekeeping or maintain the new approach of multidimensional complex operation? The question is however not straight forward, it involves numerous prerequisites including the strong commitment of Security Council to lay the foundations for a stronger presence in maintaining world peace and security; specifically in Africa. The commitment should include political in addition to financial dimensions manifested in willingness of the Security Council's permanent members to contribute troops and needed financial support to peacekeeping operations. The problem of committing troops by the permanent members and other countries goes beyond mere contribution of troops. In this regard, the unwillingness

of states to deploy troops under the UN operations is another aspect that is no less important than the command and control problems, lack of training of troops which renders the whole operation ineffective and political affiliation of peacekeepers through advancing their countries interests rather than advocating and working to fulfill the mandate of the missions. Amidst these prerequisites, the way to reform UN peace operations is not seen to be through widening the scope of operations and giving it a multidimensional nature, but through overcoming the existing limitations in addition to better scoping within a wider conflict prevention approach addressing root causes of conflicts. Another important benchmark which should be emphasized is the fact that peacekeeping is not to be considered as soldiering and that peacekeeping, though involves troops most times, but those contingents are not prepared or well positioned to engage in military confrontations, especially since the African context is different from normal war fare and organized armies.

There are also general principles that need to be secured in both traditional and multidimensional UN peacekeeping. This includes the consent of the conflicting parties in order to ensure that the UN does not become part of the problem or a party in the conflict. The UN however has not had successful track record in distinguishing between the victim and the aggressor by attending to the consensual principle. And when the UN attempted to take sides, it yielded significant losses such as in Congo and Sierra Leone. The mere perception of conflicting parties of a partial role of the UN rendered peacekeeping operations difficulties such as in Burundi. This posed a lot of difficulties for the UN, especially in not being able to fulfill the obligation of

responsibility to protect in full; when the consent of the conflicting parties is absent or not strong enough, and where there was general lack of confidence in UN impartial role as indicated in the case studies. Another problem associated with the former is derived from the fact that most of Africa's conflicts are intra-state in nature where armed militias, non-state actors and rebels and at times, bandits and road cutters are the main parties to the conflict fighting against national armies which makes it more difficult for the UN to assume a political role to mediate between conflicting parties¹³⁹, the peacekeeping becomes even a harder task beyond the UN's ability to act in some cases such as CAR and Burundi. Though the UN has to abide by this principle to maintain its international integrity and impartiality, this can be overcome in other ways; one of which, through promoting regional partnership in peacekeeping such as in Burundi and CAR, and empowering the role of the African Union where the Constitutive Act of the AU allows for intervention without the consent of states. To that end, and given the continued emergence of conflicts- mainly civil wars- in African countries, and the risk of regional spill over such as the case in CAR, Sudan and Chad triangle of regional conflict, the UN has the option of supporting the establishment of a permanent military arm within the African Union with rapid deployment and enhanced contingent capacities (which could take a form similar to the NATO for example). Though some might argue that regional involvement can lack the impartiality needed to prevent conflicts, but the counter argument lies in a similar statement questioning the impartiality of any external involvement regardless

¹³⁹ Atwood, J. Brian (2002), The Development Imperative: Creating the Preconditions for Peace, **Journal of International Affairs**, vol. 55. no. 2, The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York

of its geographic decent. As such, where applicable, the UN should work under AU leadership in African countries, through giving the broader political and military responsibility to the AU troops while the UN provides financial and logistical support in addition to equipment and training of peacekeepers if and when needed.

On another spectrum, and to put things into perspective; effectiveness of UN peace operations in post conflict countries can be looked at in terms of ability/ inability of those operations to overcome many challenges. The challenges include, inter alia:

- Strategic approach to establishing and fielding peace operations missions; including political direction of the Security Council members. There is a tendency of Security Council members to substitute UN peacekeeping for genuine political efforts to resolve long-running disputes. "For many of our missions there is no consensus in the international community regarding optimal political direction,"¹⁴⁰ Alain Le Roy- former Under Secretary General said. The mandates of the peacekeeping missions were often stretched to include political and diplomatic efforts as a complementary component of peacekeeping and peace-building operations. Those efforts lacked coherence and synergy with other operations' components, they were not focused and failed to bring about sustainable peace at many times. Another pertinent problem is the lack of information and intelligence gathering which the UN has maintained; is not a function of the UN. The former position dictated the situation where the Security

¹⁴⁰ Tisdall, Simon, "Peacekeeping without the Peace", The Guardian, February 12, 2009. Retrieved in October 2009 from: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199/40879.html>

Council made uninformed decisions on deployments; this led in its own right to hold the position of reactor to events on the ground rather than having a proactive and pre-emptive role, such as in the case of Sierra Leone. The reactions were mostly either through enlarging the missions, increasing the number of deployed troops and widened mandates which had mixed results; or drastic curtailment of the missions and/ or terminations.

Overcoming this particular challenge is typically beyond the control of the UN as it relates to political decisions on governments levels. The UN's attempts to influence these decisions are minor if none. The only leeway the UN has is developing new strategic approaches to peacekeeping and peace-building, guidelines and wider visibility of the work of the missions. The choices are limited and any options to be adopted by the UN will fall short in competing with super powers politics. The latter assessment is also incomplete without referring to securing necessary resources.

- Resource mobilization including financial and human resources has been on the priority agenda of the UN for many years. This critical problem has resulted in failure of missions, incapacitation of other missions, inability to apply Security Council decisions of increasing deployments and support to new and ongoing missions and an overall inertia of the system. This had drastic implications on the ground where the UN had to postpone the establishment of missions in some cases such as in CAR. In other instances, the UN was left with the option of deploying ill equipped and poorly trained troops who lacked the unified command and control from within, and did not receive adequate field support from outside.

Other problems associated especially with the human resources were the accusations of sexual exploitation, corruption and other forms of misconduct by peacekeepers. Both of these difficulties prevailed in Sierra Leone. The lack of financing of peace-building programmes had similar impacts to those of peacekeeping; where the UN constantly failed to secure needed funds for peace-building and replenishing peace-building funds resulting in slow down of crucial peace-building efforts in DDR, mine action, governance and general developmental aspects that were much needed for securing durable peace. The poor funding of DDR programmes in Sierra Leone for example, not only forced former combatants to re-arm but also had negative impact on the reputation and credibility of the UN as an effective and strong partner. In the case of CAR, the developmental efforts suffered greatly and despite political commitment from the international community to revive CAR economy; economic collapse was the only option with the much and still belated proper financing and resource mobilization from donor community.

The reality is that the financial and human resources remain a significant problem which jeopardized the effectiveness and success of both peacekeeping and peace-building missions in Africa. The notion of Africa peacekeeping and partnering with African organizations such as the African Union and other regional bodies remain a viable option as seen in Burundi and CAR, but it needs to be perfected and supported to great extent- Burundi is a case in point. Partnering in peace-building should however, exert more emphasis on regional developmental and humanitarian agendas

supported by the international community through credible and proper assistance. But as long as rich countries do not contribute financially and countries with strong armies do not contribute well trained and equipped troops, the problems will persist; waiting for more effective African capacities to take over.

- Multidimensional peacekeeping. This is another area which is still to be explored in terms of its efficiency. To properly tackle this area we need to dismantle its components. First, main principles, second, traditional peacekeeping and finally integrated peace-building dimension.

It must be acknowledged that each country has a unique case that needs to be dealt with separately, but at the same time, commonalities exist among all operations. To begin with, the idea of peacekeeping's main aim being to "keep peace" is controversial as the many cases presented throughout this thesis delineate that "peace" does not effectively exist in all cases where peacekeeping and/ or peace-building operations were/ are established. As mentioned before, the mere signature of a peace accord between conflicting parties does mean that sustainable or even viable peace exists. This is a trap which the UN found itself dwelled in many times as seen in Sierra Leone, Burundi and CAR. For this reason, the priority action of the UN in peacekeeping and peace-building should be seen not to depend on the end of actual conflict because the stages of conflict cycle could be blurred as a result of many internal and/ or external factors whereby the view of peacekeeping and peace-building deployments in "post conflict" conditions appear to stand on shaky grounds.

We are left here with three choices, either to re-interpret the event of peacekeeping and peace-building to synergise with the "post conflict" view or we realign "post conflict" with requirements of peacemaking and enforcement. The two choices are similarly hard to adopt and apply. While the first choice imply the necessity to re-shuffle the tasks and terms of peacekeeping and peace-building- something which was proven to be ineffective so far-, the second choice disregards peacekeeping and peace-building completely and provides more emphasis on the how to solidify "post conflict" conditions. Though the former argument seems to be confusing, but the issue is simpler than what appears to be. The practical application of peacekeeping and peace-building is purely political in nature. The evolution of the terms and their practicalities were mostly driven by political interests and to some extent by UN necessity to respond to severe international scrutiny and loss of confidence in the UN ability and credibility. Despite the new approaches and re-configurations of the peacekeeping and the new addition of peace-building to it; but the original trigger of the gun stays the same and its short and long term impact will linger in the circle of UN peace efforts without much influence of the UN in reality over the process.

For example, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East established in 1948 and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) established in 1949 are two long term peacekeeping missions that still exist to date. Is it possible to say that if we changed any or all components of these missions that things will differ?? The answer is as we all can imagine "highly unlikely". With or without these missions, with the UN military

observers or without them, we will not be able to find such practical evidence to support the argument that things will, in the matter of fact, change. In reality, cease fire agreements are often breached between the warring parties in the mentioned cases, UN military observers report those breaches and the story ends there. One might argue that the same applies to peace-building programmes in the countries in question where years of UN peace-building and developmental efforts did not end the conflict between the countries in question. But it must be reminded that peace-building is only one tool of conflict prevention and should not be regarded as a panacea that cures all conflict illnesses but the longer term impact on the quality of life and establishing a sense of human security if not political security is still considered a tremendous impact if successfully achieved. The other reality is that even with sub-optimal overall impact of peace-building on durable peace and security conditions, but any accomplishment of peace-building efforts is seen as a gain. This argument is augmented when reciting some of the tasks of peace-building, such as strengthening state institutions including armed forces and police, assisting in upholding rule of law, promoting human rights,...etc. Another consideration should be made to the fact that the UN, though is a reflection of the international community's will and commitment, but in executing peace-building mandates, the UN is a single party that needs multi partner presence of national and international stakeholders and collaboration between all concerned parties to have a real and lasting impact.

Main principles of UN demonstrated in impartiality, assurance of state sovereignty through consensual operations and non-use of force except in self defence are all political decisions of governments that normally starts with the decision of the Security Council to establish a given mission in addition to mandating it. This in turn is taken to a different level of unilateral versus multilateral action by states, a decision which is sometimes made outside the UN and yet again is driven by political interests of states. The UN is seen in these cases as an outside observer such as in the cases of Sierra Leone, CAR and Burundi, and at best, an executive arm to the whims of the Security Council members and their political interests. In a way, there was a clear confession by the UN on the uselessness which these principles bring to peace operations. In July 2008 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the stepping down Under-Secretary-General of Peacekeeping Operations at the time, told reporters that hard lessons had been learned in recent times; "I, for one, am convinced that force does matter – that we are a long way past the time when peacekeeping started 60 years ago and we would have only unarmed observers: force does matter. To be able to be respected is essential," Le Roy said, especially in civil conflicts¹⁴¹. This statement signifies both desperation and pessimism. For this reason, the discussion over priority actions by the UN is misleading in connoting the sole responsibility and power of the UN over the discussions and their respective conclusions in addition to the ability to undertake robust reform and make actual change. Another evidence of the former is the clear shift in the way and methods which the UN adopted prior versus post Cold War

¹⁴¹ Ibid, Guéhenno, Jean-Marie (2008)

where the international community was unified again on common causes and interests, whereas Cold War era witnessed clashes and accounts settlements in the Security Council between the two opposites which drove all decisions of peace and conflicts.

This thesis attempted to a large degree to eliminate the politicization of the UN peace operations in order to concentrate on the physical application of the Security Council decisions with regards to peace-building and peacekeeping operations.

As for the issue of integrating peace-building components in peacekeeping missions; and as illustrated throughout this thesis, the UN could also find ways to undertake peace-building efforts within the limitations of the existing conflict situation and the prerequisite of a Security Council decision for peacekeeping missions. They could be observers of political elections, provide judicial support and assistance in the area of criminal justice and human rights, build the capacity of police and other law enforcement catalysts, supervise the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants and other measures; all of which would complement the peacekeeping operation. However, as noticed from the case studies, peace-building should be the emphasis of UN priority actions even during the deployment of peacekeeping operations. Undertaking a thorough programming exercise providing situation analysis, conflict- sensitive needs assessment, planning coherent and comprehensive peace-building strategies, including the planning for proper implementation by the UN and other partners. The assessment should also be sensitive to the timing of the

different interventions and the best method through which the UN could assist and support peace-building initiatives.

Introducing peacekeeping in post conflict countries should be part of the wider UN involvement in peace-building within these countries. The integration of the two disciplines should be carefully planned through giving peace-building supremacy while maintaining traditional tasks of peacekeeping to provide the needed imputes and political leverage. It is suggested that peacekeepers are best suited to undertake the following tasks in addition to the traditional tasks along the peace-building efforts:

- Maintain the status quo on short term with regards to conflict situation and attempt to prevent armed escalation. The peacekeepers should be supported by a strong mandate concentrating on the use of all necessary means including use of force to protect civilians rather than a mandate giving the power to peacekeepers to only defend themselves and the international humanitarian actions.
- The mandate should ensure that conflicting parties who are signatories to the peace accord respect their commitments and obligations of the peace agreement. Mechanisms of the former should differentiate between the victim and aggressor; and the UN should endeavour to push the conflicting parties to refer to international or regional dispute resolution bodies such as the International Court of Justice to resolve acute differences. This has to be guaranteed and facilitated by the UN Mission.
- Maintain Law and order to compensate for the non-existence or weak policing and judicial capacities. This is an important measure to ensure the minimum level of localized security. A pertinent measure is ensuring the protection of civilians through authorizing all necessary measures. The peacekeeping mission should

assume this responsibility in full regardless of the governing Chapter of the UN Charter (be it VI or VII) until the local capacities are enhanced and capable of protecting civilians.

- Security Sector Reform (SSR). Though it is argued that domestic peace is secured when governance is established and development is in process, SSR is one of the key areas that peacekeepers should initiate in a transit period to ascertain a smooth exit of peacekeepers. SSR and Rule of Law are bases without which, governance and development processes can not be instigated. It is noticed that even if developmental and governance initiative are undertaken by the international community on an earlier stage, those initiatives cannot be synergized effectively with the peacekeeping efforts, lack of sustainability as impact is weak, absent or short lived and it is evidenced that those efforts are repeated on the recovery stage which suggests the inappropriate time of commencement. Despite the former, it is argued that governance and developmental efforts in this phase has its political implications and significance in giving visibility to the progress of local development on a downstream level. It is at best, a political price paid by the international society to build confidence in a post conflict country; it exerts international pressure on conflicting parties if channelled correctly and is regarded as early dividend of peace to encourage further reform.

In presenting the counter argument highlighting success UN peace operations stories, we need to acknowledge that the UN failed when the UN Peace operations were used for purposes beyond the traditional merits of peacekeeping/ peace-building, especially when missions were deployed where peace enforcement was a prerequisite and also when "post-conflict" conditions did not necessarily prevail as underlined in the three

case studies. It might be true that the previous poses considerable limitations to the ability of peace missions to protect civilians in conflicts and/ or to put an end to conflicts, but it has to be recognized that the UN peace operations, especially peacekeeping missions and the actual deployment of peacekeepers are not intended to directly do that nor to be another NATO forces model. In scanning the peacekeeping operations and study if and where the term "peacekeeping" applies, we notice that the term was misused repeatedly especially in traditional deployments where the deployment of a number of observers across borders or inside the country did not qualify the mission to be called peacekeeping operation. The earlier –still ongoing- peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and India/ Pakistan is a case in point.

The analysis of the case studies and the developed conceptual framework of UN post conflict peacekeeping and peace-building led the researcher to formulate the view that the peace-building was being incorporated in peacekeeping missions' mandates to become later on an integral part of peacekeeping operations because of its dominant importance even over the peacekeeping task of the UN. In reality, peace-building can be conducted before, during and post conflicts to address root causes of conflicts through long term and inclusive involvement of all national and international stakeholders in the peace-building processes. The literature, including UN approach recited the incorporation of peace-building into peacekeeping mission, where the researcher contends that the peace-building is the prime priority and framework of action under which other measures and UN mechanisms including peacekeeping can be incorporated. This was also evidenced through the commitment shown by the Security Council in asserting the need for peace interventions through peacekeeping

(which integrated peace-building components), establishing peace-building support offices and listing on the peace-building commission agenda outlines important conclusions; first, that peace-building was emphasized by the UN in post conflict countries, second; that the UN addresses peace-building needs through different modalities of intervention; third, that the need for these different methods of operations implies the sub-optimal results/ impact that the previous methods conceived; fourth; that the lessons learned from past experiences necessitated the establishment of a more comprehensive and strategic approach to peace-building; and finally that the implicit and explicit priority action by the UN in post conflict countries was peace-building.

In acknowledging that conflict prevention is only effective when the tools leading the conflict prevention efforts and management address root causes of the conflict and realize their importance and complications as deeply rooted in societal and communal foundations that makes any attempt to derange the conditions behind the problems on the short term; superficial and deemed ineffective. The establishment of a political and social environment conducive to sustainable peace and security needs solid foundations that can not be created through mere stabilizing of a given country for a short term through peacekeeping or peace-building initiatives even when all conditions are prepared to effectively secure peace through maintaining the prerequisites needed for the deployment of peacekeeping operations. Though UN peace missions were proven to have positive impact on keeping peace and creating the impetus and conducive environment to build peace such as in the case of CAR in

1998 and 1999 but there is little evidence that the blue helmets are in fact an effective apparatus in the long term and that the dependence on the short term peacekeeping can in fact do harm in some cases to the peace investments made within the peacekeeping missions whereby these investments are put in risk when closely linked to peacekeeping especially in programmes like DDR, policing and security Sector reform where the withdrawal of the blue helmets signals the green light to conflicting parties to resume conflict causing the loss of any major milestones made in the peace-building aspects.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions and Recommendations

There is a general consensus that the UN peacekeeping and peace-building in Africa is not an easy undertaking. Africa's share of UN peacekeeping and peace-building interventions topped other continents by a large extent. This had its direct impact on shaping limitations and possibilities of UN engagements in conflict prevention world wide. The UN failures and difficulties in dealing with the African conflicts in post Cold War era were acknowledged by the different UN bodies including the Security Council, General Assembly and the successive UN Secretary Generals. In his report in 1998 to key UN organs, among which, the Security Council, the general Assembly and Bretton Woods institutions, the UN Secretary General presented an analysis regarding the sources of conflict in Africa, ways to prevent and address conflicts, and how to lay the foundation for durable peace and economic growth following their resolution. The report uncovered the failure of the UN and the international community at large in addressing conflicts in Africa and securing peace¹⁴². This is tracked to years of UN endeavours in Africa to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcing, peacekeeping and peace-building. This was evidently following UN setbacks in Somalia and Rwanda in early nineties leading the Security Council to withdraw the operation in Somalia without completing its mandate and in Rwanda where the UN was unable to stop massacres and genocides which ultimately affected credibility of the UN as a guarantor of peace.

¹⁴² United Nations (1998), **The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa**, Report of the UN Secretary-General on Document No. A/52/871 – S/1998/318 delivered on 13 April 1998

This thesis answered the first question of what do peace-building and peacekeeping encompass in the first chapter and provided clear definitions and differentiated between the two terms. The second question of the thesis addressing the extent to which the United Nations peace-building and peacekeeping efforts have succeeded in establishing durable non-conflict zones in the countries where peacekeeping missions were deployed was also answered through the three case studies in the third chapter, while the answer to the third question to clarify the conceptual as well as the operational aspects of the United Nations Peacekeeping and peace-building initiatives was answered in the three chapters combined. These answers led to another emerging question of where do UN peace operations fit best? This is a simple or a simplified question that has its roots in the traditional peacekeeping and the typology of the term. Peace operations are deployed to keep and/ or build peace, which means that the classic attributes should be maintained in terms of deployment following the successful achievement of a peace process. Where peace agreements and processes are regarded as the signal for potential peace, the UN peace operations should first validate the agreement/ process, assess the credibility of the conflicting parties in their quest for peace and study the probability of the agreement to hold for a long time. This diagnosis must be strongly maintained throughout the process by the UN. When all the former are confirmed, the yellow light could be given by the Security Council to study the feasibility and ability of the Council to establish a peace operation with a clear and applicable mandate; sufficient financial and logistical support, and giving priority for the involvement of regional organizations. Long term

commitment of troops contributing states should be ascertained. The scope of the mandate should consider the involvement of regional organizations such as the AU with clear outline of the division of labor. Where the AU and other regional and sub-regional organizations are committed to proactive involvement in conflict prevention through the deployment of troops, the mandate of the UN peace operations should give more weight to operational, logistical and financial support of the African led missions and complement them by robust peace-building activities and sufficient resources when and if needed.

Another area considered by this thesis was that despite the fact that peace-building was increasingly considered as an integral part of peacekeeping operations, but the reality of conflicts in Africa provides for the need of placing peace-building at the heart of peace operations while complementing and supporting UN peace-building efforts through peacekeeping and partnering with developmental partners to that end. Brining the history and present of the mentioned still ongoing operations in the Middle East and India/ Pakistan into the scope of this thesis and in an attempt to conclude, we shed light on the original hypotheses of this thesis which include two main hypotheses drawing a positive correlation between peacekeeping and conflict prevention in post conflict African countries and positive correlation between peace-building and conflict prevention in post conflict African countries. Based on the derived definitions and analysis of three case studies and other peacekeeping missions, this thesis acknowledges the individuality and uniqueness of the conflicts in

African countries and in other continents, but notes the commonalities of peacekeeping measures in its short term longevity which prevents peacekeeping from having a longer term impact to prevent the relapse into conflict on the long run, while the continuity of the peace-building measures, if applied with the needed comprehensiveness and strategic approach to addressing root causes of conflicts would be more apt to be placed a conflict prevention tool in post conflict situations. This thesis also notes the inconsistent theoretical and practical application of the UN peacekeeping and peace-building by the Security Council. While obvious Security Council commitment was evidenced in the case of Sierra Leone; effecting successes and failures in both peacekeeping and peace-building, the reluctance of the Security Council prevailed in the case of Burundi with modest impact in both peacekeeping and peace-building interventions so far. The Central African Republic, on the other hand, had a unique case in French induced, though late, attention by the Security Council to the security impasse in the country coupled with modest action but rather close follow up.

Based on the former, this thesis extends its main recommendation to put more emphasis on prioritizing UN work in post conflict countries through long term peace-building as a conflict prevention measure. It is also recommended to apply short term peacekeeping only as a last resort and to be used for political leverage of UN in post conflict societies. Peacekeeping should be authorized as part of the peace-building efforts and is recommended to embed the tasks outlined earlier. The UN is called also to resume its support to African regional organizations through building technical,

logistic and financial capacities of African peacekeeping contingents to respond to security deteriorations in African countries. Regional partnership should be sought all times to advance peace-building in the African continent through developmental and humanitarian assistance before, during and post conflict situations.

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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1289 (2000)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1313 (2000)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1400 (2002)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1545 (2004)

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Appendices



Map No. 4309 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS
August 2009 (Colour)

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section



Conakry★

Kindia●

Mamou●

Tiro●

GUINEA

MALI

Freetown★

Makeni●

Magburaka●

Sefadu●

SIERRA LEONE

Bo●

Kissidougou●

Macenta●

Beyla●

Borotou●

Sherbo Island

Moa

St. Paul

Nzerekore●

Lola●

Touba●

COTE D'IVOIRE (IVORY COAST)

Man●

Atlantic Ocean

Robertsport●

Monrovia★

Danane●

Toulepleu●

Guiglo●

LIBERIA

Buchanan●

Zwedru●

Tai●

Cess


Greenville●

Harper●

Tabou●

Sierra Leone / Liberia

- International Boundary
- Road
- Minor Road
- River
- ★ National Capital
- City or Town



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
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Map No. 4048 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONS
January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING MISSIONS



NUMBER OF MISSIONS 12

PERSONNEL

Uniformed personnel	354
International civilian personnel (30 June 2009).....	992
Local civilian personnel (30 June 2009).....	2097
UNV Volunteers	122
Total number of personnel serving in political and peacebuilding missions	3565



United Nations

For information on United Nations peacekeeping operations, see DPI/1634 Rev.100 or visit the United Nations website at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>

CURRENT POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING MISSIONS

UNPOS **Since 15 April 1995**
United Nations Political Office for Somalia
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)
Strength: international civilian 40; local civilian 17

UNOGBIS **Since 3 March 1999**
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
Representative of the Secretary-General: Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)
Strength: international civilian 10; local civilian 13; military adviser 2; police adviser 1

UNSCO **Since 1 October 1999**
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority: Robert H. Serry (Netherlands)
Strength: international civilian 29; local civilian 27

BONUCA **Since 15 February 2000**
United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
Representative of the Secretary-General: Sahle-Work Zewde (Ethiopia)
Strength: international civilian 24; local civilian 56; military adviser 5; police 6; UNV volunteer 4

UNSCOL **Since 16 February 2007**
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon
(Formerly known as Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon)
Special Coordinator for Lebanon: Michael C. Williams (United Kingdom)
Strength: international civilian 18; local civilian 47

UNOWA **Since 29 November 2001**
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Said Djinnit (Algeria)
Strength: international civilian 12; local civilian 12; military adviser 4

UNAMA* **Since 28 March 2002**
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Kai Eide (Norway)
Strength: international civilian 334; local civilian 1,204; military observer 15; police 7; UNV volunteer 53

UNAMI **Since 14 August 2003**
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq: Ad Melkert (Netherlands)
Authorized strength: 1,014 (463 international, 551 local)
Current strength (staff based in Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait): international civilian 316; local civilian 439; troop 221; military observer 12

UNIPSIL **Since 1 October 2008**
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
Executive Representative of the Secretary-General: Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)
Strength: international civilian 27

BINUB* **Since 1 January 2007**
United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
Executive Representative of the Secretary-General: Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia)
Strength: international civilian 124; local civilian 240; military observer 7; police 12; UNV volunteer 49

UNMIN **Since 23 January 2007**
United Nations Mission in Nepal
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Karin Landgren (Sweden)
Strength: international civilian 52; local civilian 42; military observer 61; UNV volunteer 16

UNRCCA **Since 10 December 2007**
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Miroslav Jenča (Slovakia)
Strength: international civilian 6



* Political or peacebuilding mission directed and supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. All other political and peacebuilding missions are directed by the Department of Political Affairs. For information on political and peacebuilding missions, visit the United Nations website at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/index.html>

CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient

discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/1159 (1998)
27 March 1998

RESOLUTION 1159 (1998)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3867th meeting,
on 27 March 1998

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1125 (1997) of 6 August 1997, 1136 (1997) of 6 November 1997, 1152 (1998) of 5 February 1998, and 1155 (1998) of 16 March 1998,

Recalling the report dated 10 March 1998 (S/1998/221) to the Security Council by the International Committee for the follow-up of the Bangui Agreements pursuant to resolution 1152 (1998),

Recalling also the letter dated 11 March 1998 from the President of the Central African Republic to the President of the Security Council (S/1998/219, annex) and the letter dated 13 March 1998 to the President of the Security Council from the President of Gabon, on behalf of the members of the International Committee for the follow-up of the Bangui Agreements (S/1998/233, annex),

Having further considered the report of the Secretary-General of 23 February 1998 (S/1998/148) submitted to the Council in accordance with resolution 1152 (1998),

Reiterating its appreciation for the neutral and impartial way in which the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) has carried out its mandate, in close cooperation with the Central African authorities and noting with satisfaction that MISAB has contributed significantly to stabilizing the situation in the Central African Republic, in particular through the supervision of the surrendering of arms,

Recognizing that the States participating in MISAB and the Central African Republic extended the mandate of MISAB until 15 April 1998 in order to ensure a smooth transition to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation,

Stressing the importance of regional stability and the need to consolidate the progress achieved by MISAB, and in particular to assist the people of the Central African Republic to consolidate the process of national reconciliation and help to sustain a secure and stable environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections,

Stressing also the need for all signatories to the Bangui Agreements to continue to implement these Agreements, and for the authorities of the Central African Republic to take concrete steps to implement political, economic, social and security reforms as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General of 23 February 1998 including the establishment of an electoral code and preparations for legislative elections scheduled for August/September 1998,

Recognizing the link between peace and development and that a sustained commitment by the international community to assist and support the economic, social, and institutional development of the Central African Republic is indispensable for long-term peace and stability in the country, and in that regard welcoming the cooperation between the Government of the Central African Republic and the international financial institutions in developing an economic reform programme,

Determining that the situation in the Central African Republic continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

A

1. Welcomes the progress made by the Central African authorities and parties towards the achievement of national reconciliation and sustainable stability in the Central African Republic;

2. Urges the Government of the Central African Republic to continue to fulfil the commitments expressed in the letter of 8 January 1998 to the Secretary-General from the President of the Central African Republic (S/1998/61, annex) and calls upon the parties in the Central African Republic to complete the implementation of the provisions of the Bangui Agreements and to implement the National Reconciliation Pact (S/1998/219, annex);

3. Reiterates its call to all States, international organizations and financial institutions to assist in post-conflict development in the Central African Republic;

B

4. Welcomes the efforts made by the Member States participating in MISAB and by those States providing support to them, and their readiness to maintain these efforts;

5. Approves the continued conduct by the Member States participating in MISAB of the operation in a neutral and impartial way to achieve its objective as set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1125 (1997);

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6. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Member States participating in MISAB and those States providing logistical support to ensure security and freedom of movement of their personnel;

7. Decides that the authorization referred to in paragraph 6 above will end on 15 April 1998;

8. Recalls that the expenses and logistical support for MISAB will be borne on a voluntary basis in accordance with article 11 of the mandate of MISAB, and encourages Member States to contribute to the Trust Fund for the Central African Republic;

C

9. Decides to establish a United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) with effect from 15 April 1998, and decides also that the military component of MINURCA will not exceed 1,350 personnel;

10. Decides that, taking into account the recommendations of the Secretary-General in his report of 23 February 1998, MINURCA shall have the following initial mandate:

(a) To assist in maintaining and enhancing security and stability, including freedom of movement, in Bangui and the immediate vicinity of the city;

(b) To assist the national security forces in maintaining law and order and in protecting key installations in Bangui;

(c) To supervise, control storage, and monitor the final disposition of all weapons retrieved in the course of the disarmament exercise;

(d) To ensure security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and the safety and security of United Nations property;

(e) To assist in coordination with other international efforts in a short-term police trainers program and in other capacity-building efforts of the national police, and to provide advice on the restructuring of the national police and special police forces;

(f) To provide advice and technical support to the national electoral bodies regarding the electoral code and plans for the conduct of the legislative elections scheduled for August/September 1998;

11. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the measures necessary to ensure that MINURCA is fully deployed by 15 April 1998 in order to carry out its mandate, and to secure a smooth transition between MISAB and MINURCA;

12. Decides that MINURCA is established for an initial period of 3 months until 15 July 1998 and expresses its intention to decide on the extension of MINURCA on the basis of the report to be submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 15 below;

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13. Affirms that MINURCA may be required to take action to ensure security and freedom of movement of its personnel in the discharge of its mandate;

14. Welcomes the appointment by the Secretary-General, within MINURCA, of his Special Representative in the Central African Republic:

(a) To assist in the promotion of the reforms necessary to achieve national reconciliation, security and stability in the country;

(b) To head MINURCA;

(c) To have overall authority over all United Nations activities in the Central African Republic, in support of MINURCA's mandate;

(d) To provide good offices and mediation between the Government and political parties;

(e) To provide advice and facilitate technical assistance in the areas of good governance and the rule of law;

(f) To cooperate with other international partners, including international financial institutions, with the objective of supporting activities aimed at establishing the foundations for lasting peace, national reconstruction and development;

(g) To encourage the United Nations agencies and programmes to provide assistance to the Central African Republic, in particular in the areas referred to in the report of the Secretary-General;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed and to submit a report to the Security Council by 20 June 1998 on the implementation of the mandate of MINURCA, on developments in the Central African Republic, on progress towards the implementation of the commitments expressed in the letter of 8 January to the Secretary-General from the President of the Central African Republic and on the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and the National Reconciliation Pact, including on commitments related to ensuring the country's economic recovery;

16. Further requests the Secretary-General to provide information in his report referred to in paragraph 15 above on the progress by the Government of the Central African Republic to adopt an electoral code, set a date for the legislative elections, and develop specific plans for the conduct of the legislative elections, and to make recommendations on the future role of the United Nations in the legislative elections process;

17. Urges Member States to respond positively to the request made to them by the Secretary-General to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to MINURCA in order to facilitate its early deployment (S/1998/148);

18. Approves the intention of the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund to enable Member States to make voluntary contributions to support the

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activities of MINURCA and to assist in the financing of the Mission and urges Member States to contribute to it;

19. Requests the Government of the Central African Republic to conclude a status-of-forces agreement with the Secretary-General before 25 April 1998, and recalls that pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) should apply provisionally;

20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/1197 (1998)
18 September 1998

RESOLUTION 1197 (1998)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3928th meeting,
on 18 September 1998

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Having considered the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of 13 April 1998 on "The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa", which was submitted to the General Assembly (A/52/871) and to the Security Council (S/1998/318), regarding the need for the United Nations to provide support for regional and subregional initiatives and the strengthening of coordination between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in the area of conflict prevention and the maintenance of peace,

Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations on regional arrangements or agencies, which set out the basic principles governing their activities, and establish the legal framework for cooperation with the United Nations, in the area of the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling also the agreement of 15 November 1965 on cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as updated and signed on 9 October 1990 between the two Secretaries-General of the two organizations,

Recalling further the resolutions of the General Assembly on the enhancement of cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU, in particular resolutions 43/12 of 25 October 1988, 43/27 of 18 November 1988, 44/17 of 1 November 1991, 47/148 of 18 December 1992, 48/25 of 29 November 1993, 49/64 of 15 December 1994, and 50/158 of 21 December 1995,

Mindful of the need for continued cooperation between the United Nations and its relevant bodies and specialized agencies on the one hand, and the OAU and subregional organizations in Africa on the other,

Welcoming the high-level meeting between the United Nations and regional organizations held in New York on 28 July 1998 and encouraging the holding of such meetings at regular intervals,

Noting that subregional arrangements in Africa, as well as the OAU through its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, are developing their capacities in preventive diplomacy, and encouraging African States to make use of these arrangements and mechanisms in the prevention of conflict and maintenance of peace in Africa,

I

1. Urges the Secretary-General, through the use of the United Nations Trust Fund for Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa, to assist in the establishment within the OAU of an early warning system based on the model currently being used by the United Nations, and to assist in strengthening in making operational the OAU conflict management centre and its situation room;

2. Encourages contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa and to the OAU Peace Fund and encourages also the Secretary-General to develop a strategy for the purpose of enhancing contributions to the Trust Fund;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to assist Member States in the further development of commonly accepted peacekeeping doctrine and to share existing peacekeeping doctrine and concepts of operations with the OAU and subregional organizations in Africa;

4. Invites the Secretary-General to assist the OAU and subregional organizations in Africa to establish logistics assessment teams through the sharing of information on the establishment, composition, methods and functioning of United Nations logistics assessment teams, and also invites the Secretary-General to assist the OAU and subregional organizations, as appropriate, to determine the logistical and financial requirements of regional or subregional peacekeeping operations authorized by the Council;

5. Encourages the establishment of partnerships between States and regional and subregional organizations involved in peacekeeping operations, in which one or more States or organizations contribute troops and others contribute equipment, encourages the Secretary-General to facilitate efforts to that end, and requests him to consider developing a framework to coordinate such partnerships;

6. Commends the various initiatives taken by several States to enhance African preparedness to participate in the military, police, humanitarian and other civilian components of peacekeeping operations, and in this context encourages joint training and simulation exercises and seminars with African peacekeepers;

7. Welcomes the proposal by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to establish a Council of Elders within its Mechanism for the

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Prevention, Management, Resolution of Conflicts, Peacekeeping and Security for the purpose of facilitating mediation efforts and urges the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, to assist in facilitating its establishment and to help to ensure its effectiveness;

II

8. Endorses the establishment of a United Nations Preventive Action Liaison Office in the OAU and urges the Secretary-General to consider ways of making this office more effective and also the possibility of appointing liaison officers to peacekeeping operations of the OAU and of subregional organizations in Africa which are authorized by the Council;

9. Encourages the enhancement of consultation and coordination between the United Nations and the OAU and between the United Nations and subregional organizations in Africa, both at the field and headquarters level, and recognizes that the nomination of joint Special Representatives may be useful to further these aims;

10. Welcomes the fact that both the United Nations and the OAU have agreed to strengthen and broaden their cooperation on measures to prevent and resolve conflicts in Africa, and in this regard invites the Secretary-General to:

(a) Adopt measures for an improved flow of information through systematic mechanisms between the United Nations and OAU and between the United Nations and subregional organizations in Africa,

(b) Develop, in collaboration with the OAU and with subregional organizations in Africa, common indicators for early warning, and share, as appropriate, early warning information both on the ground with their field representatives and with their headquarters,

(c) Arrange, in collaboration with the OAU and with subregional organizations in Africa, occasional visits of staff at working level between the United Nations and the OAU and between the United Nations and subregional organizations in Africa,

(d) Arrange, in collaboration with the OAU and with subregional organizations in Africa, joint expert meetings on certain specific areas of early warning and prevention, including joint reviews of potential and existing conflicts with a view to coordinating initiatives and actions;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to implement the present resolution in the course of his ongoing efforts to develop cooperation with the OAU and subregional organizations in Africa and, where necessary, drawing on the United Nations Trust Fund for Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa, and to keep the Council informed periodically, as necessary, on the implementation of the present resolution;

12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

**Security Council**

Distr.
GENERAL

S/PRST/1998/38
29 December 1998
ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: ARABIC, CHINESE,
ENGLISH, FRENCH,
RUSSIAN AND SPANISH

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the 3961st meeting of the Security Council, held on 29 December 1998, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "Maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict peace-building", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council recalls the open debate held at its 3954th meeting on 16 December 1998 and on 23 December 1998 on "The Maintenance of Peace and Security and Post-Conflict Peace-building". It recalls also the report of the Secretary-General of 13 April 1998 on "The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa", which was submitted to the Security Council (S/1998/318) and to the General Assembly (A/52/871), as well as the report of the Secretary-General of 27 August 1998 on the Work of the Organization submitted to the fifty-third General Assembly (A/53/1). In this context, it welcomes the recommendations of the Secretary-General concerning the role of the Security Council in the aftermath of conflict, in particular in ensuring a smooth transition from peacekeeping to post-conflict peace-building. The Council recalls further the statement of its President (S/25696) of 30 April 1993 on the Secretary-General's report entitled "An Agenda for Peace", including the subject of post-conflict peace-building.

"The Security Council reaffirms its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. It stresses the need to prevent the resurgence or escalation of conflict. The Council recognizes the importance of the post-conflict peace-building efforts of the United Nations to this end in all regions of the world and with due involvement of all United Nations bodies. In particular, it welcomes the role played by the Secretary-General in this field. It recognizes the timeliness of exploring further means to prevent and settle conflicts based on the Charter of the United Nations and generally recognized principles of peacekeeping, and which would incorporate post-conflict peace-building as an important component.

"The Security Council recalls the statement of its President (S/PRST/1998/29) of 24 September 1998, which affirmed that the quest for peace in Africa requires a comprehensive, concerted and determined approach, encompassing the eradication of poverty, the promotion of

democracy, sustainable development and respect for human rights, as well as conflict prevention and resolution, including peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. The Council underlines that efforts to ensure lasting solutions to conflicts require sustained political will and a long-term approach in the decision-making of the United Nations, including by the Council itself. It affirms its commitment to the principles of the political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in conducting peace-building activities, and the need for States to comply with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law.

"The Security Council underlines that economic rehabilitation and reconstruction often constitute the major tasks facing societies emerging from conflict and that significant international assistance becomes indispensable to promote sustainable development in such cases. In that context, it recalls that Article 65 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

"The Security Council, conscious of the emphasis placed by the Secretary-General on the issue of post-conflict peace-building, in particular in the context of the reform of the United Nations, encourages him to explore the possibility of establishing post-conflict peace-building structures as part of efforts by the United Nations system to achieve a lasting peaceful solution to conflicts, including in order to ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peace-building and lasting peace.

"The Security Council recognizes the value of including, as appropriate, peace-building elements in the mandates of peacekeeping operations. It agrees with the Secretary-General that relevant post-conflict peace-building elements should be explicitly and clearly identified and could be integrated into the mandates of peacekeeping operations. It notes that peacekeeping operations may include military, police, humanitarian and other civilian components. It requests the Secretary-General to make recommendations to the Council to this effect whenever appropriate.

"The Security Council also requests the Secretary-General to make recommendations to the appropriate United Nations bodies concerning the transitional period to the post-conflict peace-building phase when recommending the final drawdown of a peacekeeping operation.

"The Security Council recognizes the need for close cooperation and dialogue between the bodies of the United Nations system, in particular those directly concerned in the field of post-conflict peace-building, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and expresses its willingness to consider ways to improve such cooperation. It also emphasizes the need to improve the exchange of information between all relevant actors in the field of post-conflict peace-building, including United Nations agencies and bodies, international financial institutions, regional and subregional organizations, troop contributors and the donor

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community. In this context, it notes with appreciation the Secretary-General's plans for strategic frameworks to ensure increased coherence and effectiveness in the entire range of United Nations activities in States in and recovering from crisis.

"The Security Council will remain seized of the matter."



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/1265 (1999)
17 September 1999

RESOLUTION 1265 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4046th meeting,
on 17 September 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling the statement of its President of 12 February 1999
(S/PRST/1999/6),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 8 September 1999
(S/1999/957) submitted to the Security Council in accordance with the above-
mentioned statement,

Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General of 13 April 1998 on the
"Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable
Development in Africa" (S/1998/318) and 22 September 1998 on the "Protection for
Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees and Others in Conflict Situations"
(S/1998/883), in particular their analysis related to the protection of
civilians,

Noting that civilians account for the vast majority of casualties in armed
conflicts and are increasingly targeted by combatants and armed elements,
gravely concerned by the hardships borne by civilians during armed conflict, in
particular as a result of acts of violence directed against them, especially
women, children and other vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally
displaced persons, and recognizing the consequent impact this will have on
durable peace, reconciliation and development,

Bearing in mind its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, and underlining
the importance of taking measures aimed at conflict prevention and resolution,

Stressing the need to address the causes of armed conflict in a
comprehensive manner in order to enhance the protection of civilians on a long-
term basis, including by promoting economic growth, poverty eradication,
sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy,
the rule of law and respect for and protection of human rights,

Expressing its deep concern at the erosion in respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and principles during armed conflict, in particular deliberate acts of violence against all those protected under such law, and expressing also its concern at the denial of safe and unimpeded access to people in need,

Underlining the importance of the widest possible dissemination of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and of relevant training for, inter alia, civilian police, armed forces, members of the judicial and legal professions, civil society and personnel of international and regional organizations,

Recalling the statement of its President of 8 July 1999 (S/PRST/1999/21), and emphasizing its call for the inclusion, as appropriate, within specific peace agreements and, on a case-by-case basis, within United Nations peacekeeping mandates, of clear terms for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including the safe and timely disposal of arms and ammunition,

Mindful of the particular vulnerability of refugees and internally displaced persons, and reaffirming the primary responsibility of States to ensure their protection, in particular by maintaining the security and civilian character of refugee and internally displaced person camps,

Underlining the special rights and needs of children in situations of armed conflict, including those of the girl-child,

Recognizing the direct and particular impact of armed conflict on women as referred to in paragraph 18 of the report of the Secretary-General and, in this regard, welcoming the ongoing work within the United Nations system on the implementation of a gender perspective in humanitarian assistance and on violence against women,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 8 September 1999, and takes note of the comprehensive recommendations contained therein;

2. Strongly condemns the deliberate targeting of civilians in situations of armed conflict as well as attacks on objects protected under international law, and calls on all parties to put an end to such practices;

3. Emphasizes the importance of preventing conflicts which could endanger international peace and security and, in this context, highlights the importance of implementing appropriate preventive measures to resolve conflicts, including the use of United Nations and other dispute settlement mechanisms and of preventive military and civilian deployments, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, resolutions of the Security Council and relevant international instruments;

4. Urges all parties concerned to comply strictly with their obligations under international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, in particular those contained in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as with the decisions of the Security Council;

5. Calls on States which have not already done so to consider ratifying the major instruments of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, and to take appropriate legislative, judicial and administrative measures to implement these instruments domestically, drawing on technical assistance, as appropriate, from relevant international organizations including the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations bodies;

6. Emphasizes the responsibility of States to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law, affirms the possibility, to this end, of using the International Fact-Finding Commission established by Article 90 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, reaffirms the importance of the work being done by the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, stresses the obligation of all States to cooperate fully with the Tribunals, and acknowledges the historic significance of the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which is open for signature and ratification by States;

7. Underlines the importance of safe and unhindered access of humanitarian personnel to civilians in armed conflict, including refugees and internally displaced persons, and the protection of humanitarian assistance to them, and recalls in this regard the statements of its President of 19 June 1997 (S/PRST/1997/34) and 29 September 1998 (S/PRST/1998/30);

8. Emphasizes the need for combatants to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, as well as personnel of international humanitarian organizations, and recalls in this regard the statements of its President of 12 March 1997 (S/PRST/1997/13) and 29 September 1998;

9. Takes note of the entry into force of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel of 1994, recalls the relevant principles contained therein, urges all parties to armed conflicts to respect fully the status of United Nations and associated personnel and, in this regard, condemns attacks and the use of force against United Nations and associated personnel, as well as personnel of international humanitarian organizations, and affirms the need to hold accountable those who commit such acts;

10. Expresses its willingness to respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted or humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed, including through the consideration of appropriate measures at the Council's disposal in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and notes, in that regard, the relevant recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General;

11. Expresses its willingness to consider how peacekeeping mandates might better address the negative impact of armed conflict on civilians;

12. Expresses its support for the inclusion, where appropriate, in peace agreements and mandates of United Nations peacekeeping missions, of specific and adequate measures for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, with special attention given to the demobilization and

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reintegration of child soldiers, as well as clear and detailed arrangements for the destruction of surplus arms and ammunition and, in this regard, recalls the statement of its President of 8 July 1999;

13. Notes the importance of including in the mandates of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building operations special protection and assistance provisions for groups requiring particular attention, including women and children;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that United Nations personnel involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building activities have appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including child and gender-related provisions, negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordination, and urges States and relevant international and regional organizations to ensure that appropriate training is included in their programmes for personnel involved in similar activities;

15. Underlines the importance of civilian police as a component of peacekeeping operations, recognizes the role of police in assuring the safety and well-being of civilians and, in this regard, acknowledges the need to enhance the capacity of the United Nations for the rapid deployment of qualified and well-trained civilian police;

16. Reaffirms its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the needs of children, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

17. Notes that the excessive accumulation and destabilizing effect of small arms and light weapons pose a considerable impediment to the provision of humanitarian assistance and have a potential to exacerbate and prolong conflicts, endanger the lives of civilians and undermine security and the confidence required for a return to peace and stability;

18. Takes note of the entry into force of the Convention on the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and their Destruction of 1997 and the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 1980, recalls the relevant provisions contained therein, and notes the beneficial effect that their implementation will have on the safety of civilians;

19. Reiterates its grave concern at the harmful and widespread impact of armed conflict on children, recalls its resolution 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, and reaffirms the recommendations contained therein;

20. Stresses the importance of consultation and cooperation between the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other relevant organizations, including regional organizations, on follow-up to the report of

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the Secretary-General and encourages the Secretary-General to continue consultations on this subject and to take concrete actions aimed at enhancing the capacity of the United Nations to improve the protection of civilians in armed conflict;

21. Expresses its willingness also to work in cooperation with regional organizations to examine how these bodies might better enhance the protection of civilians in armed conflict;

22. Decides to establish immediately an appropriate mechanism to review further the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General and to consider appropriate steps by April 2000 in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations;

23. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/1270 (1999)
22 October 1999

RESOLUTION 1270 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4054th meeting
on 22 October 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998, 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998, 1231 (1999) of 11 March 1999 and 1260 (1999) of 20 August 1999 and other relevant resolutions and the statement of its President of 15 May 1999 (S/PRST/1999/13),

Recalling also the report of the Secretary-General of 8 September 1999 (S/1999/957) and its resolution 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict,

Affirming the commitment of all States to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 23 September 1999 (S/1999/1003),

Determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

1. Welcomes the important steps taken by the Government of Sierra Leone, the leadership of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF), the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) towards implementation of the Peace Agreement (S/1999/777) since its signing in Lomé on 7 July 1999, and recognizes the important role of the Joint Implementation Committee established by the Peace Agreement under the chairmanship of the President of Togo;

2. Calls upon the parties to fulfil all their commitments under the Peace Agreement to facilitate the restoration of peace, stability, national reconciliation and development in Sierra Leone;

3. Takes note of the preparations made for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including child soldiers, by the Government of Sierra Leone through the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, and urges all concerned to make every effort to ensure that all designated centres begin to function as soon as possible;

4. Calls upon the RUF, the Civil Defence Forces, former Sierra Leone Armed Forces/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and all other armed groups in Sierra Leone to begin immediately to disband and give up their arms in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Agreement, and to participate fully in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme;

5. Welcomes the return to Freetown of the leaders of the RUF and AFRC, and calls upon them to engage fully and responsibly in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and to direct the participation of all rebel groups in the disarmament and demobilization process without delay;

6. Deplores the recent taking of hostages, including UNOMSIL and ECOMOG personnel, by rebel groups and calls upon those responsible to put an end to such practices immediately and to address their concerns about the terms of the Peace Agreement peacefully through dialogue with the parties concerned;

7. Reiterates its appreciation for the indispensable role which ECOMOG forces continue to play in the maintenance of security and stability in and the protection of the people of Sierra Leone, and approves the new mandate for ECOMOG (S/1999/1073, annex) adopted by ECOWAS on 25 August 1999;

8. Decides to establish the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with immediate effect for an initial period of six months and with the following mandate:

(a) To cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement;

(b) To assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan;

(c) To that end, to establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centres and demobilization centres;

(d) To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel;

(e) To monitor adherence to the ceasefire in accordance with the ceasefire agreement of 18 May 1999 (S/1999/585, annex) through the structures provided for therein;

(f) To encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning;

(g) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance;

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(h) To support the operations of United Nations civilian officials, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff, human rights officers and civil affairs officers;

(i) To provide support, as requested, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone;

9. Decides also that the military component of UNAMSIL shall comprise a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, subject to periodic review in the light of conditions on the ground and the progress made in the peace process, in particular in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, and takes note of paragraph 43 of the report of the Secretary-General of 23 September 1999;

10. Decides further that UNAMSIL will take over the substantive civilian and military components and functions of UNOMSIL as well as its assets, and to that end decides that the mandate of UNOMSIL shall terminate immediately on the establishment of UNAMSIL;

11. Commends the readiness of ECOMOG to continue to provide security for the areas where it is currently located, in particular around Freetown and Lungi, to provide protection for the Government of Sierra Leone, to conduct other operations in accordance with their mandate to ensure the implementation of the Peace Agreement, and to initiate and proceed with disarmament and demobilization in conjunction and full coordination with UNAMSIL;

12. Stresses the need for close cooperation and coordination between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in carrying out their respective tasks, and welcomes the intended establishment of joint operations centres at headquarters and, if necessary, also at subordinate levels in the field;

13. Reiterates the importance of the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, notes that the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF have agreed in the Peace Agreement to provide guarantees in this regard, and calls upon all parties in Sierra Leone to respect fully the status of United Nations and associated personnel;

14. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG;

15. Underlines the importance of including in UNAMSIL personnel with appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including child and gender-related provisions, negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordination;

16. Requests the Government of Sierra Leone to conclude a status-of-forces agreement with the Secretary-General within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and recalls that pending the conclusion of such an agreement

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the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) should apply provisionally;

17. Stresses the urgent need to promote peace and national reconciliation and to foster accountability and respect for human rights in Sierra Leone, underlines in this context the key role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Human Rights Commission and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace established under the Peace Agreement, and urges the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure the prompt establishment and effective functioning of these bodies with the full participation of all parties and drawing on the relevant experience and support of Member States, specialized bodies, other multilateral organizations and civil society;

18. Emphasizes that the plight of children is among the most pressing challenges facing Sierra Leone, welcomes the continued commitment of the Government of Sierra Leone to work with the United Nations Children's Fund, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and other international agencies to give particular attention to the long-term rehabilitation of child combatants in Sierra Leone, and reiterates its encouragement of those involved to address the special needs of all children affected by the conflict;

19. Urges all parties concerned to ensure that refugees and internally displaced persons are protected and are enabled to return voluntarily and in safety to their homes, and encourages States and international organizations to provide urgent assistance to that end;

20. Stresses the urgent need for substantial additional resources to finance the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and calls upon all States, international and other organizations to contribute generously to the multidonor trust fund established by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for this purpose;

21. Stresses also the continued need for urgent and substantial humanitarian assistance to the people of Sierra Leone, as well as for sustained and generous assistance for the longer term tasks of peace-building, reconstruction, economic and social recovery and development in Sierra Leone, and urges all States and international and other organizations to provide such assistance as a priority;

22. Calls upon all parties to ensure safe and unhindered access of humanitarian assistance to those in need in Sierra Leone, to guarantee the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and to respect strictly the relevant provisions of international humanitarian and human rights law;

23. Urges the Government of Sierra Leone to expedite the formation of professional and accountable national police and armed forces, including through their restructuring and training, without which it will not be possible to achieve long-term stability, national reconciliation and the reconstruction of the country, and underlines the importance of support and assistance from the international community in this regard;

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24. Welcomes the continued work by the United Nations on the development of the Strategic Framework for Sierra Leone aimed at enhancing effective collaboration and coordination within the United Nations system and between the United Nations and its national and international partners in Sierra Leone;

25. Notes the intention of the Secretary-General to keep the situation in Sierra Leone under close review and to revert to the Council with additional proposals if required;

26. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every 45 days to provide updates on the status of the peace process, on security conditions on the ground and on the continued level of deployment of ECOMOG personnel, so that troop levels and the tasks to be performed can be evaluated as outlined in paragraphs 49 and 50 of the report of the Secretary-General of 23 September 1999;

27. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.: General

29 October 2001

Resolution 1375 (2001)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4399th meeting, on
29 October 2001**

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Burundi, in particular the statement of its President of 26 September 2001 (S/PRST/2001/26),

Reaffirming that the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of August 2000 (Arusha Agreement) remains the most viable basis for a resolution of the conflict together with the continued efforts to build an internal political partnership in Burundi,

Expressing deep concern at the ongoing violence and insecurity in Burundi,

Noting with concern the implications of the situation in Burundi for the region as well as the consequences for Burundi of continued regional instability,

Reiterating its strong support for the facilitation of former President Nelson Mandela in his efforts to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict in Burundi,

Supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General to enhance the role of the United Nations in Burundi, and in particular the continued work of his Special Representative for the Great Lakes region, as well as in his capacity as Chairman of the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC),

Commending the continued efforts of, and support from the Organization of African Unity/African Union for a peaceful resolution of the conflict,

Welcoming the agreement reached at the Summit of the Regional Initiative on 11 October 2001 in Pretoria, South Africa, on the legal framework and the structure of the transitional government, and the composition of the cabinet, the senate and the transitional national assembly,

Also welcoming the letter from the Foreign Minister of South Africa to the President of the Security Council of 23 October 2001 and the letter from the President of Burundi to the President of South Africa annexed thereto (S/2001/1013),

1. *Reaffirms* its strong support for the 1 November 2001 installation of the transitional government in Burundi;



2. *Calls* on the parties to the Arusha Agreement and the armed groups, namely the Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) and Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), to put an end immediately to all acts of violence against civilians;
3. *Calls* on the FDD and FNL to cease immediately all hostilities, enter into negotiations and join the peace process, and *calls* on all the States of the region to support fully the process;
4. *Endorses* the efforts of the Government of South Africa and other member States to support the implementation of the Arusha Agreement, and *strongly supports* in this regard the establishment of an interim multinational security presence in Burundi, at the request of its Government, to protect returning political leaders and train an all-Burundian protection force;
5. *Requests* the Government of Burundi to keep the Council informed of progress to establish an all-Burundian protection force;
6. *Reiterates* its willingness to consider, in the light of progress in the peace process, further contributions to the peace process and the implementation of the Arusha Agreement;
7. *Urges* the international community, with the installation of the transitional government, to provide additional assistance, including by honouring fully the pledges made by donors during the Paris Conference of December 2000;
8. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.: General
21 May 2004

Resolution 1545 (2004)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4975th meeting, on
21 May 2004

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions as well as the statements of its President on Burundi, in particular its resolution 1375 (2001) of 29 October 2001 and the statements of its President on 18 December 2002 (S/PRST/2002/40) and 23 December 2003 (S/PRST/2003/30),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the respect of the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Burundi, and *recalling* the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness and non-interference, and of regional cooperation,

Reaffirming also its full support for the process of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, signed at Arusha on 28 August 2000 (hereafter "the Arusha Agreement"), *calling on* all the Burundian parties to fully honour their commitments, and *assuring* them of its determination to support their efforts to that end,

Encouraging in particular the transitional institutions of Burundi to enact without delay the laws and regulations required for the organization of the electoral process under the Arusha Agreement, so that this process can take place before the expiration of the transitional period on 31 October 2004,

Taking note with satisfaction of the ceasefire agreements signed on 7 October 2002 by the transitional Government with Mr. Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye's Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and Mr. Alain Mugabarabona's Forces nationales de libération (Palipehutu-FNL) as well as the comprehensive ceasefire agreement signed on 16 November 2003 in Dar-es-Salaam between the transitional Government and Mr. Pierre Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD,

Reiterating its concern at the continuing hostilities in certain parts of the country, *underlining* that there cannot be a military solution to Burundi's problems, *urging* all the parties to observe an immediate ceasefire, and *stressing* the importance attached to Mr. Agathon Rwasa's Palipehutu-FNL, the last armed movement that has still not done so, in participating in the peace process of the Arusha Agreement,

Taking note in this regard of the talks which were started between the President of the Republic of Burundi, Mr. Domitien Ndayizey , and this armed movement at the meeting of 18 to 21 January 2004, at Oisterwijk in the Netherlands, as well as the congress held in Kigoma, Tanzania, from 18 to 21 April 2004, by Mr. Rwasas Palipehutu-FNL, and *urging* the latter to conclude an agreement with the transitional Government without delay with a view to a complete cessation of hostilities and its participation in the transitional institutions,

Condemning all acts of violence, as well as human rights and international humanitarian law violations, and *particularly concerned* by the increasing incidents of rapes, including mass rapes,

Reaffirming its determination to support the efforts of Burundians to bring the perpetrators of such acts and violations to justice on the basis of the rule of law, in order to put an end to situations of impunity, and *calling upon* the parties and transitional authorities to take without delay all necessary measures to that end,

Expressing its concern at the tragic humanitarian situation of a large majority of the Burundian population, *recalling* that all the parties are responsible for the security of the civilian populations, and *recalling in particular* in this regard its resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003) and 1539 (2004) on children in armed conflict, and 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict,

Taking note of the progress achieved in preparing the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for the combatants, *calling on* the parties to firmly commit themselves to that programme without delay, and *encouraging* the international financial institutions and donors to support the programme,

Expressing its concern at the deteriorating economic situation in Burundi in the context of the conflict, and *recognizing* that any improvement in security should be matched by tangible economic and social benefits for the population,

Considering that the voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons will be a critical factor for the consolidation of the peace process, and will require a just solution of the issue of land ownership,

Welcoming the conclusions of the Forum of Development Partners for Burundi, which was held in Brussels on 13 and 14 January 2004, and *calling on* donors to honour their pledges,

Paying tribute to the efforts made by the African Union as well as by the States who are members of the Regional Initiative, especially Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Facilitation, in particular South Africa, to bring peace to Burundi, and *encouraging* the African Union to maintain a strong presence in Burundi to accompany the efforts of the Burundian parties, as specified in the Arusha Agreement and subsequent agreements,

Welcoming the efforts of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the contingents from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique which make it up, as well as the Member States which have assisted AMIB in its deployment,

Encouraging the efforts being undertaken to train a joint Burundian protection unit to ensure continuing security of the leaders of the transitional institutions, and *underlining* the need for this unit to be operational as soon as possible,

Taking note of the statements made before the Council by the President of the Republic of Burundi on 22 September 2003, and by the Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Jacob Zuma, on 4 December 2003, in favour of transforming AMIB into a United Nations peacekeeping operation, and *taking note also* in that regard of the letter dated 15 March 2004 addressed by Mr. Thérence Sinunguruza, Minister of External Relations and Cooperation of Burundi, to the President of the Security Council (S/2004/208), as well as the letter dated 17 March 2004 addressed by the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Mr. Alpha Omar Konaré, to the Secretary-General,

Aware of the difficulty of sustaining stability in Burundi unless peace is restored beyond its borders, in particular in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and *underlining* how important it is for all the States concerned, especially those of the region, to cooperate towards that end, and for the United Nations to coordinate its efforts in the two countries,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on Burundi dated 16 March 2004 (S/2004/210),

Welcoming with satisfaction and encouraging the efforts of the United Nations Organization to enhance the awareness of peacekeeping personnel on the need to prevent and combat HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases,

Noting that obstacles remain to Burundi's stability, and *determining* that the situation in this country continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Welcomes* the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on Burundi dated 16 March 2004;

2. *Decides* to authorize, for an initial period of six months as from 1 June 2004, with the intention to renew it for further periods, the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in Burundi entitled United Nations Operation in Burundi (the acronym ONUB being used in all languages), pursuant to the mandate specified in paragraphs 5 to 7 hereafter, in order to support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation, as provided under the Arusha Agreement;

3. *Decides* that ONUB will be headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who chairs the Implementation Monitoring Committee for the Arusha Agreement, and will initially be composed of existing AMIB forces, and *requests therefore* the Secretary-General, acting in liaison with the African Union, to ensure the transfer of authority over AMIB, within ONUB's framework, to his Special Representative for Burundi;

4. *Decides further* that ONUB shall consist of a maximum of 5,650 military personnel, including 200 observers and 125 staff officers, up to 120 civilian police personnel, as well as the appropriate civilian personnel;

5. *Authorizes* ONUB to use all necessary means to carry out the following mandate, within its capacity and in the areas where its armed units are deployed, and in coordination with humanitarian and development communities:

- to ensure the respect of ceasefire agreements, through monitoring their implementation and investigating their violations,
- to promote the re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces present, monitor and provide security at their pre-disarmament assembly sites, collect and secure weapons and military materiel to dispose of it as appropriate, and contribute to the dismantling of militias as called for in the ceasefire agreements,
- to carry out the disarmament and demobilization portions of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants,
- to monitor the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi and their heavy weapons, as well as the disarmament and demobilization of the elements that need to be disarmed and demobilized,
- to monitor, to the extent possible, the illegal flow of arms across the national borders, including Lake Tanganyika, in cooperation with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and, as appropriate, with the group of experts referred to in paragraph 10 of resolution 1533,
- to contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons,
- to contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the Arusha Agreement, by ensuring a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections to take place,
- without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,
- to ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, as well as the security and freedom of movement of ONUB's personnel, and to coordinate and conduct, as appropriate, mine action activities in support of its mandate;

6. *Decides* that ONUB shall provide advice and assistance, within its capacity and subject to carrying out tasks stipulated in paragraph 5 above, to the transitional Government and authorities to contribute to their efforts:

- to monitor Burundi's borders, with special attention to refugees, as well as to movements of combatants, especially in the Cibitoké province,
- to carry out institutional reforms as well as the constitution of the integrated national defence and internal security forces and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms,
- to proceed with electoral activities,

- to complete implementation of the reform of the judiciary and correction system, in accordance with the Arusha Agreement,
- to ensure, in close liaison with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable persons, and investigate human rights violations to put an end to impunity;

7. *Decides further* that ONUB shall cooperate with the Government and authorities of Burundi, as well as their international partners, to ensure the coherence of their work, in assistance to the Government and authorities of Burundi in:

- extending State authority and utilities throughout the territory, including civilian police and judicial institutions,
- carrying out the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants and members of their families, including those coming from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in liaison with the Government of this country and MONUC, and with particular attention to the specific needs of women and children;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative for Burundi, to conduct all the activities of the United Nations system in Burundi and to facilitate the coordination with other national, regional and international actors, in particular the African Union, of activities in support of the transition process, while ensuring that ONUB's personnel give special attention to issues related to gender equality, as well as to the specific needs of children;

9. *Requests further* the Secretary-General to conclude agreements with States neighbouring Burundi to enable ONUB forces to cross their respective borders in pursuit of armed combatants, as may be necessary while carrying out their mandate;

10. *Requests* the transitional Government of Burundi to conclude a status-of-forces agreement for ONUB with the Secretary-General within thirty days of the adoption of this resolution, taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protections under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, and *notes* that, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the model status-of-forces agreement for peacekeeping operations of 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;

11. *Requests* all parties to cooperate fully with the deployment and operations of ONUB, in particular by ensuring the safety and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, as well as the personnel of humanitarian, development and aid organizations, throughout the territory of Burundi;

12. *Recalling* its resolution 1502 of 26 August 2003, reaffirms the obligation of all parties to comply fully with the rules and principles of international humanitarian law applicable to them related to the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, and also urges all those concerned to allow full unimpeded access by humanitarian personnel to all people in need of assistance as set forth in applicable international humanitarian law;

13. *Requests* all parties and concerned States to facilitate the voluntary, safe and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and to cooperate fully to this end with ONUB and the relevant international organizations;

14. *Underlines* the need for ONUB to have at its disposal an effective public information capacity, including through local and national radio, television and newspaper channels, to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of ONUB among local communities and the parties;

15. *Stresses* the importance of the full and unconditional implementation of the Arusha Agreement, and *demand*s that all parties fulfil their obligations under this agreement, in order to allow the electoral process, in particular the legislative elections, to take place before 31 October 2004;

16. *Reaffirms* the need for all parties to complete in a timely manner the execution of the programme for regrouping and cantonment of combatants, and to begin implementing as soon as possible the programme to dismantle all armed groups, including the militias, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, giving particular attention to the specific need of women and children, and to proceed as well in parallel with the restructuring of the armed forces and the internal security forces;

17. *Reaffirms also* the continued need to promote peace and national reconciliation and to foster accountability and respect for human rights in Burundi, and urges the Government of Burundi, specialized agencies, other multilateral organizations, civil society and Member States to accelerate their efforts to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as provided for in the Arusha Agreement;

18. *Expresses its deep concern* over the illicit flow of arms provided to armed groups and movements, in particular those which are not parties to the peace process under the Arusha Agreement, *calls upon* all States to halt such flow without prejudice to the Burundian national army and police forces whose integration is in progress, and *expresses* its intention to consider this issue further as soon as possible after the deployment of ONUB;

19. *Urges* the international financial institutions and the donor community to continue to contribute to the economic development of Burundi, in particular for the long term, including through the realization of pledges already made, to enable that country to achieve sustainable stability, and in order also to contribute to the wider stability of the region;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that his Special Representatives for Burundi and for the Democratic Republic of the Congo coordinate the activities of ONUB and MONUC, share military information at their disposal, in particular concerning cross-border movements of armed elements and arms trafficking, and pool their logistic and administrative resources, to an extent that does not affect the ability to carry out their respective mandates, in order to maximize efficiency and cost-effectiveness;

21. *Decides* that ONUB shall carry out its mandate in close cooperation with MONUC, in particular concerning monitoring and prevention of movements of combatants across the border between Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the implementation of the disarmament and demobilization programmes;

22. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep it informed on a regular basis of developments in the situation in Burundi, the implementation of the Arusha Agreement and the execution of ONUB's mandate and to submit a report on these developments every three months, including an evaluation of the strength of the military component, with a view to its adjusted reduction, taking account of the progress made on the ground and the tasks remaining to be accomplished;

23. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.: General
31 August 2005

Resolution 1620 (2005)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5254th meeting, on
31 August 2005

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the situation in Sierra Leone,

Commending the valuable contribution the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) has made to the recovery of Sierra Leone from conflict and to the country's peace, security and development,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 26 April 2005 (S/2005/273), and its addendum of 28 July 2005 (S/2005/273/Add.2), and welcoming his recommendation that a United Nations integrated office be established in Sierra Leone, after the withdrawal of UNAMSIL at the end of 2005, in order to continue to assist the Government of Sierra Leone to consolidate peace by enhancing political and economic governance, building the national capacity for conflict prevention, and preparing for elections in 2007,

Noting the letter of 21 June 2005 from the President of Sierra Leone to the Secretary-General (S/2005/419), that likewise emphasizes the need for an integrated United Nations office to support the above objectives,

Emphasizing the importance of a smooth transition between UNAMSIL and the new United Nations integrated office, and of the effective and efficient operation of the office,

Emphasizing the importance of the continued support of the United Nations and the international community for the long-term security and development of Sierra Leone, particularly in building the capacity of the Government of Sierra Leone,

Reiterating its appreciation for the essential work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and its vital contribution to the establishment of rule of law in Sierra Leone and the subregion, underlining its expectation that the Court will finish its work in accordance with its Completion Strategy, and in this regard encouraging all States to cooperate fully with the Court and to provide it with the necessary financial resources,

Welcoming the publication of the report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and encouraging the Government of Sierra Leone to take further steps to implement its recommendations,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), as recommended in the addendum to his report (S/2005/273/Add.2), for an initial period of 12 months beginning on 1 January 2006, with the following key tasks:

(a) to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in:

(i) building the capacity of State institutions to address further the root causes of the conflict, provide basic services and accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals through poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth, including through the creation of an enabling framework for private investment and systematic efforts to address HIV/AIDS;

(ii) developing a national action plan for human rights and establishing the national human rights commission;

(iii) building the capacity of the National Electoral Commission to conduct a free, fair and credible electoral process in 2007;

(iv) enhancing good governance, transparency and accountability of public institutions, including through anti-corruption measures and improved fiscal management;

(v) strengthening the rule of law, including by developing the independence and capacity of the justice system and the capacity of the police and corrections system;

(vi) strengthening the Sierra Leonean security sector, in cooperation with the International Military Advisory and Training Team and other partners;

(vii) promoting a culture of peace, dialogue, and participation in critical national issues through a strategic approach to public information and communication, including through building an independent and capable public radio capacity;

(viii) developing initiatives for the protection and well-being of youth, women and children;

(b) to liaise with the Sierra Leonean security sector and other partners, to report on the security situation and make recommendations concerning external and internal security threats;

(c) to coordinate with United Nations missions and offices and regional organizations in West Africa in dealing with cross-border challenges such as the illicit movement of small arms, human trafficking and smuggling and illegal trade in natural resources;

(d) to coordinate with the Special Court for Sierra Leone;

2. *Emphasizes* the primary responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone for the consolidation of peace and security in the country, and urges continued support from international donors for the Government's efforts in this regard;

3. *Underlines* the importance of establishing a fully integrated office with effective coordination of strategy and programmes between the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Sierra Leone, between the United Nations and other international donors, and between the integrated office, the Economic Community of West African States and other United Nations missions in the region;

4. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's recommendation in the addendum to his report (S/2005/273/Add.2) that the integrated office should be headed by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and his intention that he/she should also serve as the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme and United Nations Resident Coordinator;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue planning for security for the Special Court for Sierra Leone on the basis outlined in paragraphs 15 to 24 of the addendum to his report (S/2005/273/Add.2), and *looks forward* to further details on the proposed arrangements;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of progress with establishing the United Nations integrated office in Sierra Leone, and thereafter with the implementation of this resolution;

7. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.: General
25 October 2006

Resolution 1719 (2006)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5554th meeting, on
25 October 2006**

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions and the statements of its President on Burundi, in particular its resolutions 1545 (2004) of 21 May 2004, 1577 (2004) of 1 December 2004, 1602 (2005) of 31 May 2005, 1606 (2005) of 20 June 2005, 1650 (2005) of 21 December 2005 and 1692 (2006) of 30 June 2006,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Burundi, and emphasising the importance of national ownership by Burundi of peacebuilding, security and long-term development,

Congratulating again the people of Burundi on the successful conclusion of the transitional period and the peaceful transfer of authority to a representative and democratically elected Government and institutions,

Welcoming the signature, on 7 September 2006 at Dar-es-Salaam, of a Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Forces nationales de libération (Palipehutu-FNL),

Paying tribute to the efforts made by the States of the Regional Peace Initiative, in particular Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, and the facilitation efforts of South Africa in the service of peace in Burundi, welcoming the continued commitment and engagement of these States, and recalling also the role played by the Burundi Partner's Forum established at the summit meeting on Burundi held in New York on 13 September 2005,

Taking note with concern of reports of a possible attempt to perpetrate a coup d'Etat in Burundi and of the subsequent arrest of a number of political figures,

Reaffirming its support for legitimately elected institutions, and *stressing* that any attempt to seize power by force or derail the democratic process would be deemed unacceptable,

Calling upon the authorities and all political actors in Burundi to persevere in their dialogue on achieving stability and national reconciliation and to promote social harmony in their country, and underscoring the importance of successfully completing the reforms provided for in the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, signed at Arusha on 28 August 2000, in the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement signed in Dar-es-Salaam on 16 November 2003 and in the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement signed in Dar-es-Salaam on 7 September 2006,



Calling upon the authorities also to persevere in their efforts to promote good governance, including through continued measures to combat corruption,

Emphasizing the need for the United Nations system and the international community to maintain their support for the security and long-term development of Burundi, inter alia by strengthening the capacity of the Burundian Government,

Expressing once again its gratitude to the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), as well as to the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) previously deployed by the African Union, for their important contribution to the successful completion of the transition process in Burundi and to peace in the region,

Welcoming the holding on 13 October 2006 of the first country-specific meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission on Burundi and taking note of the Chairman's summary of that meeting,

Having considered the seventh report of the Secretary-General, dated 21 June 2006 (S/2006/429), and the addendum thereto of 14 August 2006 (S/2006/429/Add.1), and welcoming his recommendation on the establishment of a United Nations integrated office in Burundi following the withdrawal of ONUB, with a view to providing continued peacebuilding assistance to the Burundian Government by strengthening national capacity to address the root causes of conflict,

Underscoring the need for a smooth transition from ONUB to the United Nations integrated office and to ensure the proper functioning of that entity,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish a United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi, BINUB) as recommended in the addendum of his seventh report of 14 August 2006 (S/2006/429/Add.1) for an initial period of 12 months, commencing on 1 January 2007, to support the Government in its effort towards long-term peace and stability throughout the peace consolidation phase in Burundi, including through ensuring coherence and coordination of the United Nations agencies in Burundi, under the leadership of the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General;

2. *Requests* that, once established, BINUB focuses on and supports the Government in the following areas, in coordination with donors and taking account of the Agreement concluded on 24 May 2006 by the Government of Burundi and the Secretary-General and of the role of the Peacebuilding Commission:

Peace consolidation and democratic governance

(a) Strengthening the capacity of national institutions and civil society to address the root causes of conflict and to prevent, manage and resolve internal conflicts, particularly through reforms in the political and administrative spheres;

(b) Strengthening good governance and the transparency and accountability of public institutions;

(c) Promotion of freedom of the press and strengthening the legal and regulatory framework for the media and communications, and enhancing the professionalization of the media;

(d) Consolidation of the rule of law, in particular by strengthening the justice and corrections system, including independence and capacity of the judiciary;

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and reform of the security sector

(e) Support for the implementation of the Dar-es-Salaam Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement of 7 September 2006;

(f) Support for the development of a national plan for reform of the security sector, including human rights training, and provision of technical assistance for its implementation, including training and capacity-building for the Burundi National Police, and technical assistance to enhance the professionalization of the National Defence Force of Burundi;

(g) Support for the completion of the national programme for the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants;

(h) Support for efforts to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons;

Promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity

(i) Promotion and protection of human rights, including by building national institutional capacity in that area, particularly with regard to the rights of women, children and other vulnerable groups, by assisting with the design and implementation of a national human rights action plan including the establishment of an independent national human rights commission;

(j) Support for efforts to combat impunity, particularly through the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, including a truth and reconciliation commission and a special tribunal;

Donor and United Nations agency coordination

(k) Strengthening the partnership between the Government and donors for the implementation of priority, emergency and longer-term activities, within the framework of the Government's Emergency Programme and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which is being finalized;

(l) Strengthening the Government's capacity for donor coordination, effective communication with donors, and mobilization of resources in line with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, when finalized;

(m) Ensuring effective coordination among the strategies and programmes of the various United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Burundi;

3. *Urges* BINUB to take account of the rights of women and gender considerations as set out in resolution 1325 (2000) as cross-cutting issues in all the areas outlined in paragraph 2 above, including through consultation with local and international women's group, and *requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout the Integrated Office and all other aspects relating to the situation of women and girls, especially in relation to the need to protect them from gender-based violence;

4. *Stresses* the need for cooperation, within the limits of their respective capacities and current mandates, between BINUB and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

5. *Welcomes* the recommendation, in the addendum to the Secretary-General's report, that the Integrated Office should be headed by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and that the latter should also serve as the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme and as the United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator;

6. *Takes note* of the benchmarks outlined in the Addendum to the Secretary-General's report for gauging progress made by BINUB during its mandate, in particular as they relate to the priorities mentioned in paragraph 2 above, and of the proposed time frame for the eventual transition to a primarily development-focused engagement, and reaffirms its willingness to adjust as appropriate the United Nations presence in Burundi during the peace consolidation phase, taking all circumstances into account;

7. *Emphasizes* that the Government of Burundi bears the primary responsibility for peacebuilding, security and long-term development in the country, and urges international donors to continue to support the Government's efforts in those areas;

8. *Urges* the authorities and all political actors in Burundi to pursue the reforms agreed upon at Arusha and Dar-es-Salaam and to maintain the spirit of dialogue, consensus-building and inclusiveness that enabled them to achieve a successful transition in their country;

9. *Encourages* the Burundian authorities to continue to cooperate with the Secretary-General, including for the establishment of the mechanisms referred to in Council resolution 1606 (2005);

10. *Calls upon* the Burundian authorities, in their investigations into the alleged attempt to perpetrate a coup d'Etat, to follow due process and to respect the guarantees provided for by law and its international obligations;

11. *Expresses its deep concern* at reports of continuing human rights violations, and *urges* the Government to investigate all such reports, take the necessary steps to prevent further violations and to ensure that those responsible for such violations are brought to justice;

12. *Calls upon* the Government of Burundi and the Forces nationales de libération (Palipehutu-FNL) to expeditiously implement in good faith the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, which they signed at Dar-es-Salaam on 7 September 2006, and to pursue their efforts to resolve outstanding issues in a spirit of cooperation;

13. *Encourages* the States of the Regional Peace Initiative and the South-African Facilitation to continue to work with the Burundian authorities to consolidate peace in their country and in the region;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed of the progress made in establishing the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi and, subsequently, to report regularly to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution, including with respect to the security situation and the human rights situation;

15. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.: General
25 September 2007

Resolution 1778 (2007)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5748th meeting, on
25 September 2007

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions and the statements of its president concerning Chad, the Central African Republic and the subregion, including resolution 1769,

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and political independence of Chad and the Central African Republic, and to the cause of peace in the region,

Deeply concerned at the activities of armed groups and other attacks in eastern Chad, the north-eastern Central African Republic and western Sudan which threaten the security of the civilian population, the conduct of humanitarian operations in those areas and the stability of those countries, and which result in serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law,

Reaffirming that any attempt at destabilization through violent means or seizing power by force is unacceptable,

Recalling that the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic bear primary responsibility for ensuring the security of civilians in their territories,

Reiterating its concern that the ongoing violence in Darfur, eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic might further negatively affect the region,

Recalling the Tripoli Agreement of 8 February 2006 and the other bilateral and multilateral agreements between the Governments of the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic, *stressing* that a proper settlement of the Darfur issue and an improvement of relations between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic will contribute to long-term peace and stability in the region, and *welcoming* the communiqué of the 70th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, concerning the relations between Chad and the Sudan, which was held on 12 and 13 February 2007,

Reiterating its full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and of the African Union to revive the peace process begun by the Darfur Peace Agreement, consolidate the ceasefire and reinforce the peacekeeping presence in Darfur,



Reaffirming its resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, and 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict,

Reaffirming its resolution 1612 (2005) on children in armed conflict, *taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Chad (S/2007/400) and the recommendations therein, and *recalling* the conclusions regarding Chad subsequently adopted by its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (S/AC.51/2007/16),

Bearing in mind the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 and its additional protocol of 16 December 1966,

Emphasizing the need to preserve the civilian nature of the refugee camps and internally displaced persons sites and to prevent any recruitment of individuals, including children, which might be carried out in or around the camps by armed groups,

Welcoming the signing on 13 August 2007 in N'Djamena of the Political Agreement for the reinforcement of the democratic process in Chad,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General (S/2007/488) of 10 August 2007 (hereinafter referred to as "the report of the Secretary-General") and its recommendations for the deployment of an international presence in the regions of eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic indicated in paragraph 37 thereof (hereinafter referred to as "eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic"),

Welcoming the readiness of the European Union, expressed at the meeting of the Council of the European Union held on 23 and 24 July 2007, to consider the establishment, for a 12-month duration, of an operation to support the United Nations presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, and *taking note* of the letter dated 17 September 2007 from the Secretary-General/High Representative of the Council of the European Union (S/2007/560, annex),

Welcoming the letter from the authorities of Chad dated 11 September 2007 (S/2007/540) and the letter from the authorities of the Central African Republic dated 17 September 2007 (S/2007/551) approving the deployment of an international presence provided by the United Nations and the European Union,

Determining that the situation in the region of the border between the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Approves* the establishment in Chad and the Central African Republic, in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 6 below and in consultation with the authorities of Chad and the Central African Republic, of a multidimensional presence intended to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic and by creating favourable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas;

2. *Decides* that the multidimensional presence shall include, for a period of one year, a United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (the acronym MINURCAT is to be used in all languages), with the following mandate in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, in liaison with the United Nations country team:

Security and protection of civilians

(a) To select, train, advise and facilitate support to elements of the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire referred to in paragraph 5;

(b) To liaise with the national army, the gendarmerie and police forces, the nomad national guard, the judicial authorities and prison officials in Chad and the Central African Republic to contribute to the creation of a more secure environment;

(c) To liaise with the Chadian Government and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in support of their efforts to relocate refugee camps which are in close proximity to the border, and to provide to UNHCR, on availability and cost-reimbursable basis, logistical assistance for that purpose;

(d) To liaise closely with the Sudanese Government, the African Union, the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) which will succeed it, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), the Multinational Force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (FOMUC) and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) to exchange information on emerging threats to humanitarian activities in the region;

Human rights and the rule of law

(e) To contribute to the monitoring and to the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence, and to recommend action to the competent authorities, with a view to fighting impunity;

(f) To support, within its capabilities, efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic and civil society through training in international human rights standards, and efforts to put an end to recruitment and use of children by armed groups;

(g) To assist the Governments of Chad and, notwithstanding the mandate of BONUCA, the Central African Republic in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system, in close coordination with United Nations agencies;

3. *Decides* that MINURCAT shall include a maximum of 300 police and 50 military liaison officers and an appropriate number of civilian personnel;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General and the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic to conclude status-of-forces agreements for MINURCAT as soon as possible, taking into account General Assembly resolution 59/47 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, General Assembly resolution 60/42 on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and General Assembly resolution 61/133 on the Safety and Security of Humanitarian

Personnel and the Protection of United Nations Personnel, and notes that the model status-of-forces agreement of 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally pending the conclusion of such an agreement with one or other of the countries;

5. *Endorses* the police concept referred to in the report of the Secretary-General, including the provisions regarding the establishment of the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire (PTPH), which would be dedicated exclusively to maintaining law and order in refugee camps, sites with concentrations of internally displaced persons and key towns in neighbouring areas and to assisting in securing humanitarian activities in eastern Chad, and, in this regard, *encourages* the Government of Chad to establish the PTPH, *emphasizes* the urgent need to provide logistical and financial support to the PTPH and *requests* the Secretary-General to mobilize member States and institutional donors for this purpose;

6. *Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

(a) *Authorizes* the European Union to deploy, for a period of one year from the date that its initial operating capability is declared by the European Union in consultation with the Secretary-General, an operation (hereinafter referred to as “the European Union operation”) aimed at supporting the elements referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4, and *decides* that this operation shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, to fulfil the following functions, in accordance with the arrangement to be concluded between the European Union and the United Nations, in liaison with the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic:

- (i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;
- (ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;
- (iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel;

(b) *Authorizes* the European Union operation, at the close of the period referred to in subparagraph a, to take all appropriate measures to achieve an orderly disengagement, by means including fulfilment of the functions indicated in subparagraph a, and within the limits of its residual capacity;

7. *Invites* the European Union, as may be required for the proper execution of the mandate of its operation, to take part in the liaison and support activities referred to in paragraphs 2 (b) to 2 (d);

8. *Invites* the European Union operation to immediately take all appropriate measures to prepare its full operational capability and *requests* the Secretary-General to coordinate closely with the European Union particularly with regard to those arrangements required to ensure appropriate protection for United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and ensure freedom of movement of United Nations staff;

9. *Requests* the European Union, the Secretary-General and the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic to cooperate closely throughout the period of deployment of the European Union operation, until its complete disengagement;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to it, after due consultations with the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic, six months from the date indicated in paragraph 6, subparagraph a, on the arrangements for following up the intended European Union operation which has been authorized for a one-year period, including a possible United Nations operation, depending on the developments in the situation, and *notes* that, to that end, the United Nations and the European Union shall perform an evaluation of needs before the date in question;

11. *Invites* the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic and the European Union to conclude status-of-forces agreements as soon as possible for the operation referred to in paragraph 6;

12. *Requests* the European Union to report to the Security Council, in the middle and at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6, subparagraph a, above, on how its operation will fulfil its mandate;

13. *Calls upon* all the parties to cooperate fully in the deployment and operations of MINURCAT and the European Union operation, including by guaranteeing the security and freedom of movement of their personnel and associated personnel;

14. *Urges* all the Member States, particularly the States bordering Chad and the Central African Republic, to facilitate the delivery to Chad and the Central African Republic freely, without obstacles or delay of all personnel, equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, intended for MINURCAT and the European Union operation;

15. *Encourages* the respective Governments of the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic to ensure that their territories are not used to undermine the sovereignty of others and to cooperate actively with a view to implementing the Tripoli Agreement and other agreements aimed at ensuring security along their common borders;

16. *Encourages* the authorities and political stakeholders in Chad and the Central African Republic to pursue their efforts of national dialogue, with respect for the constitutional frameworks;

17. *Reaffirms* the obligation of all parties to implement fully the rules and principles of international humanitarian law, particularly those regarding the protection of humanitarian personnel, and furthermore *requests* all the parties involved to provide humanitarian personnel with immediate, free and unimpeded access to all persons in need of assistance, in accordance with applicable international law;

18. *Takes note* of the measures already undertaken by the authorities of Chad to put an end to the recruitment and use of children by armed groups, *encourages* them to pursue their cooperation with United Nations bodies, particularly UNICEF, and *calls on* all the parties involved to ensure that children are protected;

19. *Exhorts* the donor community to redouble its efforts to address the humanitarian, reconstruction and development needs of Chad and the Central African Republic;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep it informed of the liaison arrangements set out in OP2-b to 2-d above, and to report regularly on the security and humanitarian situation, including movements of refugees and internally displaced persons, in eastern Chad, the north-eastern Central African Republic and the region, of progress towards the objective of helping to create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons and of the implementation of the mandate of MINURCAT, and to submit to it a report on that matter every three months;

21. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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